PostLaborEconomics
Charts
41 charts from the Post-Labor Economics research. Click a chart for the full-size file.
Data
American Housing Construction Starts per 100,000 People
U.S. housing construction starts per 100,000 people, from about 1900 to the 2020s: a mid-century peak, a collapse in the early 1930s, another low around 2010, and a partial recovery since.
Civilian Employment, Seasonally Adjusted
U.S. civilian employment, seasonally adjusted, October 2004 to October 2024 (Bureau of Labor Statistics): dips around 2009, a plunge in 2020, then new highs.
Civilian Labor Force Participation Rate
U.S. civilian labor force participation rate, seasonally adjusted (Bureau of Labor Statistics): a slide from about 66% to about 63%, a brief plunge in 2020, then a partial recovery.
Cost vs Utility per Token (2020–2025)
Cost per 1,000 tokens (log scale) against capability (MMLU score), 2020–2025: cost falls more than a hundredfold while the score roughly doubles.
Labor Share of U.S. Non-Farm Business Income
Labor’s share of U.S. non-farm business income, 1950–2023: a slow slide with a recovery around 2000, then a sharp drop in the 2000s.
Manufacturing Employment Share of U.S. Jobs
Manufacturing’s share of U.S. non-farm employment, 1950–2023: a steady fall from about 30% to about 8%.
Prime-Age (25–54) Male Labor-Force Participation, U.S.
Labor-force participation of U.S. men aged 25–54, 1950–2023: a long decline from about 98% to the high 80s, with a slight uptick at the end.
Real Value of the U.S. Federal Minimum Wage
The U.S. federal minimum wage in 2019 dollars, from 1968 to 2023: its real value peaks in 1968 and trends down since, apart from a rise around 2009.
Top 1% Wealth Share, UK vs. U.S. (Approximate)
Approximate share of household wealth held by the top 1%, 1895–2015: the UK’s falls steeply through the century, while the U.S. share falls until the 1980s and then rebounds.
U.S. Farm Employment vs. Real Output, 1910–2015
U.S. farm employment, 1910–2015, falls from about 13.6 million to about 2.4 million, steepest from 1950 to 1975, while real agricultural output keeps rising.
U.S. Manufacturing Employment vs. Output, 1925–2025
Illustrative decade-by-decade points: U.S. manufacturing employment peaks around 1979 and then falls, while real manufacturing output climbs steadily throughout.
U.S. Productivity vs Typical Pay (1979 = 100)
U.S. net productivity against nonsupervisory compensation, indexed to 1979 = 100, through the early 2020s: productivity rises far faster than pay, and the gap keeps widening.
U.S. Union Density Over Time
The U.S. union membership rate, 1955–2023: a fall from about a third of workers to about a tenth.
Youth (16–24) Labor-Force Participation vs. Industrial Phases
Labor-force participation of 16- to 24-year-olds, 1948–2020s: a rise to the late 1970s, a plateau, then a fall to a low in 2020, with shading for the third to fifth industrial revolutions.
Projections and models
Aggressive Ramp-Up Scenario for U.S. Humanoid Robots (2024–2050)
An aggressive scenario for cumulative U.S. humanoid robots (log scale): deployment starts in 2028 and passes a 57-million target around 2041.
Credential Inflation: Median Schooling for Entry-Level Work
Median years of schooling required for entry-level work, 1800–2045, against the levels from primary school to doctorate: a steady rise from about 3 years to about 18.5 years by 2045.
Estimated and Projected U.S. Jobs Displaced by Automation (1950–2045)
Estimated U.S. jobs displaced by automation each year, 1950–2025, rising to about 1 million, with projections to 2045 under linear and exponential acceleration.
Estimated Annual U.S. Jobs Displaced by Automation (1950–2025)
Estimated U.S. jobs displaced by automation each year, 1950–2025: a long climb with a dip around 2010, reaching about 1 million a year by 2025.
Fastest Plausible Timelines to 1 Billion Humanoid Robots
Three scenarios for cumulative humanoid robots, 2025–2060: optimistic, central and conservative curves each cross 1 billion in the 2040s.
Forecast: Urban Office Space (2010–2045)
Forecast urban office space, 2010–2045: occupied space falls by about half as vacancy climbs, across a pandemic remote-work shift and later automation and humanoid-robot waves.
Illustrative AI-Induced Deflationary Pressures, 2025–2045
Illustrative AI-induced CPI impulse in annual percentage points, 2025–2045, split into a supply-side (productivity) effect and a larger demand-side (wage loss) effect, together approaching −10 by 2045.
Modeled Decline of AI Capability Jerk
Modeled AI capability “jerk” (the rate of change of acceleration), October 2023 to December 2027: an S-shaped fall toward zero, steepest during 2025.
Net Corporate Income Needed for a $60k Dividend
Net corporate income needed to fund a $60,000 annual dividend per adult, at effective corporate tax rates from 1% to 60%: the lower the rate, the larger the corporate base required.
Post-Labor Income Distribution
Illustrative annual income by source in a mature post-labor economy (2040s and later): universal basic income, public wealth-fund dividends, collectively owned assets, personal assets and residual wages.
Projected Adoption Curve for Computer-Using Agents (2024–2040)
Projected share of vulnerable keyboard-video-mouse (KVM) jobs taken over by computer-using agents, 2024–2040: an S-curve that stays low through 2028, rises steeply in the early 2030s and nears 100% by the late 2030s.
Projected Total Demand for Human Labor (U.S.)
Projected U.S. demand for human labor as a share of the 2025 workforce, 2025–2045: a fall to well under half, steepest between 2030 and 2035.
Projected Unit Cost of Medium-Utility Humanoid Robots
Projected unit cost of medium-utility humanoid robots (log scale), 2025–2060, under central, optimistic and conservative scenarios, all falling by roughly an order of magnitude.
Stylized Cumulative U.S. Job Displacement (1980–2025)
Stylized cumulative U.S. jobs displaced by globalization (trade and offshoring) and by automation, 1980–2025: trade losses plateau around 2010 while automation keeps climbing.
U.S. Humanoid Robots: Workforce and Household Thresholds
Projected cumulative U.S. humanoid robots (log scale) from 2028 to 2050, passing a 57-million workforce target around 2041 and the number of U.S. households (about 130 million) near 2048.
Utility Trajectories 2020–2035 under Five Scenarios
Utility per dollar (log scale), 2020–2035: a steep rise to 2025, then five scenarios, from “Worst” to “Snap,” spreading over several orders of magnitude by 2035.
Diagrams
Aggregate Demand (Household Income)
Aggregate demand as household income from three sources: wages (faded, with a downward arrow), property and transfers.
AI Pushing the Limits
Anton Korinek’s stylized distribution of tasks by complexity, with tasks automated by 2023 in gray. If complexity is unbounded, humans keep moving to harder tasks; if it is bounded, AI may overtake all human capabilities.
Algorithmic Rights
Algorithmic rights as a new central pillar, replacing labor rights, between property rights and democratic rights; its parts are data sovereignty, algorithmic auditability, participatory algorithmic governance, and algorithmic dividend and liability.
Blockchain Power
A pillar enclosing a chain, surrounded by four attributes: democratic, unstoppable, decentralized and permissionless.
Four Pillars of Civic Society
Four columns labeled people, state, businesses and banks, each topped by a matching icon.
Income Hierarchy in a Post-Labor Economy
Five tiers of post-labor income: universal basic income at the base, then public wealth-fund dividends, collectively owned private assets, personally accumulated assets, and residual wages at the top.
Jobs as Identity, Not Assets as Freedom
Text graphic: people are conditioned to see “jobs as identity,” not “assets as freedom.”
Labor Substitution
Labor substitution: an arrow from a human figure to a machine, with icons for better, faster, cheaper and safer.
Levers of Power
Three pillars of economic agency: labor rights (faded and cracked, with a downward arrow), property rights and democratic rights.
Property-Based Income
Income sources in a post-wage economy: UBI, wealth funds, private collective property and private wealth, with residual wages faded and marked by a downward arrow.
The Great Decoupling
Definition card: Post-Labor Economics acknowledges the irreversible decoupling of GDP growth from wage employment and builds institutions that turn the productivity surplus into broad, property-based income streams.