

POST-LABOR ECONOMICS · RESEARCH CATALOGUE

Post-Labor Household Income Interventions

A consolidated superset of programs implemented or tested worldwide, from citizen dividends and asset accounts to worker ownership, guaranteed income, conditional and emergency cash, and public jobs

213

INTERVENTIONS

78

CAPITAL

117

TRANSFERS

18

WAGE-ADJACENT

119

OPERATING TODAY

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October 2026 · Figures as of 4 October 2026

Companion to Funding Universal High Income (white paper v02)

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OVERVIEW

Key findings

213 household-income interventions have been implemented or tested worldwide: 78 route income through capital, 117 through transfers and 18 through wage-adjacent supports. 119 operate today; most of the rest are pilots or one-off payments.

1

Assets outlast the programs that create them.

When transfers or collectively held funds ended, households kept nothing: Mincome, Prospera, the 2021 US Child Tax Credit and Sweden's wage-earner funds. Where title passed to households, the asset outlived the program: 2.05 million Right to Buy homes in England, land-reform titles in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, and 2.9 million UK Child Trust Fund accounts still open.

2

Modest unconditional payments barely reduce work.

Alaska's dividend left employment unchanged, and Finland and Germany found no withdrawal. Work falls more with large payments (participation down 4.2 points in the OpenResearch trial), income-tested top-ups (Seoul, Italy), and pensions and child benefits among older people and mothers. The clearest dependence evidence is disability-insurance receipt passing from parents to children.

3

Transfers are well measured; ownership is not.

Half of wage-adjacent entries and 41% of transfer entries carry randomized or quasi-experimental evidence, against 10% of capital entries. No causal study was found for most capital dividends, for England's Right to Buy or Iran's Justice Shares, or for Trump Accounts.

4

White paper v02 needs five corrections.

Norway's fund is about 4.1 times GDP, not 4.5; New Mexico's permanent funds hold USD 61.2 billion, not about USD 75 billion; the bottom half of households holds 0.6% of equities, not 1.1%; labor's share of income peaked at 58.4% (1970), not about 65%; and no Alaska borough pays residents a municipal dividend. The full cross-check is in the Sources section.

OVERVIEW

Scope, definitions and method

213 household-income interventions have been implemented or tested somewhere: 78 route income through capital, 117 through transfers and 18 through wage-adjacent supports. Figures and statuses are as of 4 October 2026.

Inclusion test. An entry qualifies only if money or assets reached households, or a randomized or quasi-experimental test ran. Proposals, laws that never paid out, and models are kept out of sections A to I and listed once, with the reason, under Excluded.

Channel	What carries the income	Sections
Capital	Households own the claim: citizen dividends from public wealth, individual asset accounts, shares in firms, land	A, B, C
Transfers	Government or philanthropy pays cash: universal, guaranteed-minimum, conditional, emergency, and the pilots that tested them	D, E, F, G, H
Wages	Earned income, including state-funded jobs and wage supplements; kept in adjacent scope only	I

Mark	Meaning in the tables
W	Already in the v02 white paper (Funding Universal High Income, September 2026)
+	Added from research for this document
A	Evidence grade: randomized or quasi-experimental results published
B	Evidence grade: administrative-data or natural-experiment evidence at scale, no randomization
C	Evidence grade: descriptive or advocacy-led reporting only, or too early for results

Status values are Operating, Operating (modified), Ended, One-off, Pilot completed and Pilot running. A fact that could not be confirmed on an opened source is marked (unverified) where it stands.


Inputs. The v02 white paper and the project's saved notes. Every program and figure the white paper names appears below as a row or in the white-paper cross-check. The notes set this stream's goal, a superset of interventions that move household income from wages to capital and transfers, but name no programs. The project holds no other files, and white paper version 1 was not provided. All rows rest on pages opened on 4 October 2026; rows from the first research pass were re-verified in a second, independent pass. Links sit in the name cell or beside each figure.

OVERVIEW

At a glance

Of the 213 entries, 119 operate today, 83 as designed and 36 in modified form. Another 41 are pilots (37 completed, 4 running), 26 programs have ended and 27 were one-off payments. Established programs mostly survive in both channels: 60 of 78 capital entries and 46 of the 53 entries in families D, E and G, most of them national programs, still operate; the transfer channel's lower overall share comes from its pilots and one-off payments. Measurement is uneven: half of wage-adjacent entries (9 of 18) and 41% of transfer entries (48 of 117) carry grade A evidence, against 10% of capital entries (8 of 78). Twenty-one entries come from the white paper; the other 192 were added here.

Figure 1. 119 of 213 interventions operate today; most of the rest are pilots or one-off payments



Status column of the 213 entries in sections A to I. Operating = as designed or modified; pilots = completed or still running.

What each family pays, its largest or longest-running programs, and its best-measured result:

Family	What the household holds or receives	Largest or longest-running	Best-measured result
A. Citizen dividends and public wealth funds	A per-capita payment from a public or collective fund; funds that finance budgets pay households nothing directly	Alaska PFD since 1982 (A01); Osage headrights since 1906 (A40); Macao since 2008 (A04); Iran's energy-subsidy cash since 2010 (A06)	Alaska: no fall in employment, part-time work up 1.8 points (A01). Iran: transfers worth 29% of median household income did not reduce labor supply except among youth (A06)

Family	What the household holds or receives	Largest or longest-running	Best-measured result
B. Asset accounts, baby bonds and funded retirement accounts	An account in the member's name, seeded or matched by government or filled by mandatory contributions	Singapore's CPF (B04); Australian superannuation, AUD 4.8 trillion (B10); UK Child Trust Fund, 2005-2011 (B01); Trump Accounts since 2025 (B05)	SEED for Oklahoma Kids, randomized: USD 1,130 in assets against USD 76 at 30 months (B07)
C. Worker, community and broad-based ownership	Shares in the employer, co-op membership, or a one-time transfer of shares, land or homes	US ESOPs, 15.1 million participants (C01); French profit-sharing, 10.6 million employees (C09); land-to-the-tiller reforms in Japan, Korea and Taiwan (C13); England's Right to Buy, 2.05 million homes (C12)	France: mandatory profit-sharing raised the labour share 1.8 points with no significant effect on investment or productivity (C09)
D. Universal and quasi-universal cash	Unconditional cash for children or older people	Germany's Kindergeld since 1955 (D02); Poland's 800+ (D04); Mexico's 65+ pension, 13.7 million people (D08)	US 2021 monthly Child Tax Credit: very small, insignificant employment effects; child poverty (SPM) 5.2% in 2021 and 12.4% in 2022, after it expired (D01)
E. Guaranteed-minimum incomes and targeted unconditional cash	A means-tested top-up to a floor, or unconditional cash for a defined group	UK Universal Credit, 8.4 million people (E06); Spain's Ingreso Mínimo Vital, 860,458 households (E02); state transfers to women in 12 Indian states (E09)	Ireland's artists' basic income, allocated by lottery: arts income up EUR 500 a month, other income down EUR 280 (E11)
F. Pilots and randomized experiments	Time-limited cash for sampled households or villages	US negative income tax experiments, 1968-1980 (F02); GiveDirectly's 12-year Kenya basic income (F05); Finland, 2017-2018 (F14); OpenResearch, USD 1,000 a month for three years (F31)	Kenya: local multiplier 2.4, prices up 0.1% (F06). United States: labor participation down 4.2 points, income excluding transfers down USD 1,900 a year (F31)
G. Conditional and targeted cash at national scale	Cash conditioned on schooling, health visits or poverty status	Brazil's Bolsa Família (G01); Mexico's Prospera, 1997-2019 (G02); the Philippines' 4Ps (G04); Pakistan's BISP (G09)	Indonesia's PKH, randomized: stunting down 23-27% after six years (G05)
H. Emergency and one-off payments	A lump sum, usually universal or near-universal	US Economic Impact Payments, more than USD 800 billion (H01); Japan's JPY 100,000 per resident (H04)	Randomized payment timing in the US: 12-40% of the 2001 and 2008 rebates spent on nondurables within three months (H02, H03)
I. Public jobs, wage subsidies and in-work credits	A public job, a subsidized wage or an earnings-linked tax credit	India's MGNREGA, 2005-2026 (I01); US EITC, about 24 million workers and families (I16); German short-time work (I07)	Marienthal job guarantee: employment up 46 points (I05). MGNREGA, randomized implementation: earnings up 14%, poverty down 26% (I01)

CAPITAL · SECTION A

A. Citizen dividends and public wealth funds

Only Alaska (since 1982; USD 1,200 in 2026) and Macao (since 2008; MOP 10,000 a year for permanent residents since 2019, set in each year's budget) pay every eligible resident a recurring per-capita sum; Maricá and Niterói in Brazil pay income-tested residents from oil royalties. Kazakhstan has credited half of its sovereign National Fund's investment income to accounts for 6.9 million children since 2024. Membership payouts are narrower: Osage headrights since 1906, Alaska Native corporations since 1971 and tribal gaming per-capita payments since 1988. The largest public funds, led by Norway's NOK 22.7 trillion fund, pay budgets, not households. Energy and carbon revenue has also been recycled as near-universal cash (Iran since 2010, Canada 2018-2025) or as a credit against health-insurance premiums (Switzerland since 2008).

Grade **A** randomized or quasi-experimental · **B** administrative or natural-experiment evidence · **C** descriptive or too early · **W** in white paper v02 · + added here


Per-capita dividends and account credits from public or collective wealth

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
A01 Alaska Permanent Fund and Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) Alaska, United States 1982-present Operating (modified)	Eligible residents receive an annual dividend: \$1,702 (2024), \$1,000 (2025), \$1,200 including \$200 energy relief (2026). Funded by a 5% draw on the royalty-funded Permanent Fund's average market value; legislature sets the amount.	Fund \$91.9B at 30 Jun 2026 (\$85.1B at 30 Jun 2025); FY2026 draw \$3.8B, FY2027 \$4.0B. 618,863 recipients in 2025. 2026 payments scheduled 1 Oct (direct deposit) and 22 Oct 2026 (checks).	Jones and Marinescu 2022 , synthetic control on CPS data: no effect on employment; part-time work up 1.8 percentage points (17%). Watson, Guettabi and Reimer 2019 , SSRN working paper: an extra \$1,000 cuts child obesity probability by up to 4.5 points (about 22%) in middle-income households; no effect detected for low or high incomes.	A W
A40 Osage Mineral Estate headright payments (Osage Nation) Osage Nation Reservation (Osage County), Oklahoma, United States 1906-present (Osage payment series from 1880) Operating	Headright holders (shareholders in the Osage Mineral Estate, administered under the Act of June 28, 1906, 34 Stat. 539) receive quarterly distributions of oil and gas royalty income; shareholder payment US\$6,230 for September 2026.	Estate: about 1,475,000 acres (Osage County). Per full headright: US\$3,570 (March 2020), US\$2,950 (June 2020), US\$4,190 (Q2 2025), US\$3,625 (Q3 2025); shareholder payment US\$6,230 (September 2026). 2025 proposal: Minerals Council to take over non-trust functions.	No causal evaluation. Payments move with oil prices: June 2020 checks fell to US\$2,950 with WTI near US\$33 a barrel, a production glut and COVID-19 (Osage News 2020); shareholders raised concerns over falling payments in 2025 (Osage News 2025).	C +
A02 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) regional and village corporations Alaska, United States 1971-present Operating	1971 settlement (\$962.5M, about 45 million acres) created 12 regional and 200+ village corporations that pay shareholder dividends. Section 7(i) pools 70% of resource net profits; 7(j) passes half to villages and at-large shareholders.	138,000+ enrolled shareholders and over \$3B cumulative dividends (FY2018 data); 110,000+ resident and 42,000 non-resident shareholders (May 2026). CIRI 2026: \$48 per share a year; elder payments \$600 a quarter.	No causal evidence on household outcomes. Colt 2001 : the 12 regional corporations lost 80% of their original cash endowment (about \$380M) in direct business operations, 1973-1993; shareholder-employment benefits were important in only three firms. Dividends rose from \$20-\$200 per 100 shares early on to \$300-\$3,700 in FY2018 (ANCSA Regional Association).	C +

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
A03 US tribal per-capita distributions from gaming revenue (IGRA 1988), including Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians United States (EBCI: North Carolina) 1988-present Operating	IGRA allows per capita payments from net gaming revenue only under a Secretary-approved plan protecting minors; payments taxable. EBCI splits gaming revenue 50/50 between government and citizens, paid June and December (\$7,007 each, December 2018).	Indian gaming gross revenue \$46.2B in FY2025 (+5.3%): 545 establishments, 246 tribes, 29 states (NIGC). EBCI: 15,779 members paid December 2018, over \$12,000 each that year; annual Qualla Enterprises per capita from April 2026.	Costello et al. 2003 : 1,420 children; payments moved 14% of families out of poverty; conduct and oppositional symptoms fell to never-poor levels, anxiety and depression unchanged. Akee et al. 2010 : \$4,000 more a year for poorest households adds one year of schooling by 21; minor crime at 16-17 down 22%. Akee et al. 2018 : better emotional-behavioral health and personality traits.	A+
A04 Macao Wealth Partaking Scheme Macao SAR, China 2008-present Operating (modified)	Government pays eligible residents an annual sum set by administrative regulation: MOP 5,000/3,000 (permanent/non-permanent) in 2008, MOP 10,000/6,000 since 2019. From 2025, 183+ days in Macao the prior year required, with exemptions.	2024: about MOP 7.30 billion paid, 580,000+ by bank transfer and 161,000 by cheque. 2026 round scheduled 1-28 July 2026 by transfer and cheque.	No causal evaluation of household outcomes. The 2025 residence test exempts persons under 22 with eligible parents and disability pension or allowance recipients (gov.mo).	C+
A04b Macao Central Provident Fund special allocation from budget surplus Macao SAR, China 2010-present Operating	Permanent residents aged 22+ with 183+ days in Macao receive a budget-surplus allocation into government-managed provident sub-accounts: MOP 7,000 in 2025, plus a one-time MOP 10,000 basic fund for first-time recipients.	Allocations made for every year since 2010; 2025 deposits from 25 Sep 2025; 2026 allocation claimable until 31 Dec 2029. Number of accounts and total allocated (unverified).	No causal evaluation of household outcomes.	C+
A11 National Fund for Children program (Kazakhstan) Kazakhstan 2024-present Operating	Half of the National Fund's annual investment income is credited in equal US-dollar amounts to special savings accounts for minors; from age 18 the money can pay for housing or education.	Accruals per child: \$100.52 (2024), \$129.38 (2025), \$130.71 (2026); about 6.9 million children; \$2.3B over three years. By June 2026, 297,000 applications approved for housing or education.	Too early for outcome evidence; no evaluation. Use at 18 by June 2026: housing over 187,000 applications for over \$33M, education over 110,000 for over \$19M; over \$238.5M moved to accounts of adults; balance per child since launch \$370.56 including investment income (Government of Kazakhstan).	C+
A05 Mongolia Human Development Fund cash transfers and Erdenes Tavan Tolgoi citizen shares Mongolia 2010-2012 (universal cash transfers); 2011-present (citizen shares) Operating (modified)	Human Development Fund (2010) paid citizens MNT 21,000 a month in 2010-2012, replacing annual MNT 120,000 transfers; mining revenue covered about half, borrowing the rest. 2011: free Erdenes Tavan Tolgoi shares (20% of company).	HDF spending peaked in 2012 at up to 18% of government revenue; universal payments stopped after 2012 elections. ETT: 536 shares each to 2.796M citizens (2011); 2020 dividend up to MNT 96,480 to 1.08M holders.	No causal evaluation. NRGI 2020 : mining revenue covered about half of HDF spending, the rest borrowed; MNT 1.071 trillion of HDF debt moved to the Future Heritage Fund (2016 law); children kept MNT 20,000 a month (Child Money Programme). Share buybacks: MNT 491,960 tuition for half the shares (2011), MNT 300,426 for one-third (2016).	C+
A10 Renda Básica de Cidadania (RBC), Maricá, paid in the Mumbuca social currency Maricá, Rio de Janeiro state, Brazil 2013-present (Renda Mínima Mumbuca from 2013; RBC from 2019) Operating	Residents of 3+ years earning up to three minimum wages get a monthly individual payment in mumbucas, a local digital currency at par with the real: 130 mumbucas a month from 2019, 200 from May 2022. Oil-royalty funded.	About 93,000 beneficiaries of roughly 200,000 residents (Oct 2024), up from 42,000 (2020-22). Oil royalties about 66.8% of municipal revenue (2022 estimate). Sovereign fund (Dec 2017) above R\$1B (2022). 2025-26 amount unverified.	UFF and JFI 2024 : surveys of 3,000+ people comparing recipients with non-recipients, not randomized: household income +9%, consumption +5%; other income fell, mainly labor income; larger gains for female-headed households and households with minors. School-work hours and routine doctor visits rose but results not robust.	B+

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
A43 Moeda Social Arariboia (Niterói social-currency cash transfer) Niterói, Rio de Janeiro state, Brazil 2021-present Operating	Low-income families in CadÚnico registry get monthly credits in arariboias, a digital currency spent at accredited local shops; from December 2025, R\$345 for the first member plus R\$125 per extra member, maximum R\$970; oil-royalty funded.	About 50,000 families (November 2025) and over 54,000 (September 2026), up from about 37,000 families and 92,000 people after the June 2023 expansion; R\$200M a year (2023). Christmas extra payment 14 December 2026.	No impact evaluation. Oliveira, Sanches and Gonzalez (FGV EAESP) , qualitative study (documents 2020-2022, fieldwork 2022-2023) in the International Journal of Community Currency Research: the city took an autonomous role in basic income policy.	C+
A12 Bonosol (Bono Solidaridad), Bolivia Bolivia 2003-2007 under the 2002 Bonosol law (1997 origin unverified) Ended	One annual payment of Bs 1,800 for life to resident citizens aged 65+ born before 1 Jan 1974, financed from the privatization of state-owned enterprises (2002 law, implemented 2003); adjusted every five years.	Ended 2007. Replaced from 2008 by the universal Renta Dignidad (2007 law), financed by hydrocarbon taxes and public-enterprise dividends. Bonosol beneficiary numbers, total cost and 1997-2002 payments unverified.	No Bonosol evaluation confirmed; household-level studies unverified.	C+

Figure 2. Alaska paid USD 1,000 per resident in 2025; the statutory formula implied about USD 3,900



Alaska PFD Division, *Summary of Dividend Applications and Payments, 1982-2025*, and PFD Division homepage for 2026. Amounts as listed: 2022 includes the USD 662 energy relief payment and 2026 the USD 200 energy relief; the separate 2008 Resource Rebate of USD 1,200 is not included. 2025 formula figure from Alaska Beacon.

The fund kept growing, to \$91.9 billion at 30 June 2026 (row A01). The dividend fell because, since the 2016 veto, legislators have paid for state services first from the same 5% draw and set the dividend from what is left.

One-off surplus and windfall dividends

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
A08 Kuwait 2011 citizen grant (KD 1,000 plus free food rations) and Future Generations Fund Kuwait 2011-2012 (grant and food rations); 1976-present (Future Generations Fund) One-off	KD 1,000 to each citizen born before 1 Feb 2011 and free staple foods to 31 Mar 2012, from state general reserves. Future Generations Fund (1976 decree) saves at least 10% of state revenue.	Grant: KD 1,000 each to 1.12 million (Gulf News) or 1.155 million (BIEN) citizens; cost about \$4B (Gulf News), over \$5B (BIEN). KIA assets estimated at 640% of GDP end-2025. Later one-off grants: unverified.	No evaluation. Occasion: 50th anniversary of independence, 20th of liberation and 5th of the emir's rule; budget surpluses in each of the prior 11 fiscal years (Gulf News). IMF Country Report 26/52: 2025 bond issuance finances deficits and replenishes the General Reserve Fund.	C ⁺
A09 Alberta Resource Rebate 2005-06 ('Prosperity Bonus', 'Ralph Bucks') and Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund Alberta, Canada 2006 (rebate); Heritage Fund ongoing One-off	C\$400 per Albertan, paid from January 2006 as a refundable tax credit after record resource revenue (C\$13.2B forecast 2005-06). The same surplus put C\$1.6B into the Heritage Fund and endowments.	About 3.25 million recipients; cost C\$1.3B (2005 fiscal update) or C\$1.4B (CTV News 2020). Heritage Fund external assets C\$12.3B book value forecast for 2005-06; 2025-26 value unverified.	No evaluation. Critics preferred ending health-care premiums (C\$884M a year) or an endowment; oil prices fell in 2008 and Alberta ran deficits in all but one later year to 2020 (CTV News 2020).	C ⁺
A42 Saskatchewan Affordability Tax Credit (2022) and Alberta Affordability Payments (2023) Saskatchewan and Alberta, Canada 2022 (Saskatchewan); 2023 (Alberta) One-off	Saskatchewan: C\$500 to each resident 18+ who filed a 2021 return, from higher resource revenue (2022). Alberta: up to C\$600 over six months per senior, child or core-support client, household income under C\$180,000 (2023).	Saskatchewan: about 900,000 eligible adults, C\$450M, paid fall 2022 as the 2022-23 surplus forecast reached C\$1.04B. Alberta: more than one million Albertans scheduled; applications 18 January-30 June 2023; total cost unverified.	No evaluation. Saskatchewan's 2022-23 first-quarter update raised non-renewable resource revenue C\$1.86B on higher potash and oil prices; the province also retired up to C\$1B of debt (Saskatchewan 2022).	C ⁺
A41 Singapore Growth Dividends (2008 and 2011) Singapore 2008; 2011 One-off	One-off cash to adult citizens, tiered by income and home value. 2011: S\$600-S\$800 for 80%, S\$100-S\$300 for higher income or wealth (Widerquist 2011); part of Budget 2011's S\$3.2B Grow and Share Package.	2011: 2.5 million citizens notified from 5 April 2011; Growth Dividends and Medisave top-ups worth S\$2B paid from 1 May 2011; over 90% signed up by June 2011. 2008: seniors got up to S\$200 extra.	No evaluation. MOF illustrations of all Budget 2011 benefits: about S\$3,500 for a lower-income two-generation household in a 3-room flat and S\$4,000 for a middle-income three-generation household in a 5-room flat (MOF 2011).	C ⁺
A13 Singapore: Net Investment Returns Contribution (NIRC), GST Voucher cash, SG60 Vouchers (2025) Singapore 2012-present (GST Voucher); 2025-2026 (SG60 Vouchers); NIRC ongoing Operating	NIRC: up to 50% of expected long-term real returns on constitutionally specified reserve assets plus up to 50% of other net investment income funds the Budget. Households get GST Voucher cash and one-off vouchers.	NIRC S\$28.48B (3.4% of GDP) in FY2026 estimate, S\$27.53B FY2025. GSTV Cash S\$850 or S\$450 (Aug 2026). SG60 Vouchers S\$600 or S\$800 to about 3 million adult citizens, valid to end-2026.	No causal evaluation. FY2026 Budget lines: GST Voucher Fund spending S\$2,648M, Cost-of-Living Special Payment S\$685M, CDC Vouchers S\$700M, SG60 Vouchers S\$53M (MOF FY2026 analysis). GSTV Cash requires assessable income up to S\$39,000 and home annual value up to S\$31,000 (GovBenefits).	C ⁺

Energy-price and carbon dividends

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
A06 Targeted Subsidies Reform cash transfers (Subsidy Reform Law of 2010), Iran Iran 2010-present Operating (modified)	From Dec 2010, 455,000 rials per person a month (about \$90 PPP), financed by raising energy and bread prices; deficits were money-financed. Now top decile excluded, 3-4 million rials a month plus food e-vouchers.	About 70 million recipients in 2011. CPI rose nearly 28-fold 2010-2025; transfer was 3% of median income by 2019. Aug 2026: deciles 1-4 get 4,000,000 rials, 5-8 get 3,000,000; Kala Barg 10,000,000 rials a month.	Salehi-Isfahani and Mostafavi-Dehzoeei 2017 (ERF WP 1090), panel fixed effects and difference-in-differences on timing of receipt: transfers worth 29% of median household income did not reduce labor supply except among youth; service-sector workers worked more hours. Authors' summary: positive effects for women and the self-employed.	A ⁺

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
A07 Citizen Account Program (Citizen's Account), Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia 2017-present Operating (modified)	Monthly cash deposits to eligible registered Saudi households (heads and dependents), full or partial support; wealth-based eligibility criteria added by 2025. Average SAR 1,476 per family, January 2025.	First payment Dec 2017: SAR 2B to 10.6M beneficiaries. Jan 2025 (86th): SAR 3.1B to 10M (2M+ households); SAR 229B paid since launch. IMF (Aug 2025): focus shifting to means-tested Damaan program.	No causal evaluation. IMF 2025 Article IV : wealth-based eligibility improves targeting; shifting focus to the means-tested Damaan program is expected to contain spending. Nov 2019: SAR 2.6B to 12.6M individuals, SAR 58.2B paid since launch (Arab News).	C ⁺
A14 Canada Carbon Rebate (formerly Climate Action Incentive and Climate Action Incentive Payment) Canada (Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland and Labrador) 2018-2025 Ended	Paired with the federal fuel charge: refundable credit on 2018-2020 tax returns, then quarterly payments per individual, spouse (half) and child (quarter), plus a rural supplement raised from 10% to 20% in 2024.	2024-25 quarterly base per individual: AB CAD 225, SK 188, MB 150, NL 149, ON 140, PE 110, NS 103, NB 95 (CRA). Final payment April 2025; total paid and recipients (unverified).	No causal evaluation of household outcomes cited.	C ⁺
A14b Switzerland CO2 levy redistribution to the population Switzerland 2008-present Operating	CO2 levy (first levied 2008) of CHF 120 per tonne since 2022. Two-thirds of proceeds return to population and business; residents' share is offset against health insurance premiums; one-third funds building and renewable energy measures.	Refund per person CHF 64.20 in 2024 and CHF 61.80 in 2025; 2026 amount (unverified). Number of recipients (unverified).	No causal evidence on household outcomes.	C ⁺
A14c Austria Klimabonus Austria 2022-2024 Ended	Annual payment: EUR 500 per adult and EUR 250 per child under 18 paid for 2022; from 2023 a base amount plus regional supplement of 0-100% by infrastructure category; children half; restricted mobility: top supplement.	About 8.6 million recipients for 2022 (7.4 million by bank transfer, 1.2 million by postal voucher). Paid for 2022-2024 only; past claims accepted until 31 Dec 2027. 2023-24 amounts and total cost (unverified).	No causal evaluation of household outcomes cited.	C ⁺
A14d California Climate Credit California, United States 2014 (unverified) to present Operating (modified)	Residential customers of PG&E, SCE, SDG&E and smaller utilities receive bill credits; funding from cap-and-trade allowance proceeds (unverified). 2026 electric: PG&E \$36.18, SCE \$36.00, SDG&E \$49.36 in each of August and September.	2026 gas credit in April: PG&E \$46.26, SoCalGas \$36.06, Southwest Gas \$45.57, SDG&E \$32.58 (2025: \$67, \$87, \$74, \$54). Gas credit moves to February from 2027. Recipients (unverified).	No causal evidence on household outcomes.	C ⁺

Public wealth funds that pay budgets, not households

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
A15 Government Pension Fund Global (Norway) Norway 1996-present (first deposit 1996; returns measured from 1998) Operating	Government inflows are invested worldwide. Fiscal rule (2001): budget transfers follow the expected real return, estimate cut from 4% to 3% in spring 2017; transfers cover almost 20% of the budget. No household payouts.	NOK 22,683 billion at 30 June 2026 (15,210 billion returns, 5,509 billion inflows, 1,965 billion currency); owns about 1.5% of listed shares worldwide, about 7,100 companies. Return 9.4% H1 2026, 15.1% in 2025.	No household-level causal evidence; the fund reaches households only through the budget. Net real return 4.50% a year since 1998 after management costs and inflation, 6.86% nominal in the currency basket, to 30 June 2026 (NBIM).	C ^W

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
A16 US state public wealth funds with no resident cash payout: Texas Permanent School Fund and Permanent University Fund, New Mexico permanent funds, North Dakota Legacy Fund, Wyoming Permanent Mineral Trust Fund United States (Texas, New Mexico, North Dakota, Wyoming) Texas PSF 1854-present; ND Legacy Fund 2010-present; others ongoing Operating	Land, royalty and severance revenues are invested permanently; earnings go to schools (Texas PSF over \$4.8 billion per biennium), universities (PUF, 2.1 million acres) or general funds (ND Legacy Fund), not to residents.	New Mexico permanent funds \$61.2B at 31 Dec 2025 (Land Grant \$38.0B, Severance Tax \$12.2B, Early Childhood \$11.0B). Wyoming PWMTF \$13.1B, 28 Feb 2026. Texas PSF over \$60B (undated). PUF, ND Legacy values (unverified).	No household-level evidence; the funds finance schools, universities and state budgets. ND Legacy Fund earnings transfers to the general fund: \$455.3M (2017-19), \$871.7M (2019-21), \$486.6M (2021-23), \$686.9M (2023-25) (ND Treasurer).	C W
A16b Alaska municipal public wealth funds: Anchorage MOA Trust Fund, North Slope Borough Permanent Fund, Valdez Permanent Fund Alaska, United States (Anchorage, North Slope Borough, Valdez) 1977-present (Valdez); 1984-present (North Slope Borough); 1999-present (Anchorage) Operating	Municipal endowments pay local budgets, not residents: Anchorage MOA Trust (1999, utility-sale proceeds) 4.00% of trailing average value; North Slope Borough fund (1984) up to 8%; Valdez fund (1977) principal held in trust.	MOA Trust \$483.2M at 31 Dec 2025, paid \$16.6M to the municipality in 2025. North Slope Borough Permanent Fund \$1.25B at 30 Jun 2025. Valdez Permanent Fund \$340.1M at 30 Jun 2026.	No household-level evidence; payouts finance municipal operations. None of the three funds pays residents, and a cash dividend to residents from any other Alaska borough or city is unverified. A 2005 state bill for a 'municipal dividend' (HB 28) would have paid municipalities, not residents, \$250 per resident.	C W
A17 Other national funds financing pensions or budgets: New Zealand Superannuation Fund, Chile Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (FEES) and Pension Reserve Fund (FRP), Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund New Zealand; Chile; Timor-Leste NZ 2003-present; Chile FRP 2006-present, FEES 2007-present; Timor-Leste ongoing Operating	NZ fund invests government contributions toward future superannuation. Chile: FEES covers deficits when growth or copper prices are low; FRP receives fiscal surplus up to 0.5% of GDP for pensions. Timor-Leste fund pays budget transfers.	NZ Super Fund NZ\$95.4 billion at 31 July 2026. Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund US\$18.29 billion at 31 Aug 2026. Chile FEES began with US\$2,580 million (2007), FRP with US\$604.5 million (2006); current values (unverified).	No household-level evidence; the funds finance pensions or budgets. NZ Super Fund return 10.2% a year since inception, before NZ tax and after costs (NZ Super Fund).	C +

CAPITAL · SECTION B

B. Individual asset accounts, baby bonds and funded retirement accounts

Governments have seeded or matched accounts that children own: UK 2005-2011, Hungary since 2006, Connecticut since 2023 and Trump Accounts since 2025; in Maine a private foundation has seeded every newborn's account since 2013. Mandatory retirement accounts give workers larger stakes: Singapore SGD 689 billion, Malaysia RM 1.41 trillion, Australia AUD 4.8 trillion. Automatic deposits reliably create assets; in the randomized SEED for Oklahoma Kids trial, treated children held USD 1,130 against USD 76 at 30 months. Matched savings that depend on voluntary deposits built little lasting wealth: Tulsa's homeownership gain faded, and learn\$ave left net worth unchanged.

Grade **A** randomized or quasi-experimental · **B** administrative or natural-experiment evidence · **C** descriptive or too early · **W** in white paper v02 · + added here

Child accounts and baby bonds

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
B01 UK Child Trust Fund (CTF) United Kingdom 2005-2011 (children born 1 Sep 2002 to 2 Jan 2011; legacy accounts still open) Ended	Government paid about GBP 250 into a child-named account (about GBP 500 for low-income or in-care children); family top-ups allowed; matures at 18. GBP 2.0 billion paid 2005-06 to 2011-12.	6.3 million accounts opened (NAO summary; NAO web page: about 6.1 million by April 2012), 28% set up by HMRC. 5 April 2026: about 2.9 million open; 827,000 matured accounts unclaimed (about 22%).	No randomised evaluation. NAO 2023 : 37% of accounts got non-government deposits in 2005-2010. HMRC 2026 : matured accounts claimed or transferred in 2025-26 averaged GBP 3,596; all accounts GBP 2,642 (April 2026). McKay, Tian and Lymer 2023 : eligible children held about GBP 426 more savings (Wealth and Assets Survey 2006-2018); quartile gap widened.	B W
B02 Junior ISA (JISA) United Kingdom 2011-present Operating	Children under 18 living in the UK and without a Child Trust Fund; savings limit GBP 9,000 a year (2026-27); child takes control at 16 and can withdraw at 18; no government deposit.	2024-25: about 1.6 million accounts subscribed to, GBP 2.5 billion subscribed (38.3% in cash), average GBP 1,570. 2023-24: 1.37 million accounts, GBP 1.8 billion, average GBP 1,347 (HMRC).	No causal evaluation; administrative counts only. Subscriptions rose from GBP 1.8 billion (2023-24) to GBP 2.5 billion (2024-25) and the average subscription from GBP 1,347 to GBP 1,570 (HMRC 2025 ; HMRC 2026).	C +
B05 Trump Accounts United States 2025-present (contributions from 4 Jul 2026) Operating	Treasury deposits USD 1,000 once for citizen children born 2025-2028 whose account is claimed (Form 4547 election); families add up to USD 5,000 a year; invested in American companies; locked until 18.	IRS, 31 Mar 2026: 4 million+ signed up, 1 million+ USD 1,000 pilot elections. Treasury, 22 Jul 2026: 6 million+ sign-ups before launch. 1 Oct 2026: 60 million+ further accounts auto-created, awaiting claim.	No outcome evidence; contributions opened 4 Jul 2026. Treasury: 86% of enrolled children are from families earning under USD 200,000 (Bessent, 22 Jul 2026). Dell pledge: USD 6.25 billion, USD 250 each for the first 25 million children aged 10 and under in ZIP codes with median income below USD 150,000 (White House). Related randomized evidence: SEED OK (B07).	C W
B06 Connecticut Baby Bonds (CT Baby Bonds) Connecticut, United States 2023-present (births from 1 Jul 2023) Operating	USD 3,200 invested for each baby born from 1 Jul 2023 with HUSKY (Medicaid) birth coverage; automatic; claimable at 18-30 after a financial literacy course, for a Connecticut home or business, education or retirement.	9 Jul 2025: over 33,000 children enrolled; USD 398 million initial investment (July 2023), USD 485 million assets. 15,000-16,000 eligible births a year. Projected value USD 11,000-24,000 at 18-30.	No outcome evaluation; the oldest enrolled children are about 3 and funds are locked until 18. Administrative counts only (CT Treasurer 2025). Funded upfront with about USD 400 million from a state reserve fund, covering 12 years of deposits (CT Mirror 2025).	C W

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
B20 Other US state and city child savings accounts: CalKIDS (California), San Francisco Kindergarten to College (K2C), Pennsylvania Keystone Scholars, Nevada College Kick Start California; San Francisco; Pennsylvania; Nevada 2011-present (K2C 2011; Keystone Scholars births from 2019; CalKIDS 2022) Operating	Seeds into 529-type accounts: CalKIDS USD 100 per newborn (births from July 2023) and USD 500 per eligible student; K2C USD 50 per public-school kindergartner; Keystone USD 100 per Pennsylvania baby, from 529 fund earnings.	CalKIDS, 30 Jun 2025: over 5.1 million accounts, over USD 2.16 billion state deposits, over 628,000 claimed. K2C: 57,000+ accounts, USD 19.6 million+ (May 2026). Nevada: expiry of unclaimed 2013-2014 cohort accounts on hold.	No randomized results for these programs. CalKIDS: about 12% of accounts claimed; linked ScholarShare 529 balances averaged USD 4,538 per family, up from USD 3,117 a year earlier (CalKIDS 2025). K2C: inaugural 2023 cohort about 600 seniors; those who saved since kindergarten averaged USD 1,422 (K2C).	C w
B33 Harold Alfond College Challenge (My Alfond Grant) Maine, United States 2008-present (automatic for births from 1 Jan 2013) Operating	The Alfond Scholarship Foundation, a non-profit, awards and invests USD 500 for every baby born a Maine resident since 1 Jan 2013; usable for post-secondary costs until age 28, otherwise forfeited to the foundation.	Spring 2026: over USD 90 million invested since 2013 for more than 180,000 Maine children. Births 2009-2012 qualified only if parents set up a NextGen 529 account before the first birthday.	No randomized evaluation. Automatic enrollment gives universal participation; parental opt-in was required before 2014 (CSD 2018). Grants for more than 180,000 children and over USD 90 million invested by spring 2026 (Alfond Grant FAQ). Policy brief on the first decade of automatic deposits: Quint and Clancy 2023 .	B +
B07 SEED for Oklahoma Kids (SEED OK) Oklahoma, United States 2007-2011 (deposits and matches; follow-up data through 2019) Pilot completed	2,704 Oklahoma newborns randomized (2007); treatment got an automatic USD 1,000 OK 529 deposit, USD 100 to open an own account, and an income-tested match up to USD 250 a year (2008-2011).	Experiment only: 1,358 treatment and 1,346 control children. Data through 2019: the USD 1,000 deposit almost doubled; investment earnings were 40% of treatment children's average OK 529 assets.	At 30 months average assets were USD 1,130 (treatment) vs USD 76 (control); individual 529 accounts 17.3% vs 2.4%; maternal depressive symptoms fell (effect size 0.11); social-emotional gains in disadvantaged subgroups (0.20-0.25) (Sherraden et al. 2015). By 2019 the accounts raised the share of children of color with any 529 assets by 98 points, vs 2% of controls (WashU 2021).	A +
B03 Singapore Baby Bonus Scheme: Cash Gift, Child Development Account (CDA) and First Step Grant Singapore Start year unverified to March 2027 (SG Child Support Package payouts from April 2027) Operating (modified)	Cash Gift SGD 11,000 (children 1-2) or 13,000 (3rd on); CDA First Step Grant SGD 5,000, or 10,000 for 3rd on (from 18 Feb 2025); government matches CDA savings up to SGD 4,000-15,000.	From April 2027 the SG Child Support Package replaces it: SGD 10,000 Baby Gift, SGD 5,000 CDA grant plus match up to SGD 5,000, SGD 2,000 yearly Child Credits (ages 1-16), SGD 10,000 PSEA top-up.	No causal evaluation of CDA saving effects is known; the MSF programme page sets out rules only (gift amounts, First Step Grant, matching caps by birth order: SGD 4,000, 7,000, 9,000, 9,000, 15,000).	C +
B08 Savings for Every Child (Israel) Israel 2017-present (start year unverified) Operating	National Insurance deposits NIS 58 a month (2026) into a savings plan for each child until 18; parents may add NIS 58 a month from the child allowance; a bank or provident fund manages it.	Operating; deposit NIS 58 a month per child from 1 Jan 2026; managers report deposits and returns to parents by 1 March each year. Number of accounts and total balances: unverified.	No causal evaluation is known; the National Insurance Institute page sets out rules only, with no take-up or balance statistics.	C +
B09 Canada Education Savings Grant (CESG) and Canada Learning Bond (CLB) for Registered Education Savings Plans Canada Operating (start years unverified); automatic RESP opening from April 2028 Operating (modified)	CESG: 20% of the first CAD 2,500 saved yearly in an RESP, up to CAD 100 more below CAD 117,045 family income (2026), lifetime CAD 7,200. CLB: deposits for low-income children without any family contribution.	From April 2028 the government will open RESPs automatically to deposit the CLB for eligible children born 2024 or later; earlier-born eligible children can request one from 2028. Take-up and asset totals: unverified.	No randomized evaluation of CESG or CLB is known; Learn\$ave (B23) gives experimental evidence on matched education saving. Additional CESG: 20% on the first CAD 500 below CAD 58,523 and 10% from CAD 58,523 to CAD 117,045 family income (2026) (ESDC).	C +

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
B32 Didim Seed Account (Didimssiat Tongjang; Child Development Account) South Korea 2007-present (start year unverified) Operating (modified)	Children under 18 in care, basic-livelihood, near-poor or single-parent households save monthly; public funds add KRW 2 per KRW 1, up to KRW 100,000 a month (2025); withdrawals from 18 for education, training or housing.	Eligibility widened in 2025 to near-poor and single-parent households. Children supported in Seoul: 3,207 (2024) to 44,682 (2025); Seoul budget KRW 3.7 billion to 27.6 billion. Andong: 1,114 children (April 2026).	No randomized evaluation; reporting is administrative. Children supported in Seoul rose from 3,207 (2024) to 44,682 (2025) and the budget 7.4-fold (Seoul 2025); Seoul projected about 41,000 additional children in 2025 (Asiae 2025); Andong passed 1,000 enrolled children in April 2026 (Kukinews 2026).	C ⁺
B34 Children and Youth Future Education and Development Account Taiwan 2017-present (children born from 1 Jan 2016) Operating	Children born from 2016 in low-income or middle-low-income households, or in long-term out-of-home care: the government deposits NTD 10,000 and matches family savings 1:1, up to NTD 15,000 a year (2017 rules); withdrawal from 18.	End-2024: 35,641 children with accounts; account-opening rate 64% (31% in 2017); balances NTD 2.63 billion including opening deposits, savings, matches and interest. Statute passed 15 May 2018.	No causal evaluation. Administrative data: opening rate among eligible children rose from 31% (2017) to 64% (2024) and balances from NTD 47.6 million to NTD 2.63 billion (MOHW statistics 2025). First year: 3,436 accounts, families saved NTD 23.2 million, average balance about NTD 18,500 (April 2018) (MOHW 2018).	B ⁺
B35 Life-start support (életkezdési támogatás), Treasury Start account and Babakötvény (baby bond) Hungary 2006-present (children born from 1 Jan 2006) Operating	State deposits HUF 42,500 per Hungarian child born from 2006; in a Treasury Start account it earns prior-year inflation plus 3 points (Babakötvény); family deposits get a 10% top-up, up to HUF 12,000 yearly.	302,000 children held Babakötvény worth nearly HUF 199 billion (end-2022); about 400,000 children (January 2025). Current Babakötvény rate 7.40%. Funds usable from age 18.	No causal evaluation. Treasury figures: 20.6% interest (about HUF 32 billion) credited February 2025; Treasury estimate that the HUF 42,500 grows to about HUF 121,000 by maturity in a Start account versus about HUF 74,000 in the default deposit account (economx 2025). Accounts: 302,000 at end-2022 (VG 2023).	B ⁺

Matched savings for low-income adults

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
B22 Individual Development Accounts: American Dream Demonstration Tulsa experiment and the federal Assets for Independence (AFI) program Tulsa, Oklahoma (experiment); United States (AFI) 1998-2003 (Tulsa experiment; follow-ups 2003 and 2009); AFI years unverified Pilot completed	Low-income savers' deposits were matched when withdrawn for qualified uses: 2:1 for home purchase, with education among other matched uses; AFI grants let nonprofits and government agencies run IDAs.	Tulsa: random assignment from 1998, three-year program ending 2003 with six months to use savings; follow-up surveys 2003 and 2009. AFI funding status: unverified.	Random assignment: baseline renters' homeownership was 7 points higher at the 4-year follow-up (11 points for renters in unsubsidized housing), but by 2009 the effect was small and not statistically significant (Grinstein-Weiss, Sherraden, Gale, Rohe, Schreiner and Key 2012).	A ⁺
B23 learn\$ave Individual Development Accounts project Canada (10 communities; experiment in Halifax, Toronto, Vancouver) Completed (final report 2010; enrolment years unverified) Pilot completed	Low-income adults (income up to 120% of the Low-income Cut-off, assets up to CAD 3,000) got CAD 3 in credits per CAD 1 saved, up to CAD 1,500 saved over three years; HRSDC funded.	About 4,800 participants in 10 communities, 3,583 in the randomized experiment (credits only; credits plus financial training and case management; control). Ended after the research period.	Random assignment: enrolment in education or training rose 13 points (69% vs 56% for controls); average deposits about CAD 1,100 over three years; no impact on average net worth (Leckie, Hui, Tattrie, Robson and Voyer 2010).	A ⁺
B21 Help to Save (UK) United Kingdom 2018-present Operating	Universal Credit claimants with take-home pay of GBP 1 or more save GBP 1-50 a month for 4 years; government adds 50p per GBP 1 saved, paid at the end of years 2 and 4.	April 2026: 293,600 open accounts; 656,700 opened in total; about 566,650 people have deposited, average GBP 48 a month; about GBP 88 million deposited in 2025-26. April 2025: 282,700 open (HMRC).	No causal evaluation; administrative counts only. Open accounts rose from 282,700 (April 2025) to 293,600 (April 2026); HMRC 2026 says this may reflect expansion of the scheme to all working Universal Credit claimants.	C ⁺

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
B18 Lifetime ISA (LISA) United Kingdom 2017-present (start year unverified) Operating	Adults who make a first payment before 40 save up to GBP 4,000 a year until 50; government adds a 25% bonus, maximum GBP 1,000 a year.	2025-26: 99,750 account holders withdrew to buy a first home, average withdrawal GBP 15,407 (HMRC, September 2026); 2024-25: 87,250 (HMRC, September 2025). Total accounts and bonus paid: unverified.	No causal evaluation; administrative counts only. First-home withdrawals rose from 87,250 account holders in 2024-25 (HMRC 2025) to 99,750 in 2025-26, average GBP 15,407 (HMRC 2026).	C +

Funded retirement accounts and provident funds

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
B04 Central Provident Fund (CPF) Singapore 1955-present (start year unverified) Operating (modified)	Citizens and permanent residents in work: from 1 Jan 2026 employer 17% plus employee 20% of wages (37%) at 55 and below, falling to 12.5% total above 70; individual accounts usable for housing and retirement.	June 2026: 4.3 million members, 163,628 employers, SGD 689 billion balances. April-June 2026: SGD 14.4 billion contributions, SGD 1.9 billion withdrawn for homes. SGD 23.6 billion interest credited in 2025.	No causal evaluation. Administrative data at scale: SGD 689 billion in individual balances for 4.3 million members and SGD 1.9 billion withdrawn for home purchase in one quarter (April-June 2026) (CPF statistics); contribution rates by age band (CPF).	B +
B30 Provident funds: Malaysia Employees Provident Fund (EPF, KWSP) and India Employees' Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) Malaysia; India Malaysia 1951-present, India 1952-present (start years unverified) Operating	Employers and employees pay a share of wages into individual accounts pooled and invested by a state fund, which credits an annual declared return: Malaysia 6.15% for 2025 (RM79.6 billion paid); India 8.25% for 2025-26.	Malaysia, end-2025: 18.1 million members, 10.6 million active, 640,391 active employers, RM1.409 trillion investment assets. India: over seven crore contributing members (June 2026).	No causal evaluation. Administrative data: Malaysia's EPF took in RM121.5 billion in 2025; 10.6 million of 18.1 million members were active; assets rose from RM1.25 trillion to RM1.41 trillion (FMT 2026 ; Borneo Post 2026). India's EPFO board kept 8.25% for 2025-26 (also 2023-24 and 2024-25), ratified 18 June 2026 (Statesman 2026 ; ETV Bharat 2026).	B +
B10 Australia Superannuation Guarantee Australia 1992-present (Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992) Operating (modified)	Employers pay 12% of earnings from 1 July 2025 (11.5% in 2024-25) into employees' super funds, up to a maximum contribution base; Payday Super requires payment each payday from 1 July 2026.	30 Jun 2026: AUD 4.8 trillion super assets (+9.5% from AUD 4,353.9 billion), AUD 3.4 trillion in APRA-regulated funds; 2025-26 contributions AUD 236.3 billion (employer 164.4); benefits AUD 148.2 billion (APRA, 31 Aug 2026).	No causal estimate; administrative data at scale. 2025-26 contributions rose 12.8% to AUD 236.3 billion and benefit payments 12.1% to AUD 148.2 billion (lump sums 82.5, pensions 65.7) (APRA 2026).	B +
B11 Chile individual pension accounts (AFP system) and 2025 pension reform (Ley 21.735) Chile 1981-present (start year unverified); Ley 21.735 published 26 Mar 2025 Operating (modified)	Contributions build individual AFP accounts. Ley 21.735 (26 Mar 2025) adds a 7% employer contribution, from 1% in August 2025 over 9 years, split between accounts and a Seguro Social; PGU rises to CLP 250,000.	Aug 2026: funds USD 250.6 billion. Jul 2026: 12.2 million affiliates, 5.8 million contributors, 1.33 million old-age pensions from accounts, 2.30 million PGU beneficiaries (average CLP 230,478). BAC payments began January 2026.	No causal estimate; administrative data at scale (SP fact sheet 166). Reform phase-in: PGU CLP 250,000 for pensioners 82+ from September 2025, 75+ from September 2026, 65+ from September 2027; first tender of 10% of affiliates in August 2027 (Subsecretaria de Prevision Social).	B +
B13 KiwiSaver (New Zealand) New Zealand 2007-present Operating (modified)	Employees and employers each pay a default 3.5% of pay from April 2026 (3% before, 4% from 2028); government adds 25 cents per dollar, up to NZD 260.72 a year, none above NZD 180,000 income.	31 Mar 2025: 3,385,856 members, NZD 123.1 billion, 38 schemes; year contributions NZD 12.2 billion (members 7.8, employers 3.4, Crown 1.0); NZD 1.8 billion withdrawn by 42,811 members for first homes.	No causal estimate; administrative data at scale. Over 41% of new members in 2024-25 joined through default funds; 341,453 members in default funds (FMA 2025). From 1 July 2025 government contributions were halved to 25 cents per dollar and extended to 16-17 year olds (IRD).	B +

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
B14 UK pension automatic enrolment United Kingdom (Great Britain statistics) 2012-present Operating	Employers must enrol eligible workers (aged 22 to State Pension age, earning over GBP 10,000 a year) into a workplace pension; workers may opt out; contributions come from employers, workers and tax relief.	2025: 90% of eligible employees (22.6 million) and 82% of all employees (24.2 million) saving; GBP 166.1 billion saved (employers 61%, workers 27%, tax relief 12%); opt-out and cessation about 11-12% (DWP, 30 Jul 2026).	Administrative and survey data at scale: annual saving GBP 63.5 billion higher in real terms than in 2012 (DWP 2026). Gaps: about 55% of eligible employees of private micro employers and 67% of Pakistani and Bangladeshi eligible employees save.	B +
B16 US retirement system: IRAs, defined-contribution plans and the Saver's Match United States Present (Saver's Match from tax year 2027) Operating (modified)	Workers and employers contribute to tax-advantaged IRAs and employer plans such as 401(k); from tax year 2027 the Saver's Match deposits 50% of up to USD 2,000 saved, phased out from USD 41,000 joint income.	30 Jun 2026: USD 51.2 trillion retirement assets (+7.9% on March): IRAs 19.9, DC plans 15.0 (401(k) 10.8), government DB 10.4, private DB 3.2, annuities 2.7; 33% of household financial assets (ICI).	No causal estimate; survey data at scale. Mid-2025: nearly three-quarters of US households (about 100 million) had retirement plans through work or IRAs; 44% owned IRAs; 30% had employer plans only; 86% of households aged 55-64 had some (ICI 2026).	B W
B24 Swedish premium pension (premiepension) and AP7 S�fa Sweden 2000-present Operating	Part of the public pension is saved in individual premium pension accounts invested in funds; the state-run AP7 S�fa portfolio aims for a long-term return at least 2 percentage points above the income pension.	Close to six million Swedes have their premium pension in AP7 S�fa (AP7). Contribution rate, total premium pension capital and AP7 assets: unverified.	No causal estimate. AP7 reports that AP7 S�fa has delivered average returns above its return goal since inception, with low management fees.	C +
B31 Funded occupational and quasi-mandatory pension pillars: Denmark (ATP Livslang Pension and labour-market pensions), Netherlands (occupational pension funds), Switzerland (occupational pensions under the BVG) Denmark; Netherlands; Switzerland Ongoing (start years unverified); Dutch reform: new rules from 1 July 2023, conversion by 1 Jan 2028 Operating (modified)	Workers build funded pension capital through employment: Denmark's ATP collects mandatory contributions from employees and employers; some Dutch sector funds make employer participation compulsory; Swiss employees join a funded pension fund, mandatorily or voluntarily.	ATP: 5.8 million members; 3.7 million contributed in 2024. Netherlands: about 90% of employees have a supplementary scheme; old pensions convert to the new system by 1 Jan 2028. Assets as % of GDP (unverified).	No causal evaluation. Descriptive: over 35% of Danish pensioners live on the state pension and ATP alone; a full-career contributor retiring in 2024 had paid DKK 118,000 into ATP (ATP). About 90% of Dutch employees have a supplementary pension (Rijksoverheid). Swiss occupational pensions are funded (BSV).	C +

CAPITAL · SECTION C

C. Worker, community and broad-based ownership

Employee ownership is the largest work-linked stake: 15.1 million US ESOP participants hold USD 2.06 trillion, and French profit-sharing covers 10.6 million employees; member-owned US credit unions have 146.1 million members. Mass distributions gave vouchers to 25.9 million Poles and 6 million Czechs and Justice Shares to 49 million Iranians. English tenants bought 2.05 million council homes, and land reform made tenant farmers owners in Japan, Korea and Taiwan. Sweden's 1984-1991 wage-earner funds, the only national levy-financed collective equity funds found in this review, bought listed shares with cash levies and were abolished in 1991.

Grade **A** randomized or quasi-experimental · **B** administrative or natural-experiment evidence · **C** descriptive or too early · **W** in white paper v02 · + added here

Employee ownership and profit-sharing

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
C01 Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) United States Ongoing (plan-year 2023 data, released January 2026) Operating	A trust holds employer stock in individual accounts for employees; contributions to ESOP accounts exceeded USD 114 billion in 2023 and payouts to participants USD 166 billion.	Plan year 2023 (released January 2026): 6,609 ESOPs at 6,411 companies (418 public), 15.1 million participants, 10.9 million active, assets USD 2.06 trillion, 309 new plans. DOL (February 2026): participants up 8% in a decade.	Blasi and Kruse 2025 , Health and Retirement Study 2008-2018: participants hold about double the retirement wealth of otherwise similar non-participants; no evidence of lower pay. Kurtulus and Kruse 2017 , 1999-2011 data: employee ownership linked to employment stability and firm survival in the 2001-03 and 2008-09 recessions. Observational.	B W
C02 Employee ownership trusts (EOTs), United States United States 2014-present Operating	A trust holds company shares on behalf of employees, typically bought from a departing owner. State support includes Colorado tax credits and a capital-gains exclusion in 2025 Colorado legislation (HB25-1021) that takes effect in 2027.	32 US companies with EOTs or similar structures (Mark Hand, Southern Methodist University, November 2022); about 100 trust-owned companies (Project Equity, undated). Growing since the first US EOT in 2014 (DOL 2026).	No outcome evidence for US EOTs. Aspen Institute describes EOTs as new in the US; DOL, 23 February 2026 reports growth since the first EOT in 2014 without a count. UK evidence is in C03.	C W
C03 Employee Ownership Trusts (UK) United Kingdom 2014-present Operating (modified)	Trust buys company shares for employees. Seller capital gains relief cut from 100% to 50% of the gain from 26 November 2025. Income-tax-free employee bonuses up to GBP 3,600 a year.	March 2026 register: about 2,824 employee-owned businesses (all forms), 547,971 employee-owners; 500 transitions in 2025 (total up 20%). Relief cut projected to raise GBP 185 million in 2026-27, GBP 985 million in 2030-31.	EOA and Ownership at Work 2023 , survey of 152 employee-owned firms versus 285 others: 8-12% higher GVA per employee, five times lower redundancy likelihood, minimum wages about GBP 2,900 higher; some differences not significant, trade-body authors. HMRC and Ipsos 2025 : qualitative, no impact estimate.	C W
C21 John Lewis Partnership United Kingdom 1929-present (start year unverified) Operating	Employee-owned retailer; Partners share profit through an annual Partnership Bonus set by the Board as a percentage of pay. Bonus for the year to 31 January 2026: 2% of pay, about one week's pay.	53 weeks to 31 January 2026: sales GBP 13.4 billion (up 5%), profit before tax, bonus and exceptional items GBP 134 million (up 6%), bonus 2% of pay. About 80,000 employees (NCEO, 2022).	No causal evaluation; company reporting only (full-year results, 12 March 2026).	C +

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
C09 France profit-sharing and employee savings: participation, intéressement, PEE and PER collectif (formerly PERCO) France 1967-present (participation; intéressement since 1959) Operating (modified)	Firms with 50+ employees must share profits (participation); intéressement is optional; payouts may go into PEE or PER collectif savings plans with employer top-ups. Since 2025, profitable firms with 11-49 employees must adopt one mechanism.	2024 (DARES): 10.6 million employees covered (54% of private non-farm staff); EUR 27.2 billion distributed. Assets EUR 230 billion (2025). April 2026 Senate committee bill: one-off withdrawals up to EUR 5,000.	Nimier-David, Sraer and Thesmar 2023, revised 2025, difference-in-differences on the 1990 cut of the mandatory threshold from 100 to 50 employees: firms pay out 10.5% of pre-tax income; labour share up 1.8 points, profit share down 1.4 points; low-skill workers' total pay rises; no significant effect on investment or productivity.	A ⁺
C10 Employee share plans in large European listed companies (EFES census) Europe (about 3,100 large companies) Ongoing (2025 census) Operating	Employees buy or receive employer shares through company plans; 95% of large European companies have employee share ownership and 59% run democratic plans open to all employees.	EFES 2025 (3,100 companies, 95% of listed-company employment): 6.5 million employee shareholders, one employee in five (previously one in four), EUR 497 billion held, average EUR 45,000; peak 6.9 million in 2011.	EFES 2025 census, descriptive: employees hold 3.07% of large-company equity (3.04% in 2013); EFES calls Great Britain Europe's leader in SME employee ownership (opinion). No causal evidence.	C ⁺
C31 Employee stock ownership associations (mochikabukai), Japan Japan Ongoing (TSE survey series from FY1989) Operating	Employees buy their employer's shares through contributions to an employee association administered by a securities firm; 3,154 of 3,265 surveyed companies (96.6%) pay an incentive, averaging ¥107.24 per ¥1,000 contributed (FY2024).	31 March 2025: 3,265 of 3,956 TSE-listed domestic companies surveyed; 3,302,106 members, 40.12% of their employees; holdings ¥8.2635T (0.91% of TSE market value), ¥2.503M per member. FY2025 results due about December 2026.	No causal evaluation. FY2024 membership rate rose 2.30 points to 40.12% (FY2023: 3.11 million members, 37.82%); holdings fell 5.9% from ¥8.7838T and per-member holdings 11.4% from the FY2023 peak of ¥2.824M (TSE 2025).	C ⁺
C24 Huawei employee shareholding China (global operations) 1987-present (company founded 1987; scheme start unverified) Operating	Company states it is 100% privately owned by its employees. Shareholding vehicle, eligibility, share rights and dividends: unverified.	About 213,000 employees (company page, 2026); 2025 revenue CNY 880.941 billion, net profit CNY 68.036 billion. Number of employee shareholders: unverified.	No independent evaluation; ownership is company-stated (Huawei).	C ⁺

Cooperatives and worker-controlled firms

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
C04 Mondragon Corporation Basque Country and Navarre, Spain; international subsidiaries 1956-present Operating	Federation of worker cooperatives, one member one vote; pay scale of 1 to 6 between lowest and highest salary (2023 report); surplus goes to common funds, reserves, social projects and member returns.	2025: sales EUR 11,322 million, average workforce 71,400, 1,346 jobs created, net profit EUR 618.8 million, investment EUR 406.3 million; 30,135 active members (LagunAro); 92 cooperatives (2023). Largest employer in the Basque Country.	Fagor Electrodomésticos closed in October 2013: of 1,895 member-workers, by December 2016 1,012 were relocated, 526 pre-retired, 212 placed with the CNA group, 145 (about 8%) still awaiting placement (Arando and Arenaza 2018). The group mobilised EUR 300 million in credits and risk exposure. Descriptive case evidence, no counterfactual.	C ^w
C05 Worker cooperative and workers' buyout sectors: Italy (Marcora Law), France (SCOP and SCIC), Argentina (recovered enterprises) Italy; France; Argentina Italy 1985-present (Marcora Law); France and Argentina ongoing Operating	Italy: CFI finances workers' buyouts under the Marcora Law. France: SCOP (worker-owned) and SCIC (multi-stakeholder) cooperative companies. Argentina: workers take over failed firms, mostly as cooperatives.	France 2024: 2,723 SCOP (32,287 members, 70,972 employees, EUR 8.4 billion turnover); 1,417 SCIC (16,365 employees). Argentina August 2025: 398 recovered firms, 13,812 workers. Italy: about 600 companies financed since 1986, mainly workers' buyouts, over 25,000 jobs.	Italy: 85% of buyouts were still successful five years after start-up (Il Sole 24 Ore); Legacoop 2022 mapping counts 323 buyouts, about 71% survival (IDEAS). Argentina: 62% of 34 surveyed firms had not matched wages to inflation since late 2023 (La Capital). Descriptive only.	C ⁺

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
C19 US worker cooperatives and democratic workplaces (2025 State of the Sector) United States Ongoing (FY2024 census) Operating	Workers own and democratically govern their firms; the census covers worker cooperatives, democratic workplaces and firms converting to worker ownership. 79% of workers are member-owners; median top-to-bottom pay ratio 1.44 to 1.	FY2024: 820 firms and 13,520 workers identified, USD 805 million revenue; estimated 1,300 firms and 16,000 workers nationally; firms up 34% and workforce more than doubled since 2020.	Census of 242 responding firms; the authors state it is not fully representative (DAWI and USFWC, February 2026). DOL, 23 February 2026 : worker cooperatives more than doubled in a decade. No causal studies.	C W
C20 Evergreen Cooperatives, Cleveland Cleveland, Ohio, United States 2007-present Operating (modified)	At the laundry, employee-owners hold 80% and Evergreen Cooperatives the rest, with voting control; Cleveland Clinic and hospital clients buy services. Target: USD 10,000 a year per employee-owner, 25% cash, 75% deferred.	2023: Evergreen Cooperative Laundry revenue USD 25 million, USD 1.5 million distributed to employee-owners; about 20% of employee-owners formerly incarcerated. 2021: five cooperatives, about 320 workers; some cooperatives have left the network.	Descriptive only. Shelterforce 2021 : workers earned 20-25% more than at competitors; average pay close to USD 15 an hour, and profit sharing could add USD 4-5 an hour. No causal evaluation.	C +
C07 US electric cooperatives (capital credits) and credit unions (member dividends) United States Ongoing (2026 data) Operating	Electric co-ops are not-for-profit utilities owned by consumer-members and return over USD 1.3 billion to them a year; credit unions are member-owned and pay dividends on member shares.	Electric co-ops (2026): 830 distribution, 60 generation-transmission, 42 million people served, over USD 1.3 billion returned yearly. Credit unions (Q2 2026): 4,214, 146.1 million members, USD 2.50 trillion assets, USD 32.6 billion annualised dividends.	Descriptive operator and regulator statistics only; no study of price, wealth or stability effects. NRECA reports over USD 1.3 billion returned to consumer-members each year without labelling it capital credits; NCUA dividends are call-report totals at an annual rate for the first half of 2026.	C W
C22 Yugoslav workers' self-management (social ownership) Yugoslavia (Socialist Federal Republic) 1950-1990 Ended	Enterprise assets were social property controlled by work collectives, with autonomy over internal administration, planning, income distribution and contracting; the 1953 Constitution converted state property into social property.	Economy-wide system; reforms in 1950, 1960 and 1965. Enterprise and worker counts: unverified.	Keele thesis on Yugoslav labour-managed firms : managers and technical staff concentrated control; sustained long-run growth with cycles; rising unemployment with inflation from the mid-1960s; large emigration to Western Europe; regional disparities. Papajorgji and Mëçalla 2021 : descriptive legal history. No causal evidence.	C +

Collective wage-earner and labour funds

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
C08 Swedish wage-earner funds (löntagarfonder) Sweden 1984-1991 Ended	Five regional funds bought listed shares using cash levies, not new share issues: 20% profit-sharing tax above an exemption plus 0.2 points on employer pension contributions; 8% voting cap per company.	Operated 1984-1991 at national scale: SEK 22.4 billion held on 31 August 1991, SEK 18.3 billion in listed shares; levies ended 31 December 1990. Abolished 1991.	Operating precedent for a levy-financed collective equity fund, not for an in-kind share levy. Prop. 1991/92:36 : government said only about 10% of fund capital financed new investment and funds supplied 0.5% of pension payments. Westerberg 2023 : funds slightly underperformed financial targets. No causal evidence.	C +
C06 Fonds de solidarité FTQ and Fondation (Québec labour-sponsored funds) Québec, Canada 1983-present (Fonds de solidarité FTQ; founding year unverified); 1995-present (Fondation) Operating	Individuals buy fund shares; funds invest in Québec firms. Tax credits of 30% (15% federal plus 15% Québec) on up to CAD 5,000 of purchases a year, a CAD 1,500 maximum.	FTQ fund 31 May 2025: net assets CAD 21.9 billion, over 808,000 shareholders, CAD 1.9 billion invested. Fondation 30 November 2025: net assets CAD 4.28 billion, 1,518 companies, CAD 2.82 billion invested.	FTQ fund reports a 9.2% return for the year to 31 May 2025, 7.8% annualised over 5 years and 6.9% over 10 years. No causal or quasi-experimental evaluation; figures are fund-reported.	C +

Mass distribution of shares, land and homes

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
C11 Voucher and mass privatizations giving citizens equity: Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic), Russia, Poland (National Investment Funds) Czechoslovakia and Czech Republic; Russia; Poland 1992-1996 (Czech waves 1992 and 1994; Russia from late 1992; Poland certificates 1995-1996) One-off	Citizens got vouchers to bid for shares: Czech voucher books cost 1,000 crowns; Russian vouchers had RUB 10,000 face value; Polish certificates gave claims on 15 National Investment Funds holding 512 firms.	Czech Republic: 6 million citizens (75% of eligible adults) and 988 firms in 1992; over 6 million and 676 new firms in 1994. Poland: 25.9 million (94.5%). Russia: about 14,000 medium and large firms.	Estrin, Hanousek, Kočenda and Svejnar 2009, JEL review: privatization effects mostly positive in Central Europe but smaller than for foreign owners; in the CIS, privatization to domestic owners negative or insignificant. Aluchna: Polish NIF firms underperformed direct sales and employee buyouts. Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny 1994: Russian insiders took about 50% of shares.	B +
C30 Justice Shares (Saham-e Edalat), Iran Iran 2006-present (tradable since 2020) Operating (modified)	Under amended Article 44 privatization policy, shares in state-owned companies were allotted from 2006 to the six lowest income deciles; holders receive dividends; the 2020 release allowed direct or indirect holding and partial sale.	49 million holders (2020); stakes in 49 companies valued at 918 trillion rials (US\$21.8B) in 2019. Trading ban lifted April 2020. December 2025: 532,000-toman package worth about 8,370,000 tomans; officials denied a year-end dividend.	No causal evaluation. Kalhor 2019: holders were not direct owners, shares untradable, most companies paid no dividends. Value up 16-fold since launch by May 2020 (Shahidsaless 2020a) and 30-fold by July 2020 (Shahidsaless 2020b).	C +
C13 Land-to-the-tiller reforms: Japan (1946-1950), South Korea (1950), Taiwan (1953) Japan; South Korea; Taiwan 1946-1953 (Japan 1946-1950; South Korea from 1950; Taiwan 1953) One-off	Governments bought land above ceilings from landlords and sold it to tenants: Japan's ceilings 1 hectare of let land, 3 hectares owner-farmed; Korea paid landlords 150% of annual output over five years, 3-chungbo ceiling.	Japan: 38% of farmland redistributed 1947-49, tenanted land 45.9% to 9.9%. Korea: over 70% of farmland tenanted pre-reform; 62% of eligible land redistributed by 1960. Taiwan: 194,823 tenant households; tenancy 41% to 10%.	Kim and Lee 2025, difference-in-differences across 154 Korean counties: 10 points more pre-reform tenancy, about 5% higher rice yields; model implies 9% productivity gain and 35% of 1950s primary-enrollment growth. Kawagoe 1999: little effect on Japanese farm output. Chiang, Fan and Hsu 2025: recipients shifted toward conservative parties.	A +
C16 China household responsibility system (1978-1984) China 1978-1984 One-off	Decollectivization replaced collective farming with household farming under the household responsibility system.	Lin (1992) studies a province-level panel for 1978-84. Adoption shares by province and household counts: unverified.	Lin 1992, AER 82(1): 34-51, province panel: decollectivization accounted for about half of output growth in 1978-84; procurement price rises worked mainly through input use; other market reforms had very small effects.	B +
C17 India land and tenancy reform legislation, including West Bengal's Operation Barga India (16 main states); West Bengal 1958-1992 (state legislation studied); West Bengal tenancy reform from the late 1970s One-off	State laws regulated land tenure, including tenancy laws giving tenants security and regulating crop shares; West Bengal enforced its tenancy reform from the late 1970s (Operation Barga).	Sixteen main states legislated reforms in 1958-1992 (Besley and Burgess coding). National totals of land transferred and tenants registered: unverified.	Besley and Burgess 2000, QJE, panel of 16 states 1958-1992: land reforms associated with poverty reduction. Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak 2002, JPE: West Bengal's tenancy reform raised agricultural productivity. Banerjee and Iyer 2005: districts with colonial landlord systems have lower agricultural investment and productivity.	B +
C18 US Homestead Acts United States 1863-1986 (Act of 1862; in effect until 1976, Alaska until 1986) Ended	Household heads or adults 21+ (citizens or declared intending citizens) claimed 160 acres for a filing fee after five years' residence and farming, or bought at USD 1.25 per acre after six months.	About 4 million claims, more than half proved up; 270 million acres (10% of US area) in 30 states; 45% of Nebraska's land. In effect until 1976; Alaska until 1986.	National Archives: of 500 million acres dispersed by the General Land Office in 1862-1904, 80 million went to homesteaders; most went to speculators, cattle owners, miners, loggers and railroads; small farmers gained more in the 20th century than the 19th. No causal study of household wealth effects.	C +

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
C12 UK Right to Buy England (continues); Scotland (ended 31 July 2016); Wales (ended 26 January 2019) 1980-present (England); 1980-2016 (Scotland); 1980-2019 (Wales) Operating (modified)	Council tenants may buy their home at a discount to market value. Since 21 November 2024 England's maximum discount is GBP 16,000-38,000 by area, down from GBP 136,400 in London and GBP 102,400 elsewhere.	England: 2,052,813 sales to tenants by 31 March 2026; 14,187 in 2025-26 (up 90%, applications filed before the cut); 3,452 replacements. Scotland: 494,580 sales 1979-80 to 2014-15. 2025 reform plan: 10-year qualifying period.	House of Commons Library 1999 : about 30% of tenants had bought; buyers skewed middle-aged and better off; two-thirds of 1985-86 buyers had not expected to own. Welsh social housing stock fell from over 300,000 (1980) to about 230,000 (2018) (Senedd Research). No causal wealth study.	C+

Community land and local energy ownership

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
C14 Community land ownership: Scotland community-owned land and US community land trusts Scotland; United States Ongoing (Scotland data to December 2024) Operating	Scottish community bodies own land and buildings; US community land trusts hold land and sell homes on long ground leases (often 99 years) with resale limits.	Scotland, December 2024: 853 community-owned assets (up 23), 213,803 hectares (2.7% of Scotland's land), 503 owning groups; just over GBP 4.0 million spent on 2024 acquisitions. US community land trust totals: unverified.	Scottish Government statistics (published 25 November 2025): Na h-Eileanan Siar holds 72% of community-owned land (153,678 hectares); 80% of assets are rural. No outcome evaluation for either program.	C+
C15 Local equity and community benefit standards for renewable energy: Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Germany), England, Scotland, Denmark Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Germany); England; Scotland; Denmark 2016-present (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern); England guidance 2025; Denmark from 2008 (unverified) Operating	Mandatory: Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (2016) requires offering 20% of project shares to residents within 5 km and municipalities, or alternatives. Voluntary: England GBP 5,000 per MW per year (2025), or shared ownership. Denmark 20% offer (unverified).	England: GBP 5,000 per MW per year, CPI-linked over project life, not legally required. Scotland: over GBP 30 million of benefits offered in 12 months (DESNZ 2025). Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Denmark delivery: unverified.	DESNZ working paper 2025 : unclear how far the voluntary approach to shared ownership in Great Britain has changed developer-community engagement; no England delivery data. Federal Constitutional Court 2022 : Mecklenburg-Vorpommern law constitutional except one provision. No outcome evaluation.	CW
C23 Middelgrunden offshore wind cooperative (Middelgrundens Vindmøllelaug), Copenhagen Copenhagen, Denmark 2001-present Operating	Nearly 8,000 member-owners hold the cooperative's stake in the wind farm off Copenhagen harbour in common. Turbine count, ownership split, share price and payouts: unverified.	Nearly 8,000 member-owners; inaugurated 2001; permission granted to operate for another 25 years, with turbine life-extension work under way (2026).	No evaluation; cooperative-reported facts only (Middelgrunden).	C+

TRANSFERS · SECTION D

D. Universal and quasi-universal cash

Universal cash for children and older people is the most common national transfer. Germany paid Kindergeld for 17.6 million children in 2025 (EUR 259 a month each in 2026), and Poland pays PLN 800 per child. Mexico pays every citizen 65 and over MXN 3,200 a month as a constitutional right, 13.7 million people in 2026. No country pays an unconditional cash income to residents of all ages. The US 2021 monthly Child Tax Credit shows how fast gains reverse: child poverty (SPM) was 5.2% in 2021 and 12.4% in 2022, after it expired.

Grade **A** randomized or quasi-experimental · **B** administrative or natural-experiment evidence · **C** descriptive or too early · **W** in white paper v02 · + added here

Child benefits

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
D01 Expanded Child Tax Credit, American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 United States 2021 Ended	Up to USD 300 monthly per child under 6 and USD 250 per child aged 6-17, July-December 2021, advancing an annual credit of USD 3,600 or 3,000; fully refundable, no earnings requirement; federal budget.	December 2021 payment reached families of about 61 million children (over USD 16 billion); almost USD 93 billion paid July-December 2021. Ended after tax year 2021; 2025 law: USD 2,200 per child, USD 1,700 refundable.	Ananat, Glasner, Hamilton, Parolin 2022, difference-in-differences on CPS and Census Pulse, April-December 2021: very small, inconsistently signed, insignificant employment effects. Census P60-280 : child SPM poverty 5.2% (2021), 12.4% (2022). Corinth et al. 2021 simulate 1.5 million working parents exiting under a permanent child allowance.	A +
D02 Kindergeld (Germany) and Nordic child benefits (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway) Germany; Sweden; Finland; Denmark; Norway Germany 1955-present (1954 law); Sweden 1947 law-present; Finland, Denmark, Norway ongoing (start years unverified) Operating	Flat monthly cash per child: Germany EUR 259 per child (2026), paid by the Familienkasse; Sweden SEK 1,250 per child until age 16, paid by Forsakringskassan. Finland, Denmark and Norway run per-child benefits.	Germany 2025: Kindergeld for 17.57 million children, EUR 55.32 billion paid. Sweden: 1.7 million guardians paid SEK 2.65 billion in December 2025. All operating in 2026.	Administrative counts only (Familienkasse, Jan 2026 , Forsakringskassan, Mar 2026); no causal evaluation of these schemes is cited here.	C +
D03 Child Benefit and Universal Credit two-child limit (UK) United Kingdom 1945 law-present (family allowance, now Child Benefit); two-child limit April 2017-April 2026 Operating (modified)	Weekly, 2026-27: GBP 27.05 eldest or only child, GBP 17.90 each other child. High Income Child Benefit Charge: 1% of benefit per GBP 200 of income above GBP 60,000, all repaid above GBP 80,000.	31 Aug 2025: 7.55 million families claiming, 6.87 million paid, 12.73 million children; take-up 87%. Two-child limit removed from 6 April 2026; it affected 495,990 households and 1,752,200 children in April 2026.	HMRC 2025 : charge liability fell from 437,000 people (GBP 593 million, 2023-24) to 310,000 (GBP 360 million, 2024-25 provisional) after the threshold rose from GBP 50,000 to 60,000. Removing the limit: 450,000 fewer children in poverty by the Parliament's final year, a government projection .	B +
D04 Rodzina 500+ and Rodzina 800+ (Poland) Poland 2016-present Operating (modified)	PLN 800 per child monthly to age 18 since January 2024, no income test, state budget via ZUS. 2016 launch: PLN 500 for second and later children; first child income-tested until July 2019.	2024: average 6.76 million children entitled; state budget spending PLN 66.2 billion, the first full year at PLN 800. PLN 800 per child remains the rate listed by the government.	Magda, Kielczewska, Brandt 2018 , difference-in-differences on Labour Force Survey data 2010-2017: mothers' labour force participation fell 2-3 percentage points by mid-2017 versus childless women; larger for less-educated mothers; 4.8 points for single mothers of two.	A +

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
D05 Child Allowance (Jido Teate), October 2024 expansion (Japan) Japan 1972-present (1971 law); income cap removed from October 2024 Operating (modified)	Monthly per child from October 2024, no income cap, to high-school age: JPY 15,000 under age 3, JPY 10,000 from age 3 to high school, JPY 30,000 for third and later children.	FY2025 national budget: JPY 2.1666 trillion, of which JPY 1.0708 trillion for the expansion, paid from the October 2024 entitlement month. Number of recipient children (unverified).	No published evaluation of the October 2024 expansion, which is under two years old; descriptive budget data only.	C ⁺
D06 Canada Child Benefit (CCB) Canada 2016-present Operating	Tax-free monthly payment, income-tested on prior-year adjusted family net income; maximum July 2026-June 2027 CAD 8,157 per child under 6, CAD 6,883 aged 6-17; full amount below CAD 37,487 (2025-26).	July 2026: about 3.6 million families and 6 million children, about CAD 30 billion a year. 2025-26: 3.5 million families, over CAD 26 billion. Replaced three earlier benefits in July 2016.	ESDC briefing note, Oct 2025: child poverty 16.3% in 2015, 10.7% in 2023, 313,000 fewer children in poverty; CCB was 31% of after-tax income for recipients in poverty (2022). Government attribution, no causal design.	B ⁺
D14 Asignacion Universal por Hijo para Proteccion Social (AUH), Argentina Argentina 2009-present Operating	Monthly cash per child under 18 (no age limit if disabled) for unemployed or informal-worker families below the minimum wage; 80% paid monthly, 20% held until school and health checks (Decree 1602/2009).	Operating in 2026: ANSES Resolution 290/2026 (published 30 Sept 2026) makes the school and health checks for the held 20% automatic from 1 November 2026. Amounts and recipient counts (unverified).	No impact evaluation cited; poverty and school-attendance effects (unverified).	C ⁺
D18 Child Money Programme (Mongolia) Mongolia 2005-present Operating (modified)	Monthly cash per child: MNT 100,000 since the COVID-19 top-up (MNT 20,000 before); universal again since July 2023 after a brief targeting to 91% of children. Funding source (unverified).	MNT 100,000 a month to 1.3 million children (Ministry, Sept 2024), reaching 98% of households with children (UNICEF, Dec 2023). February 2026 payment at MNT 100,000, scheduled for 12 February.	Advocacy reporting only: UNICEF 2023 reports the COVID-19 top-up kept nearly 80% of households from negative coping strategies, 0.2% of top-up spending went on alcohol, and an ADB simulation ranked it first for poverty and inequality reduction. No causal study cited.	C ⁺
D20 Universal child benefits in other rich countries: Ireland Child Benefit (also Austria Familienbeihilfe, France allocations familiales) Ireland; Austria; France Ongoing (start years unverified) Operating	Ireland: EUR 140 per child per month regardless of income or PRSI record, to age 16 (18 in full-time education or with a disability); twins 1.5 times, triplets or more double. Austria, France amounts (unverified).	Ireland rate in force per Citizens Information (updated 22 Sept 2026), paid by the Department of Social Protection. Recipient counts and spending for all three (unverified).	No impact evaluation cited; benefit rules only (Citizens Information).	C ⁺
D21 Child Allowance (Adong Sudang) and Parental Payment (Bumo Geubyeo), South Korea South Korea 2018-present (child allowance from September 2018) Operating (modified)	KRW 100,000 per child per month under age 9 from April 2026 (under 8 before), plus KRW 5,000-30,000 in non-capital and depopulating areas, maximum KRW 130,000; age limit rises yearly to under 13 by 2030.	April 2026 expansion restored eligibility to about 430,000 children born January 2017-March 2018. Total children covered (unverified). Parental payment runs alongside; its amounts (unverified).	No impact evaluation cited; government policy notices only (Korea.kr, May 2026, MOHW release, Mar 2026).	C ⁺

Social pensions

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
D08 Pension for the Well-Being of Older Adults (Pension para el Bienestar de las Personas Adultas Mayores) and Pension Mujeres Bienestar (Mexico) Mexico 2019-present Operating (modified)	Mexican nationals aged 65+ resident in Mexico: MXN 3,200 per month in 2026, paid as MXN 6,400 every two months; a constitutional right under Article 4. Women aged 60-64: MXN 3,100 every two months.	2 Sept 2026: over 13.7 million adults aged 65+ paid; over 2.8 million women aged 60-64 in the women's pension. All federal welfare programs: MXN 1 trillion in 2026; pension-only budget (unverified).	Galiani, Gertler, Bando 2014 (Labour Economics 2016), quasi-experimental study of the earlier rural program for adults over 70: paid work down 20%, household consumption up 23%, depression score down 12%. No impact evaluation of the universal 65+ pension is cited here.	A W
D17 Renta Dignidad (Renta Universal de Vejez), Bolivia Bolivia 2008-present Operating (modified)	All Bolivian residents aged 60+, funded by 30% of hydrocarbon tax (IDH) revenue and state-company dividends (Law 3791, 2007). Launch: Bs 2,400 a year, Bs 1,800 with a pension; Bs 350 monthly before 2026.	December 2015: 929,116 recipients; 1.1 million people paid Bs 16,339 million in 2008-2015. January 2026: Supreme Decree 5516 adds Bs 150, raising non-pensioners to Bs 500 monthly (press report).	Hernani-Limarino and Mena 2015, difference-in-differences on the 2007 cut in eligibility age from 65 to 60: no significant consumption effect; extreme poverty down 10 points in female-recipient households; women's labour participation down 10 points; boys' enrolment down 6-8 points, girls' up 6-7.	A +
D09 Age-based social pensions in low- and middle-income countries: Chile Pension Garantizada Universal (PGU), Nepal Senior Citizen's Allowance, Lesotho, Namibia Chile; Nepal; Lesotho; Namibia Chile PGU 2022-present (Law 21.419); Nepal, Lesotho, Namibia ongoing (start years unverified) Operating	Monthly age-based cash pensions: Chile PGU CLP 231,732 under age 82 and CLP 250,275 at 82+ (from 1 Feb 2026); Nepal NPR 4,000 from age 70 (60 for Dalits and Karnali residents).	Chile PGU: 2,225,101 beneficiaries (Nov 2025), 57.9% women. Nepal: 88.8% of people aged 60+ covered (HelpAge, Sept 2026). Lesotho and Namibia figures (unverified).	No impact evaluation of these schemes is cited; the Chilean pensions regulator and HelpAge publish administrative coverage data only (SP Chile, Feb 2026, HelpAge Nepal).	C +
D19 Universal social pensions: Mauritius Basic Retirement Pension and Georgia State Pension (also Botswana, Kosovo, Timor-Leste) Mauritius; Georgia; Botswana; Kosovo; Timor-Leste Ongoing (start years unverified) Operating	Monthly pension classed universal or near-universal by HelpAge: Mauritius MUR 15,555 from age 60 (33.54% of GDP per capita); Georgia GEL 350 from 65 for men, 60 for women (16.70%).	HelpAge (Sept 2026): Mauritius pension covers 100% of people aged 60+; Georgia 87.5%. Botswana, Kosovo and Timor-Leste amounts and coverage (unverified).	No impact evaluation of these schemes is cited; HelpAge Pension Watch coverage data only (Mauritius, Georgia).	C +
D10 Basic age pensions in rich countries: New Zealand Superannuation, Canada Old Age Security, Netherlands AOW, Denmark Folkepension New Zealand; Canada; Netherlands; Denmark Ongoing (start years unverified) Operating	NZ Superannuation: NZD 1,294.74 per fortnight before tax, single living alone (from 1 April 2026). Canada OAS: up to CAD 762.50 monthly at 65-74, CAD 838.75 at 75+ (Oct-Dec 2026), residence-based.	Canada OAS rose 1.4% for Oct-Dec 2026; recovery tax above net income of CAD 93,454 (2025). NZ couple rate NZD 984.28 each per fortnight before tax. Recipient counts and Netherlands, Denmark amounts (unverified).	No impact evaluation of these pensions is cited; official rate tables only (Work and Income, April 2026, Canada.ca, Sept 2026).	C +
D11 Basic Pension Insurance for Urban and Rural Residents and Dibao (China) China Ongoing (2009 and 2014 starts unverified) Operating	Resident pension from age 60 under Basic Pension Insurance for Urban and Rural Residents; HelpAge lists CNY 123 per month (page modified Sept 2026). Later national increases and dibao amounts (unverified).	HelpAge lists 278.4 million people aged 60+ (19.6% of population) and 100% pension coverage of that group. Participants, dibao recipients and spending (unverified).	No impact evaluation cited; HelpAge Pension Watch coverage data only (HelpAge China).	C +

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
D12 Child Support Grant and Older Persons Grant (South Africa) South Africa Ongoing (start years unverified); pension benefits and coverage expanded for the black population in the early 1990s Operating	Monthly grants paid from the national budget, average values from April 2026: Child Support Grant ZAR 580 per child (ZAR 560 in 2025/26); Older Persons Grant ZAR 2,400 (ZAR 2,315).	2026/27 projection: 12.612 million Child Support Grant and 4.199 million Older Persons Grant beneficiaries, 26.498 million in all; ZAR 292.8 billion excluding the ZAR 370 SRD grant, extended to 31 March 2027.	Duflo 2000 (AER 2000; WBER 2003), using the early-1990s pension expansion: girls in households where a woman received the pension gained 1.19 standard deviations in weight-for-height and 1.16 in height-for-age; men's pensions showed no effect. No Child Support Grant evaluation is cited here.	A +
D13 Beneficio de Prestacao Continuada (BPC) for older adults (Brazil) Brazil Ongoing (start year unverified) Operating	Monthly BPC for people aged 65+: BRL 1,621 (HelpAge, Sept 2026), equal to 35.01% of GDP per capita; HelpAge classes it as poverty-targeted.	HelpAge: BPC reaches 5.2% of people aged 60+; total pension coverage of people 60+ is 60.4%. BPC recipient totals for older and disabled people (unverified).	No impact evaluation cited; HelpAge Pension Watch coverage data only (HelpAge Brazil).	C +
D15 Old-Age Allowance (Thailand) Thailand Ongoing (start year unverified) Operating	Monthly allowance for people aged 60+: THB 600 per month (HelpAge, Sept 2026), equal to 2.78% of GDP per capita. HelpAge classes the design as poverty-targeted.	HelpAge reports 98.5% coverage of people aged 60+. Recipient count and 2025-26 changes (unverified).	No impact evaluation cited; HelpAge Pension Watch coverage data only (HelpAge Thailand).	C +

Other categorical cash

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
D16 PM-KISAN (Pradhan Mantri Kisan Samman Nidhi), India India 2019-present Operating	INR 6,000 per year to eligible farmer families, transferred by the central government in three equal installments.	21st installment (19 Nov 2025): 9.35 crore (93.5 million) beneficiaries. Over INR 4.27 lakh crore paid in 22 installments by 24 March 2026.	Government summary (PIB, Mar 2026) cites an IFPRI study (2019) finding eased credit constraints and more farm-input spending, and a NITI Aayog survey in which over 92% of beneficiaries spent on seeds, fertilizer or pesticides. No randomized or quasi-experimental result cited.	C +

TRANSFERS · SECTION E

E. Guaranteed-minimum incomes and targeted unconditional cash

Means-tested minimum-income floors operate in most rich countries. Spain's Ingreso Mínimo Vital reaches 860,458 households and UK Universal Credit 8.4 million people; Germany replaced Bürgergeld with a stricter Grundsicherung in July 2026. Low take-up is the recurring weakness: 52% of entitled Spanish households had not applied. Twelve Indian states now pay women unconditional monthly cash (Rs 1.68 lakh crore budgeted for 2025-26), and Ireland decided in October 2025 to make its randomized artists' basic income permanent, with the permanent scheme opening in 2026.

Grade **A** randomized or quasi-experimental · **B** administrative or natural-experiment evidence · **C** descriptive or too early · **W** in white paper v02 · **+** added here

National guaranteed-minimum and means-tested floors

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
E02 Ingreso Mínimo Vital (IMV) Spain (national) 2020-present Operating	Means-tested monthly benefit from Social Security that tops low household incomes up to a guaranteed level; average EUR 507 per household in June 2026, plus a child supplement (CAPI) averaging EUR 67.1 per child.	June 2026: 860,458 households, 2,627,344 people (1,070,918 minors), monthly payroll EUR 465.7M; benefits up 16.8 percent year on year; CAPI paid to 600,076 households.	AIRef fifth and final evaluation (July 2026, per El Debate): coverage 44.2 percent of potentially eligible households in 2025; 52 percent of entitled households had not applied (71 percent for CAPI); 46 percent still received IMV five years after entry; poverty reduced, size not stated. Bank of Spain : 57 percent of eligible households had not applied by end-2021.	B +
E03 Reddito di Cittadinanza and pensione di Cittadinanza (RdC/PdC) Italy (national) 2019-2023 Ended	Means-tested monthly benefit for low-income households paid by INPS, with a pension variant (PdC); December 2023 average EUR 551 per household (RdC EUR 602.26, PdC EUR 304.77).	Peak 2021: 1,772,056 households, nearly 4 million people. 2023: 1.37 million households, 2.89 million people; December 2023: 722,000 households. Abolished from 1 January 2024.	Dachille, De Paola and Nisticò (WorkINPS Paper 96, June 2025), fuzzy regression discontinuity at income thresholds: in the South, recipients were 1.5 points more likely to conceive a child within two years (about 18 percent), with no labour effect; in the Centre-North, earnings fell 10 to 11 percent (June 2019-February 2020).	A +
E14 Assegno di Inclusione (ADI) and Supporto per la Formazione e il Lavoro (SFL) Italy (national) 2024-present Operating	ADI: monthly benefit for low-income households with a minor, a member over 59, a disabled member or a care-programme member; SFL: EUR 350 a month for up to 12 months to 18-59 year-olds in training.	June 2026: about 690,000 ADI households, average EUR 672 a month (251,000 with minors, 366,000 with older members); over 1 million households and about 2.4 million people since January 2024. 2025-26 budget laws widened eligibility.	Bovini, Dicarolo and Tomasi (Bank of Italy QEF 820, December 2023), microsimulation: ADI covers 1.2 million households against 2.1 million under RdC; absolute poverty incidence rises 0.8 points (7.5 to 8.3 percent); bottom-decile income falls about EUR 1,300 a year (11 percent). No causal evaluation of ADI cited.	C +
E04 Revenu de solidarité active (RSA) and Prime d'activité France (national) Ongoing; RSA obligations reformed from 1 January 2025 Operating (modified)	RSA pays a means-tested monthly income (EUR 651.69, single person, April 2026); since 2025 recipients register with France Travail and owe 15 weekly activity hours, sanctioned by partial suspension. Prime d'activité tops up low wages.	December 2025: 1.80 million RSA households (3.55 million people), down 0.3 percent in a year. June 2025: 4.56 million Prime d'activité households (8.77 million people), average EUR 193 a month, EUR 2.64B a quarter.	No causal evaluation of the 2025 reform identified. CNAF attributes lower RSA spending to income declarations prefilled from employer data since March 2025; 472,000 households drew both RSA and Prime d'activité (December 2025, up 14.1 percent). Sanction decree published 31 May 2025: suspension of at least 30 percent for one to two months (Moneyvox).	C +

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
E05 Bürgergeld, replaced by the Neue Grundsicherung from 1 July 2026 Germany (national) Ongoing; renamed and reformed 1 July 2026 Operating (modified)	Means-tested monthly standard rate plus housing costs for employable people and their households: EUR 563 single adult, EUR 506 each partner (2026, frozen); 30 percent cut for three months for breaching the cooperation plan.	Reform law passed the Bundestag 5 March 2026, applies from 1 July 2026 (further parts 1 August 2027); asset waiting period abolished; protected assets EUR 5,000-20,000 by age. Recipient numbers unverified.	No evaluation of the 2026 reform yet. From the second missed appointment benefits fall 30 percent for a month; after three consecutive misses the standard rate is withheld for a month; refusing work withdraws it for one to two months, with rent paid to the landlord (BMAS FAQ).	C ⁺
E06 Universal Credit United Kingdom (DWP statistics) 2013-present Operating (modified)	Monthly means-tested payment: standard allowance GBP 424.90 (single, 25 or over) or GBP 666.97 (couple) plus GBP 303.94 per child; the two-child limit was removed in April 2026.	May 2026: record 8.4 million people (7.7 million in May 2025) in 7.2 million households, 6.7 million with payment; April 2026: 3.1 million in work (37.7 percent, down from 41.9).	Administrative statistics only; no causal study cited. DWP notes removal of the two-child limit in the April 2026 rate changes; Budget 2025 estimated that removing it lifts 450,000 children out of poverty (about 550,000 with other measures).	C ⁺
E17 EU national minimum income schemes (cluster): Netherlands Participatiewet (bijstand), Belgium leefloon/revenu d'intégration, Portugal Rendimento Social de Inserção, Greece Guaranteed Minimum Income, Nordic social assistance European Union member states Ongoing; figures 2019-2020 Operating	Means-tested last-resort cash benefits for low-income households; 2019 benefit adequacy: Denmark 84 percent of the poverty threshold, Belgium 73 percent, Greece 48 percent (22 percent of a low-wage earner's income).	Denmark: 164,477 recipients (2020). Benefit recipient rate 2019: EU average 78 percent; Denmark 98, Belgium 88, Greece 66 (up 26 points in a decade). Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Finland figures unverified.	SPC and European Commission, 2022 Minimum Income Report, country profiles (October 2022): descriptive benchmarking; Belgian median spell length rose from about six months (2000) to 11 months (2018). No causal estimate cited for this cluster.	B ⁺
E30 National Basic Livelihood Security System (Basic Livelihood Security Program) South Korea (national) 2000 (unverified) to present Operating	Livelihood benefit for households with recognized income at or below 32% of standard median income (2027 maximum KRW 875,533 for one person, KRW 2,217,563 for four); medical, housing and education benefits at 40%, 48%, 50%.	1.63 million recipients (3.2% of registered residents) and KRW 4,157 billion paid in 2016 (MOHW). Standard median income for four: KRW 6,494,738 (2026), KRW 6,929,885 (2027, set 28 July 2026, Asia Economy).	No causal evaluation of household outcomes cited. Single-person households are about 74% of recipient households and 80% of livelihood-benefit households (Kyunghyang, July 2026). A June 2025 ministry reform proposal, including raising the livelihood line toward 35%, was projected to need KRW 6.6 trillion more (Maeil Business).	C ⁺
E08 Seikatsu Hogo (public assistance) Japan (national) Ongoing; data June 2026 Operating	National means-tested last-resort public assistance paid to low-income households; benefit levels (unverified).	June 2026: 1,969,502 persons (1.60 percent of population) in 1,642,778 households, persons down 1.0 percent year on year; 55.3 percent of households elderly; 18,171 households started that month.	Descriptive MHLW counts only: disabled or sick households 25.5 percent, mother-child 3.4 percent, other 15.8 percent; 20,970 applications in June 2026. No causal evidence cited.	C ⁺
E12 Hong Kong Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA) and Old Age Living Allowance (OALA) Hong Kong Ongoing; data to 31 August 2026 Operating	CSSA: non-contributory cash assistance from the Social Welfare Department; OALA: monthly allowance for older residents. Standard rates and OALA amounts unverified.	31 August 2026: 195,258 CSSA cases (112,423 old age, 28,541 ill health, 17,734 single parent, 15,223 unemployment); 817,909 OALA, 386,078 Old Age Allowance and 190,182 Disability Allowance cases.	Administrative counts only; no evaluation cited. Old-age cases are 58 percent of CSSA cases (August 2026).	C ⁺
E18 Age Pension and JobSeeker Payment Australia (federal) Ongoing; JobSeeker rates from 20 September 2025 Operating	Means-tested fortnightly payments under income and assets tests: Age Pension up to AUD 1,178.70 (single, with supplements) and JobSeeker up to AUD 793.60 (single, no children); rates adjusted each 20 March and 20 September.	Couples: Age Pension AUD 888.50 each, JobSeeker AUD 726.50 each (partnered). JobSeeker rates apply from 20 September 2025; later indexations and recipient numbers unverified.	No causal study cited. Single JobSeeker (AUD 793.60) is 67 percent of the single Age Pension maximum (AUD 1,178.70) a fortnight.	C ⁺

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
E07 Canada: Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), Canada Disability Benefit (CDB) and Canada Workers Benefit (CWB) Canada (federal) Ongoing (GIS, CWB); CDB 2025-present Operating	Income-tested federal benefits: GIS adds up to CAD 1,138.90 a month for a single pensioner with income under CAD 23,112 (October-December 2026); CDB pays up to CAD 204.20 a month (July 2026-June 2027).	OAS benefits rose 1.4 percent for October-December 2026 (3.0 percent year on year). CDB adds a CAD 150 lump sum from fall 2026. Recipient numbers, spending and CWB amounts unverified.	No evaluation cited. CDB falls by 20 percent of income above CAD 23,000 for a single applicant (CAD 32,500 for couples), with CAD 10,210 of working income exempt for singles (July 2026-June 2027).	C +
E01 US cash and near-cash transfer system: Social Security (OASDI), SSI, SNAP, unemployment insurance and refundable tax credits United States (federal) Ongoing; figures for 2025 to August 2026 Operating	Social Security pays retirement and disability benefits (retired-worker average \$2,087.52 a month, August 2026). SSI pays means-tested cash (\$994 federal rate, 2026); SNAP pays food benefits; refundable credits pay through tax returns.	August 2026: 71.5M OASDI beneficiaries, \$138.8B paid that month; 7.31M SSI recipients. 2025: Social Security \$1,570B, refundable tax credits \$248.4B (BEA); SNAP \$102.6B (FY2025), 37.0M people April 2026; SSI \$65.0B.	Administrative and national-accounts data; causal EITC evidence is in row I16. Guner, Rauh and Ventura (2026, SIPP 2013-2016): means-tested transfers average \$6,007 a year per household headed by a 25-54 year-old (2016 dollars); about 35 percent of such households receive them. No causal study cited here for Social Security, SSI, SNAP or unemployment insurance.	B W

Unconditional cash for targeted groups and areas

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
E09 Indian state cash transfers to women (12 states; the two largest are E15 and E16) India (12 states in 2025-26) Ongoing; 2 states in 2022-23, 12 in 2025-26 Operating (modified)	States pay women a fixed monthly sum from their budgets under schemes PRS calls unconditional; 2025-26 amounts ranged from Rs 833 (Odisha) to Rs 2,500 (Jharkhand); West Bengal moved to Rs 3,000 in 2026.	2025-26 budgets: 12 states (2 in 2022-23), Rs 1,68,040 crore (0.5 percent of GDP); largest Maharashtra Rs 36,000 crore and Karnataka Rs 28,608 crore. 2026-27: West Bengal allocated Rs 36,000 crore to Annapurna Bhandar.	PRS State of State Finances 2025-26 (October 2025): six of the 12 states estimated a revenue deficit in 2025-26; PRS cites RBI (2024) that cash transfers to farmers, youth and women can stress state finances. No randomized or quasi-experimental evaluation cited.	C +
E15 Mukhyamantri Majhi Ladki Bahin Yojana (Maharashtra) Maharashtra, India 2024-present Operating	Eligible women receive Rs 1,500 a month from the Maharashtra state budget.	Budget Rs 26,500 crore for 2026-27 (3.4 percent of state expenditure), 31 percent below the 2025-26 revised estimate of Rs 38,310 crore; 2024-25 actual Rs 33,237 crore. Beneficiary count unverified.	No evaluation cited; PRS reports allocations only (budget presented 6 March 2026). Its Rs 36,000 crore 2025-26 budget was the largest among the 12 state schemes (PRS SOSF).	C +
E16 Lakshmir Bhandar (West Bengal), replaced by Annapurna Bhandar from June 2026 West Bengal, India Lakshmir Bhandar until 2026; Annapurna Bhandar from 1 June 2026 Operating (modified)	Annapurna Bhandar pays women aged 25-60 Rs 3,000 a month by direct benefit transfer, excluding income-tax payers and government employees; it doubled Lakshmir Bhandar, which paid Rs 1,500-1,700 before replacement.	Lakshmir Bhandar: Rs 26,700 crore in 2025-26 (10 percent of revenue receipts). Annapurna Bhandar: registration from 1 June 2026, about 2 crore women expected, Rs 36,000 crore budgeted for 2026-27; September instalment 17 September 2026.	No evaluation cited; PRS reports budget figures only (budget of 22 June 2026). The Week reports that the BJP government formed after the 2026 election launched the scheme, doubling the Rs 1,500 payment.	C +
E10 Gyeonggi Youth Basic Income (Cheongnyeon Gibonsodeuk) South Korea (Gyeonggi Province) 2019-present Operating	Gyeonggi residents aged 24 (2020 rule: 3+ consecutive or 10+ total years of residence) receive KRW 250,000 a quarter, up to KRW 1 million a year, in local currency; no conditions.	About 150,000 recipients (2020). Running in 2026: applications from March 2026 for those born 2 January 2001 to 1 January 2002; from 2026 academy and test fees can be paid anywhere in the province.	Gyeonggi follow-up study (2020; difference-in-differences against a comparison group plus interviews, summarized by BIEN): recipients improved on happiness, health and diet, attitudes and economic activity; the summary gives no effect sizes. 2019 surveys: 80.6 and 82.7 percent satisfied (Korea Herald).	C +

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
E11 Basic Income for the Arts (pilot 2022-2026; permanent scheme from 2026) Ireland (national) 2022-2026 (pilot); permanent scheme from 2026 Pilot completed	2,000 artists, drawn at random from about 8,200 applications, received a state-funded EUR 325 a week (taxable) for three years; the permanent scheme keeps EUR 325 a week for three-year cycles.	Pilot: 2,000 recipients, September 2022 to February 2026; gross cost EUR 105M. Permanent scheme: 2,000 places (possibly 2,200), applications 15 April-12 May 2026, three-year cycles, payments due before end-2026.	Lottery with a 997-person control group of unselected applicants: recipients gained EUR 500 a month in arts income, lost EUR 280 in non-arts income, spent 11 more hours a week on art and reported less anxiety and depression (RTE Brainstorm). Alma Economics cost-benefit analysis (September 2025): EUR 1.39 of benefits per EUR 1 of net cost (under EUR 72M).	A +
E19 Rural Basic Income pilot (Nongeocho Gibonsodeuk) South Korea (17 depopulating rural counties) 2026-2027 Pilot running	Every registered resident of selected depopulating counties receives KRW 150,000 a month in local gift certificates, regardless of income or work, for two years; national government pays 40 percent, provinces and counties 60 percent.	Payments began late February 2026 in 10 counties (Yeoncheon, Jeongseon, Okcheon, Cheongyang, Jangsu, Sunchang, Gokseong, Sinan, Yeongyang, Namhae); seven added June 2026, total 17, through 2027; KRW 70.63B supplementary budget.	No evaluation yet. Okcheon recorded 976 new resident registrations on 3-19 December 2025 after selection, and authorities planned checks against paper residency (Korea Herald); Boeun's population rose from 30,695 to 31,464 within two months of selection (Kyunghyang).	C +

TRANSFERS · SECTION F

F. Pilots and randomized experiments

Forty entries document trials and pilots run since 1968. In low-income countries large transfers raise consumption, assets and enterprise without measurable inflation; in Kenya the local multiplier was 2.4 and prices rose 0.1%. In rich countries results split. Finland, Germany and Alaska show little or no fall in work, while the OpenResearch trial (USD 1,000 a month for three years to 1,000 people, against 2,000 controls) cut labor participation 4.2 points and non-transfer income about USD 1,900 a year. More than 100 US guaranteed-income pilots have launched since 2018.

Grade **A** randomized or quasi-experimental · **B** administrative or natural-experiment evidence · **C** descriptive or too early · **W** in white paper v02 · + added here

Historical guaranteed-income experiments, 1968-1980

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
F02 US negative income tax experiments (New Jersey, Rural, Gary, Seattle-Denver) United States (New Jersey and Pennsylvania; rural Iowa and North Carolina; Gary, Indiana; Seattle and Denver) 1968-1980 (New Jersey 1968-72; Rural 1969-72; Gary 1971-74; Seattle-Denver 1970-78, some plans to 1980) Pilot completed	Randomized low-income families got a guarantee taxed back as other income rose: New Jersey 50-125% of the poverty line, 30-70% rates (Widerquist); Seattle-Denver US\$3,800-5,600 (1971, family of four), 50%, 70% or declining rates (ASPE).	Families enrolled: New Jersey 1,357 (Hum and Simpson 1993) or 1,216 (Widerquist), 983 at end; Rural 809; Gary 1,799; Seattle-Denver about 4,800 (ASPE). All experiments ended.	Weighted US averages imply hours cuts of about 6% (husbands), 19% (wives), 15% (single mothers); the Robins 1985 table gives 5%, 21%, 13% (Hum and Simpson 1993). Seattle-Denver year two: 9%, 20%, 14% (ASPE). Marital dissolution (5-year plan): first estimates +53% (white) and +57% (Black); Cain and Wissoker found +14%, insignificant; Hannan and Tuma 1990 reaffirm increases.	A +
F01 Mincome (Manitoba Basic Annual Income Experiment) Manitoba, Canada (Dauphin saturation site; Winnipeg and rural dispersed samples) 1974-1979 (payments to 1978) Pilot completed	Families with no other income received 60% of Statistics Canada's low-income cut-off; benefits fell 50 cents per dollar of other income; Ottawa paid 75% of costs (Forget 2011).	Dauphin (about 10,000 people per Forget , under 9,000 per Calnitsky and Latner 2017): at least 706 households, about 2,128 people, got benefits; Winnipeg: 1,187 families enrolled, 760 at end (Hum and Simpson 1993). Ended 1979.	Forget 2011 , quasi-experimental: hospitalization 8.5% lower than controls, mainly accidents, injuries and mental health; more students continued to grade 12. Hum and Simpson 1993 , Winnipeg: hours down 1% (men), 3% (wives), 5% (unmarried women), insignificant. Calnitsky and Latner 2017 : Dauphin labor-market participation down 11.3 points, nearly 30% from community effects.	A +

Low- and middle-income country trials

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
F05 GiveDirectly Universal Basic Income study, Kenya Bomet and Siaya counties, Kenya (295 villages) 2017-present (payments began January-June 2018; long-term arm 12 years) Pilot running	Every adult in 44 villages gets US\$0.75 a day (paid monthly from 2018) for 12 years; 80 villages: same for 2 years; 71: about US\$500 in two tranches; 100 controls (Banerjee et al. 2023).	About 23,000 transfer-eligible adults in 195 treated villages; US\$30 million budget (GiveDirectly). Long-term payments run 12 years from 2018, with surveys planned at 7 and 12 years (GiveDirectly 2023); 2023 paper a working paper (Niehaus).	Banerjee, Faye, Krueger, Niehaus, Suri 2023 , endline October 2019-January 2020: total labor supply unchanged, shifting from wage work to self-employment; non-agricultural enterprises up 25%; enterprise net revenues up slightly over 50%; consumption up 5%; nearby prices unchanged; lump sums had similar or larger effects, 2-year streams smaller.	A +

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
F06 GiveDirectly Kenya cash transfer trials (Haushofer and Shapiro; Egger et al.) Rarieda and three subcounties of Siaya County, Kenya 2011-2017 (Rarieda trial 2011-2015; general-equilibrium trial transfers mid-2014 to early 2017) Pilot completed	Rarieda (from 2011): monthly or lump-sum transfers averaging US\$709 PPP (arms US\$404 or US\$1,525 PPP). GE trial (2014-17): US\$1,000 (US\$1,871 PPP; 75% of annual household spending) to thatched-roof households in 653 villages (Egger et al.).	GE trial: over 10,500 households, transfers over 15% of local GDP (NBER). GiveDirectly (June 2026): 5-7 year follow-up finds spending about 12% higher; 10-year results expected within a year (GiveDirectly).	Haushofer and Shapiro 2016: monthly consumption US\$158 to US\$193 PPP at 9 months, large well-being gains, no overall cortisol effect; at 3 years assets +US\$422 (43%), consumption gains gone (J-PAL). Egger et al. 2022: consumption up US\$338 PPP (recipients) and US\$334 PPP (non-recipients); average price inflation 0.1%, under 1% at peak; local multiplier 2.4.	A+
F13 Unconditional cash transfer randomized evaluations in low- and middle-income countries (meta-analysis cluster) 34 low- and middle-income countries Various; meta-analysis August 2024, revised August 2026 Pilot completed	Cash paid without behavioral conditions to poor households, as lump sums or monthly streams, compared with control groups receiving no or minimal cash; transfer sizes vary across 72 programs (Crosta et al.).	115 randomized studies of 72 programs in 34 countries pooled; NBER working paper of August 2024, revised August 2026 (NBER).	Crosta, Karlan, Ong, Rüschpöhler, Udry 2024, revised 2026: positive average effects on 10 of 13 outcomes; per US\$100 transferred, monthly consumption +US\$3.30, assets +US\$20.30, monthly income +US\$1.30, labor-force participation +0.8 points, school enrollment +0.8 points; hours worked, weight-for-age and stunting not significant; effects close to linear in grant size.	A+
F04 SEWA-UNICEF Madhya Pradesh Unconditional Cash Transfer pilot Madhya Pradesh, India (8 transfer and 12 control villages; 1 tribal transfer village and 1 tribal comparison village) 2011-2013 (payments 12 to 17 months per village from 2011) Pilot completed	All residents of 8 villages (2011-13): Rs 200 per adult, Rs 100 per child monthly, Rs 300 and Rs 150 after a year (tribal village: Rs 300 and Rs 150, 12 months); UNICEF-funded, SEWA-run (report).	Over 6,000 people received transfers; surveys covered over 15,000 people in transfer and control villages (conference report 2013). Payments ended after 12 to 17 months.	8 transfer vs 12 similar control villages (UNICEF-SEWA 2013): school enrolment (ages 4-18) 12% higher; attendance improved in 29% of transfer households vs 13%; debt reduced 47% vs 20%; no illness in prior 3 months 47.4% vs 34.6%. Standing 2013: higher child weight-for-age, especially girls; less bonded labor; shift to own-account work.	A+
F03 Basic Income Grant pilot, Otjivero-Omitara (Namibia) Otjivero-Omitara, Namibia 2008-2014 (full grant January 2008-December 2009; reduced bridging allowance to 2014) Pilot completed	N\$100 per person per month to every resident under 60 registered by 31 July 2007, January 2008 to December 2009; funded by churches, foundations and private donors through the BIG Coalition (assessment report 2009).	930 residents registered; 27% in-migration cut the per-capita grant from N\$89 to N\$67 by November 2008 (report). A 20% lower bridging allowance ran to 2014 (Klocke-Daffa 2017); no national grant adopted.	No control village. Haarmann et al. 2009, November 2007 vs November 2008: food poverty 76% to 37%; child underweight 42% to 10%; reported crime down 36.5%; household debt N\$1,215 to N\$772; economic activity (age 15+) 44% to 55%. Osterkamp 2013: data withheld; disputes the 29% income growth and 38% savings claims.	C+
F11 Renda Básica Quatinga Velho (Brazil) Quatinga Velho, Brazil 2008-2014 (first payment 25 October 2008); lifetime payments for 14 people from January 2016 Pilot completed	R\$30 per person per month, first paid 25 October 2008, to residents who joined; funded entirely by donations to Instituto ReCivitas, with no state funding (ReCivitas).	93 participants in a community of about 100 (ReCivitas); the first phase ran 2008-2014; from 16 January 2016 payments became lifelong for 14 people (BIEN 2016); status after 2016 (unverified).	Descriptive reporting only: ReCivitas cites results reports and independent studies describing better health, education and housing (ReCivitas); no causal estimates.	C+
F07 Capital-grant experiments for youth and microenterprises (Uganda YOP, Nigeria YouWiN!, Sri Lanka, Ghana) Northern Uganda; Nigeria; Sri Lanka; urban Ghana 2008-2020 (Uganda grants 2008, surveys at 2, 4, 9 and 12 years) Pilot completed	One-time unsupervised grants: Uganda about US\$400 per member in 2008 (US\$374; group average US\$7,108); Nigeria YouWiN! about US\$50,000 per business-plan winner; Sri Lanka and Ghana small randomized microenterprise grants (cash or in-kind).	Uganda: 535 applicant groups, 265 funded, 5,460 youth (J-PAL); over 1,600 traced at 12 years (VoxDev 2025). Nigeria: US\$34 million in randomized grants (McKenzie 2017). All grants disbursed.	Uganda: earnings +38%, work +17% at 4 years; convergence by year 9 except assets and skilled work (Blattman, Fiala, Martinez 2020); men's income +22% at 12 years (p<0.10) (Fiala et al. 2025). Nigeria: winners 20+ points likelier to employ 10+ (McKenzie 2017). Cash grants raised no profits in women's firms in Sri Lanka (de Mel 2008) or Ghana (Fafchamps 2014).	A+

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
F08 Graduation approach (BRAC Targeting the Ultra-Poor and replications) Bangladesh (origin); BRAC in 17 countries; adapted in 50+ countries; trials in Bangladesh, India, Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, Pakistan, Peru 2002-present (start year unverified) Operating	Ultra-poor households (all women in BRAC cohorts) get a productive asset (US\$437-1,228 PPP in the six-country trial), 4-13 months of consumption support, training, weekly coaching and savings over about two years (Banerjee et al. 2015).	BRAC reports 2.4 million families graduated in Bangladesh, implementation in 17 countries and adaptation by over 100 organisations in more than 50 countries (page undated) (BRAC). Operating.	Banerjee et al. 2015 , six countries, 10,495 households: at year 3, consumption +0.12 SD, assets +0.25 SD, income +0.27 SD; benefits exceeded costs in 5 of 6 (not Honduras). Bandiera et al. 2017 , Bangladesh, 21,000+ households: women moved from casual wage work to livestock; gains sustained at 7 years. Banerjee, Duflo, Sharma 2021 , India: consumption +0.6 SD at 10 years.	A +
F09 PROGRESA randomized evaluation (Mexico) Rural Mexico (evaluation in 506 localities of 7 states) 1997-1999 (program from August 1997; randomized comparison November 1997-November 1999) Pilot completed	Monthly education grants of 80-165 pesos (primary grades 3-6) and 240-305 pesos (secondary, higher for girls), conditional on 85% attendance, plus 125 pesos food support; household cap 750 pesos (July-December 1999) (Skoufias 2005).	Evaluation: 24,000 households in 320 treatment and 186 control localities; controls joined by December 1999. Program reached about 2.6 million families, 40% of rural families, by end-1999 (Skoufias 2005).	Skoufias 2005 : secondary enrollment up more than 20% (girls) and 10% (boys); illness among children aged 1-5 down 12%; growth of children aged 12-36 months up about 1 cm a year; projected 0.7 extra years of schooling and 8% higher lifetime earnings (summary). Parker and Todd 2017 review the experimental and later evidence.	A +
F10 Conditional versus unconditional cash transfer experiments (Malawi Zomba; Morocco Tayssir) Zomba district, Malawi; 130 rural communes in 5 regions of Morocco 2007-2010 (Zomba offers December 2007, payments 2008-2009, final survey 2010; Tayssir evaluation 2008-2010) Pilot completed	Zomba (2008-09): girls aged 13-22 and parents got US\$5-15 monthly (parent US\$4-10, girl US\$1-5), with or without attendance conditions. Tayssir (2008-10): MAD 60-100 per child monthly to fathers, education-labeled; variants added conditions or paid mothers.	Zomba: 176 enumeration areas; 2,284 baseline schoolgirls analyzed (506 conditional, 283 unconditional, 1,495 control) (Baird et al.). Tayssir: 318 school sectors, about 4,400 households surveyed, over 47,000 children (J-PAL). Both ended.	Baird, McIntosh, Özler 2011 : dropout fell in both arms, the unconditional effect 43% of the conditional; unconditional transfers cut marriage 7.9 points (44%) and pregnancy 6.7 points (27%), among girls who left school. Benhassine et al. 2015 : labeled transfer cut dropout about 7.6 points (76%) (J-PAL); conditionality or paying mothers made almost no difference.	A +
F12 Cash transfers and violence or political support (Kenya, Ecuador, Uruguay studies) Kenya; northern Ecuador; Uruguay Kenya trial 2011-2015; Ecuador and Uruguay studies published 2016 and 2011 Pilot completed	Kenya: GiveDirectly transfers averaging US\$709 to women or men. Ecuador: randomized cash, voucher or food transfers to poor women. Uruguay: PANES anti-poverty cash transfers assigned by an eligibility score.	Evidence cluster of three studies; programs and study periods ended; Uruguay's political-support gain persisted after PANES ended (Manacorda et al. 2011).	Haushofer et al. 2019 : transfers to women cut physical violence 0.26 SD and sexual violence 0.22 SD; to men, physical violence 0.18 SD; spillover to non-recipient women -0.16 SD. Hidrobo, Peterman, Heise 2016 : controlling behaviors and violence down 6-7 points, same across modalities. Manacorda, Miguel, Vigorito 2011 : beneficiaries 11-13 points more likely to favor the government.	A +
F50 Cash benchmarking trial, Rwanda (Gikuriro nutrition program versus GiveDirectly cash) Kayonza and Nyabihu districts, Rwanda (248 villages) 2016-2017 (baseline August-September 2016; endline September-October 2017) Pilot completed	Villages randomized to Catholic Relief Services' Gikuriro nutrition, sanitation and savings program, GiveDirectly cash at equal cost per household, a large GiveDirectly transfer of about US\$517 received (US\$567 cost), or control (McIntosh and Zeitlin).	248 villages: 74 Gikuriro, 74 control, 100 cash (VoxDev 2025). One-off transfers; trial finished; published in The Economic Journal 134(664), 2024.	McIntosh and Zeitlin 2024 : at equal cost neither Gikuriro nor cash moved primary child-growth or diet outcomes within a year; Gikuriro raised savings; cost-equivalent cash raised productive assets 26% and cut debt. The large transfer raised consumption, dietary diversity (+0.55 food groups), height-for-age (+0.09 SD) and assets (+80%).	A +

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
F51 Liberia cash grant and cognitive behavioral therapy trial for high-risk young men Monrovia, Liberia 2009-2023 (interventions from 2009; 10-year results published 2023) Pilot completed	999 high-risk men randomized to an unconditional US\$200 grant (others got US\$10), 8 weeks of cognitive behavioral therapy, both, or neither (Blattman et al. 2022).	999 men enrolled; 833 resurveyed about 10 years after the grants (83% of the sample, 93% of known survivors) (Blattman et al. 2022). Trial finished.	Blattman, Chaskel, Jamison, Sheridan 2023 : therapy plus cash cut an antisocial-behavior index 0.25 SD at 1 year and 0.25 SD at 10 years; therapy alone -0.20 SD at 10 years; cash alone -0.08 SD, not significant; theft and robbery fell about half in both therapy arms (NBER 2022).	A +

High-income pilots outside the United States

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
F14 Finnish Basic Income Experiment (perustulokeilu) Finland (national random sample of the unemployed) 2017-2018 Pilot completed	Kela paid 2,000 people, drawn at random from those receiving Kela unemployment benefit in November 2016, a tax-exempt EUR 560 a month from 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2018.	2,000 recipients; control group of benefit recipients not selected (size unverified). Payments ended 31 December 2018; final evaluation published 6 May 2020.	Kangas, Jauhiainen, Simanainen and Ylikännö (eds.) 2020 , randomized: no employment effect in 2017; in November 2017-October 2018 recipients worked 78 days, 6 more than controls, with a concurrent activation model blurring attribution (University of Helsinki 2020). Survey (23% response, no baseline): higher life satisfaction, less mental strain and depression, more trust in people and institutions.	A +
F15 Ontario Basic Income Pilot Ontario, Canada (Hamilton, Brantford and Brant County; Thunder Bay and area; Lindsay) 2017-2019 Ended	Enrolled adults aged 18-64 received up to CAD 16,989 a year (single) or CAD 24,027 (couple), minus 50% of earned income, plus CAD 500 a month with a disability; Ontario government pilot.	Over 4,000 enrolled and more than 2,000 in a no-payment comparison group (Lakehead University); planned for three years from April 2017; cancellation announced 31 July 2018; payments ended March 2019.	No impact evaluation: evaluation stopped in July 2018 before meaningful data were collected. Non-random survey of Hamilton-area recipients (209 observations; Ferdosi, McDowell, Lewchuk and Ross 2020): 76.1% of those employed before kept working; 79.4% reported better general health, 83.7% better mental health. Thunder Bay interviews (20 recipients) found gains reversed after cancellation (Gokani et al.).	C +
F16 B-MINCOME Barcelona, Spain (10 neighbourhoods of the Eix Besòs area) 2017-2019 Pilot completed	Means-tested Municipal Inclusion Support (SMI) averaging EUR 575.36 a month (December 2017-December 2018), crossed with four active policies, conditional or not, and limited or unlimited income-testing; EU Urban Innovative Actions co-funding.	950 households assigned SMI (915 paid at least once) and 383 control households; payments November 2017-October 2019; ERDF contribution EUR 4,854,088.56.	Barcelona City Council first-year results, July 2019 , stratified randomization: severe material deprivation down 8 points, food insecurity about 10 points lower, mental-illness risk down 9.6 points, life satisfaction 5.0 to 6.45 of 10; employment probability 8.6% below controls; households with a working member down 10 points.	A +
F17 Participation Act experiments (Experimenten Participatiewet) Netherlands (Groningen, Tilburg, Utrecht, Wageningen, Deventer, Nijmegen) 2017-2019 Pilot completed	Social-assistance recipients were randomly assigned to exemption from work and reintegration duties, intensified guidance, or a larger earnings disregard (Utrecht: keep 50% of earnings up to EUR 202, not 25%), versus standard rules.	Six municipalities, 1 October 2017 to 1 January 2020; Utrecht 752 participants, Deventer 383 (six-city total unverified). No legislative change followed (May 2020).	CPB analysis reported to parliament (van Ark 2020): exemption had no significant effect on outflow to work anywhere; only in Utrecht, intensified guidance raised the chance of working over 12 hours a week by 7 to 8 percentage points, and the larger earnings disregard also raised it. Utrecht wellbeing, trust and health effects mostly insignificant (Verlaet et al. 2020).	A +

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
F18 Pilotprojekt Grundeinkommen (German Basic Income Pilot) Germany (national) 2021-2024 Pilot completed	Recipients aged 21-40, living alone, with net income EUR 1,100-2,600 a month, received EUR 1,200 a month unconditionally for three years; run by Mein Grundeinkommen e.V. with DIW Berlin.	122 recipients (107 in the DIW analysis sample) and 1,580 comparison participants; payments June 2021-May 2024; results published in DIW Wochenbericht 15/2025.	Bohmann, Fiedler, Kasy, Schupp and Schwerter 2025, randomized: no withdrawal from work (about 90% employed and about 40 weekly hours in both groups); mental health +0.30 SD, life satisfaction +0.42 SD, sense of meaning +0.25 SD; recipients saved EUR 779 a month versus EUR 332 for controls.	A +
F19 Mein Grundeinkommen basic-income lotteries Germany 2014-present Operating	Mein Grundeinkommen e.V. raffles one-year basic incomes, paid month by month to lottery winners and financed by its supporters; amount EUR 1,000 a month (unverified).	2,416 winners to date and 189,535 supporters (October 2026); 26 basic incomes to be drawn on 21 October 2026.	No published causal evaluation of lottery winners. The association's randomized trial is listed separately (F18).	C +
F20 Basic Income for Care Leavers in Wales pilot Wales, United Kingdom 2022-2025 Pilot completed	Care leavers turning 18 between 1 July 2022 and 30 June 2023 received GBP 1,600 a month before tax (GBP 1,280 net) for up to 24 months after turning 18; Welsh Government pilot.	644 eligible young people, 97% enrolled. Delivery formally ended July 2025; statements of July 2025 and February 2026 announce no continuation or new cohort; final evaluation reports due 2027.	No impact estimates yet. The independent evaluation (CASCADE, Cardiff University, with King's College London, Oxford, York and Northumbria) has published qualitative annual reports, the third on 26 February 2026 (summary); quantitative outcomes and value-for-money results are due in 2027.	C +
F21 Greek Guaranteed Minimum Income pilots (forerunners of Social Solidarity Income, KEA) Greece (13 municipalities in 2014-2015; 30 municipalities in 2016) 2014-2016 Pilot completed	Means-tested monthly income support for low-income households, at most EUR 200 per adult and EUR 50 per minor in the 2014 pilot; six-month first phase with EUR 20 million.	2014: 13 municipalities, just over 30,500 applications. 2016: 30 municipalities, 14 July-31 December, EUR 57 million budget, about 48,000 beneficiaries (Greek News Agenda).	No impact evaluation. Process evaluation by the National Institute of Labour and Human Resources and the World Bank, summarised in Lalioti 2016 (Social Cohesion and Development 11(2)): no predetermined evaluation design, coding errors, labour-market integration measures essentially not implemented; 74.4% of applicants and 77.4% of those selected unemployed; 55% of qualifying units declared zero income.	C +
F22 Seoul Stepping Stone Income (Seoul Didimdol Sodeuk; formerly Seoul Safety Income, Ansim Sodeuk) Seoul, South Korea 2022-2025 Pilot completed	Households with income up to 85% of median (50% in the 2022 phase) and assets under KRW 326 million receive monthly half the gap between their income and 85% of median income.	1,600 treatment and 3,200 control households randomized in 2022 and 2023 phases; payments July 2022-June 2025; a councillor cites KRW 44.456 billion and 2,076 households across three phases (Seoul Shinmun).	RCT (Lee et al. registry). City second-year results, October 2024: 8.6% rose above 85% of median income, 31.1% raised earned income, savings 11.1% above controls. Year-3 results, December 2025: household income KRW 250,000 a month higher; household heads' work participation down 10.4 percentage points on average over the three-year support period (presented by a Seoul National University researcher). A councillor says headline metrics lacked control comparisons.	A +
F23 New Leaf Project Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada 2018-2019 (unverified) Pilot completed	Adults aged 19-65, homeless under two years, Canadian citizens or permanent residents with non-severe substance use, received a one-time CAD 7,500; Foundations for Social Change with the University of British Columbia.	115 randomized participants: 50 received cash, 65 controls; 12-month follow-up; results published in PNAS on 29 August 2023.	Dwyer, Palepu, Williams, Daly-Grafstein and Zhao 2023, PNAS 120(36), randomized: over one year recipients spent 99 fewer days homeless and 55 more days in stable housing (exploratory analyses), kept CAD 1,160 more savings, spent more on rent, food and transit, with no difference on alcohol, drugs or cigarettes; net societal saving CAD 777 per person.	A +

United States pilots, 2017-2026

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
F41 US guaranteed income pilot network: Mayors for a Guaranteed Income, Penn Center for Guaranteed Income Research and the Guaranteed Income Pilots Dashboard (cluster) United States (dashboard sites include Alexandria, Atlanta, Baltimore, Birmingham, Cambridge, Columbia, Durham, Gainesville, Ithaca, Los Angeles, Louisville, Madison, Newark, New York City, Oakland, Providence, San Diego, St. Paul) 2018-present Operating	City, county and philanthropic pilots pay unconditional monthly cash, mostly USD 500 or USD 1,000 for 12-36 months, to low-income residents; Mayors for a Guaranteed Income supports launches and Penn CGIR evaluates.	160 guaranteed income initiatives announced since 2017 and about 75,000 participants paid in 35 states (Economic Security Project, 2026); more than 100 pilots launched since 2018 (Urban Institute, 2024); MGI supported 50-plus by July 2024.	Pooled spending from 30+ pilots (dashboard, July 2026): retail sales and services 35%, food and groceries 33%, transport 9%, housing and utilities 9%. Site RCTs: lower food insecurity (Los Angeles 2024); 4.2-point lower labor participation (OpenResearch, revised 2026); no child-development effects at age 4 (Baby's First Years 2025).	A W
F30 Stockton Economic Empowerment Demonstration (SEED) Stockton, California, United States 2019-2021 Pilot completed	125 randomly selected adults from census tracts at or below the city median household income (USD 46,033) received USD 500 a month for 24 months, unconditionally; philanthropic funding; evaluation funded by Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.	131 recipients (125 primary, 6 alternates) and 200 controls; payments February 2019 to January 2021; completed. Peer-reviewed two-year results published 2023.	RCT, 131 treated vs 200 controls. fact sheet on West and Castro 2023, Journal of Urban Health : month-to-month income volatility 19% vs 26% in the pre-pandemic year, 22% vs 25% in the pandemic year; psychological distress fell in year one, faded in the pandemic. SEED year-one release, 2021 : full-time employment gained at more than twice the control rate.	A +
F31 OpenResearch Unconditional Cash Study United States: 19 counties in Illinois and Texas 2019-2023 (enrollment August 2019-October 2020; payments November 2020-October 2023) Pilot completed	1,000 adults aged 21-40 with household income at or below 300% of the federal poverty level received USD 1,000 a month for three years; 2,000 controls received USD 50 a month; privately funded (funders unverified).	3,000 participants; payments November 2020 to October 2023; completed. NBER papers: employment (July 2024, revised August 2026), health (July 2024), consumption (August 2024), politics (December 2024), parenting (July 2025, revised February 2026).	RCT. Vivalt et al., NBER w32719, revised August 2026 : income excluding transfers fell USD 1,900 a year, labor participation fell 4.2 points (July 2024 version: USD 1,500, 2.0 points), hours fell 1-2 a week, partners similar. Miller et al. 2024, w32711 : short-lived stress and food-security gains, no physical-health effects. Krause et al. 2025, w34040 : closer supervision, no school-record effects.	A +
F32 Baby's First Years (BFY) United States: New York City, greater New Orleans, Twin Cities (Minnesota), Omaha 2018-2025 (payments); follow-up continuing Pilot completed	1,000 mothers below the federal poverty line, recruited at birth in 2018-19, randomized to USD 333 a month (USD 4,000 a year) or USD 20 a month; funded by NIH and a foundation consortium.	1,000 mothers enrolled May 2018-June 2019; payments extended from 40 to 76 months, ending three months after each child's sixth birthday (about September 2025 for the last enrollees). Age-8 assessments began July 2026.	RCT. Noble et al. 2025, NBER w33844 : at age 4 (n=891) no significant effects on language, executive function, social-emotional problems or high-frequency brain activity. Earlier papers summarized in w33844 : age-1 infant brain-activity differences (Troller-Renfree et al., PNAS); no maternal-reported health or development differences through age 3; more spending on books and toys and more reading time (Gennetian et al. 2024).	A +
F38 Rx Kids Flint, Michigan (from 2024); about 50 Michigan communities by July 2026; also Ohio 2024-present Operating	Pregnant residents of participating communities get USD 1,500 in pregnancy and USD 500 a month for 6-12 months after birth, no income test; run by Michigan State University and GiveDirectly; state and philanthropic funds.	11,000+ families in 42 Michigan communities by May 2026; 13,000+ in nearly 50 by July 2026; 20 more planned for summer 2026. Near-universal take-up. The USD 20 million state allocation faced proposed 2026 cuts.	Flint compared with similar Michigan places before and after launch. Lancet Public Health 2026 , about 4,500 births: preterm births -18%, low birthweight -27%, NICU admissions -29%. Agarwal, Hanna et al., JAMA Pediatrics 2026 : infant child-welfare investigations 21.7% to 15.5% vs 19.5% to 20.6%. Neonatal deaths 10.2 to 5.1 per 1,000.	A +

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
F36 Basic Income Guaranteed: Los Angeles Economic Assistance Pilot (BIG:LEAP) Los Angeles, California, United States 2022-2023 Pilot completed	Adults at or below the federal poverty line with a child or pregnancy and a COVID-19 hardship received USD 1,000 a month for 12 months, unconditionally; funded from the city general fund and councilmember allocations.	3,202 recipients (3,200 households); payments January 2022 to March 2023; ended. Successor STAY SAFE (August 2025): USD 1,000 a month for two years to about 83 partner-violence survivors and foster youth.	RCT, 3,202 treated vs 4,992 controls (Penn CGIR final report, July 2024). At 6 months: unable to eat preferred foods 43% vs 57%; able to cover a USD 400 emergency 15.9% vs 5.5%. At 18 months: lower intimate partner violence scores ($p<.05$). Housing cost burden 82% vs 80%; stress similar.	A ⁺
F40 Denver Basic Income Project (DBIP) Denver, Colorado, United States 2022-2024 (payments from late 2022; extended through September 2024) Pilot completed	Adults experiencing homelessness, recruited via shelters and providers, randomized to USD 1,000 a month for 12 months, USD 6,500 then USD 500 monthly for 11 months, or USD 50 a month; city and philanthropic funds.	804-820 enrolled (sources differ), 631 in the research sample; project cost USD 9.4 million; the city added USD 2 million to extend payments eight months through September 2024; later status unverified.	RCT, University of Denver (Calhoun, Brisson, Traver, SSWR 2025): at 10 months about 45% in every arm had their own house or apartment; of those unsheltered at baseline, 45% (USD 1,000 arm), 25% (lump-sum arm) and 28% (USD 50 arm) were housed. Full-time work rose in the larger arms; shelter nights halved (Colorado Sun 2024).	A ⁺
F43 Newark Movement for Economic Equity (NMEE) guaranteed income pilot Newark, New Jersey, United States 2021-2023 (launched October 2021; two years of payments) Pilot completed	400 randomly selected adults under 200% of the federal poverty line received USD 6,000 a year for two years (USD 12,000): half biweekly, half in two payments a year; city-led pilot.	400 participants; launched October 2021; completed. Penn CGIR reports published on lump-sum vs recurring payments and on housing, parenting and education.	Randomized comparison of biweekly versus twice-yearly payments of the same annual amount, evaluated by Penn CGIR (CGIR); published reports cover lump-sum vs recurring payments and housing, parenting and educational outcomes; effect sizes unverified.	A ⁺
F44 Other Penn CGIR-evaluated randomized pilots: Cambridge RISE, Oakland Resilient Families, Breathe (Los Angeles County) and its foster-youth arm (cluster) Cambridge, Massachusetts; Oakland (Alameda County), California; Los Angeles County, California; United States 2021-2025 (Cambridge from June 2021, Oakland from July 2021, Breathe from June 2022) Pilot completed	Cambridge RISE: single caregivers, USD 500 a month for 18 months. Oakland: families below 138% of poverty with a child, USD 500 a month for 18 months. Breathe: USD 1,000 a month for three years.	Breathe: 1,000 randomly selected participants plus a 2023 foster-youth arm (200 treatment, 288 control; USD 1,000 a month for two years). Oakland: 600 randomly selected families. Cambridge: 130 treatment, 156 control.	Randomized evaluations by Penn CGIR (Cambridge RISE, Oakland, Breathe). Cambridge (2024) and Oakland final reports are published; effect sizes unverified. Breathe foster-youth RCT results not yet reported.	A ⁺
F33 Chicago Resilient Communities Pilot (CRCP) Chicago, Illinois, United States 2022-2023 Pilot completed	Adults under 250% of the federal poverty level with a COVID-19 hardship, chosen by lottery, received USD 500 a month for 12 months; USD 31.5 million from the Chicago Recovery Plan (federal ARPA funds).	176,000+ applications; 5,006 enrolled; payments from June 2022 for one year; ended. Research sample 6,237 (2,613 treatment, 3,624 control). Process evaluation October 2024.	Randomized controlled trial run by the University of Chicago Inclusive Economy Lab (First Look report, 2023 , baseline only). The evaluator lists baseline, process (October 2024) and photovoice reports; impact estimates are not yet published.	C ⁺
F34 Cook County Promise Guaranteed Income Pilot Cook County, Illinois, United States (Chicago and suburbs) 2022-2025 (pilot); permanent successor funded for FY2026 Pilot completed	3,250 low- to moderate-income households received USD 500 a month for two years, unconditionally, from USD 42 million of federal ARPA money; FY2026 successor: USD 7.5 million from the county equity fund.	Pilot payments December 2022 to January 2025; paused in FY2025. Board approved USD 7.5 million for FY2026 (November 2025); new-phase design due mid-to-late 2026; payments under it unverified.	University of Chicago Inclusive Economy Lab evaluation; impact results were expected summer 2026 (WTTW, October 2024). Published so far: process evaluation (2025) and an economic and fiscal impact study (April 2025) (evaluator). A county survey reported improved financial stability and lower stress (Fox 32, November 2025).	C ⁺

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
F35 Compton Pledge Compton, California, United States 2020-2023 (launched late 2020; two-year payment period; end date unverified) Pilot completed	800 randomly selected low-income households, including undocumented and formerly incarcerated residents, received recurring unconditional payments of at least several hundred dollars a month for two years; private donations pooled by the Fund for Guaranteed Income.	800 households covering 1,770+ people including children; enrollment complete April 2021 with USD 1 million paid; USD 9.1 million planned over two years; payments ended.	No quantitative impact estimates listed by the program. Outputs are an implementation report and the 2022 Voices of the Compton Pledge qualitative report (Compton Pledge); design partner Jain Family Institute (JFI 2021). Recipients were drawn at random (Optimist Daily, October 2020).	C+
F37 Magnolia Mother's Trust Jackson, Mississippi, United States 2018-present Operating	Low-income Black mothers in Jackson receive USD 1,000 a month for 12 months, plus a USD 1,000 college savings deposit per child; run by Springboard To Opportunities with philanthropic funds (funders unverified).	Launched 2018; cohort 2: 110 mothers (to March 2021); cohort 3: 100 mothers (April 2021-March 2022); 2023-24 cohort evaluated. Called the longest-running US guaranteed income program in July 2026; later cohort sizes unverified.	Pre-post changes, no control comparison reported. 110-mother cohort (Springboard 2021): paying bills on time 27% to 83%; emergency savings 40% to 88%; enough money for food 64% to 81%. The 2023-24 cohort evaluation reports gains in financial stability and wellbeing (Aspen Ascend 2026).	C+
F39 St. Paul guaranteed income pilots: People's Prosperity Pilot and CollegeBound Boost Saint Paul, Minnesota, United States 2020-2024 (People's Prosperity 2020-2022; CollegeBound Boost from summer 2022 for two years) Pilot completed	CollegeBound savings families: People's Prosperity paid 150 families USD 500 a month for 18 months; CollegeBound Boost paid 333 randomly chosen families USD 500 a month for 24 months plus USD 1,000 per child.	People's Prosperity: 150 families, 2020 to April 2022, CARES Act and philanthropy. Boost: 333 families from summer 2022, USD 4 million federal relief plus USD 1 million philanthropy. Both ended.	People's Prosperity, Penn CGIR study without control group (KSTP, December 2023): 40-47% could cover a USD 400 emergency during payments, 27% six months after; employment 49% at baseline, 63% six months after. Boost: random selection, University of Michigan evaluation (William Elliott); impact results unverified.	C+
F42 The Bridge Project New York City (Washington Heights, Inwood, Central Harlem), New York, United States 2021-present Pilot running	Pregnant women or mothers of babies under one in three Manhattan neighborhoods receive USD 500 or USD 1,000 a month, paid biweekly, for three years, unconditionally; funded by the Monarch Foundation.	Launched June 2021 as New York City's first guaranteed income initiative; first study cohort of 200 (CGIR lists 100 treatment, 100 control). Listed as active with further phases planned; 2025-26 enrollment unverified.	Randomized controlled trial by Penn CGIR comparing USD 500 and USD 1,000 monthly arms on maternal health and child development (CGIR); results not yet reported by CGIR.	C+

TRANSFERS · SECTION G

G. Conditional and targeted cash at national scale

Conditional and targeted transfers are among the developing world's largest income programs. Bolsa Família guarantees R\$600 a month per poor family; the Philippines' 4Ps reached more than 4 million households and Pakistan's BISP 9.3 million families. They are among the best-evaluated transfers: Indonesia's PKH cut stunting 23-27% in a six-year randomized follow-up. They are also politically exposed: Mexico ended Prospera in 2019 after 22 years, and teenage boys' school enrollment fell 12 points within six months.

Grade **A** randomized or quasi-experimental · **B** administrative or natural-experiment evidence · **C** descriptive or too early · **W** in white paper v02 · + added here

Latin America

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
G01 Bolsa Família Brazil 2003-present (relaunched under Law 14,601 of 19 June 2023) Operating	Federal: families earning up to R\$218 per person monthly get R\$142 per member, minimum R\$600 per family, R\$150 per child under 7, R\$50 per child 7-17 or pregnant or nursing member; health and school conditions.	Nearly 14 million households (50 million people), about 0.6% of GDP, in 2013 (World Bank). Relaunched by Law 14,601 of June 2023; families rising above R\$218 keep 50% for up to 24 months.	Glewwe and Kassouf 2012 , school-census panel exploiting staggered program adoption: enrollment up about 5.5% in grades 1-4 and 6.5% in grades 5-8; dropout down 0.5 and 0.4 points; grade promotion up 0.9 and 0.3 points. Effects on participants are about three times larger, since about one-third of children took part.	A +
G02 Progres a / Oportunidades / Prospera Mexico 1997-2019 Ended	Federal cash to poor families conditional on children's schooling and family clinic visits and health talks; transfers raised beneficiaries' average incomes by about 30% (VoxDev 2025 ; Americas Quarterly).	About 7 million low-income households, roughly one-fourth of Mexican households, before its March 2019 end (VoxDev 2025). A model for many of the over sixty countries running conditional transfers by 2017 (Parker and Todd 2017).	Marquez-Padilla, Parker and Vogl 2025 , difference-in-differences on local program penetration: within six months of the 2019 shutdown, enrollment of teenage boys fell 12 points (17% of the mean), 18 points in the poorest households; over half of these dropouts joined the labor force (summary).	A +
G03 Familias en Acción (succeeded by Renta Ciudadana) Colombia 2002-2023 (final transfer cycle December 2023, paid through June 2024) Ended	National cash transfer to poor families: COP 50,000 a month per child under 7 and COP 15,000-40,000 per child 7-17 by school grade (2009) (VoxDev); since 2024 paid through Renta Ciudadana (Decree 1960 of 2023).	About 20% of Colombians were potentially eligible after the 2007 urban expansion (VoxDev 2023). Successor Renta Ciudadana, run by Prosperidad Social since 2024, pays Valoración del Cuidado and Colombia sin Hambre lines (Prosperidad Social).	Attanasio et al. 2021 , regression discontinuity at the Sisben eligibility threshold, urban program: men's arrest rates down 2.7 points, teenage pregnancy down 2.3 points, high school dropout down 5.8 points, men's college enrollment up 1.7 points and formal employment up 3.4 points (VoxDev 2023).	A +
G21 Juntos (Programa Nacional de Apoyo Directo a los Más Pobres) Peru (national) 2005-present Operating	MIDIS pays poor households with pregnant women, children or adolescents S/ 200 every two months, conditional on prenatal care, child growth checks, vaccination and school attendance; early-childhood top-up adds S/ 100.	771,318 households paid in the second 2026 cycle (May); 90,905 households also received the S/ 100 Transferencia Primera Infancia (La República); 17,960 households newly affiliated in the last 2025 period (RDE 355-2025).	Impact evaluation results (unverified).	C +

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
G22 Chile Solidario (2002-2017) and successor Ingreso Ético Familiar / Subsistema Seguridades y Oportunidades Chile (national) 2002-present Operating (modified)	Extreme-poor families get up to two years of home visits and guaranteed access to services; adult women receive monthly Bono de Protección declining over 24 months, then (Chile Solidario only) a three-year Bono de Egreso.	Chile Solidario ran 2002-2017; successor Seguridades y Oportunidades operates in 2026: Bono Base Familiar about CLP 58,594 a month (Meganoticias); protection and exit bonuses CLP 21.8 billion in 2021, 2022 pesos (DIPRES).	Carneiro, Galasso and Ginja 2015 , regression discontinuity on the eligibility index of family income and assets (Economic Journal 2019): strong and lasting increases in take-up of subsidies and employment services, concentrated among families with little prior access to welfare. Successor-program effects (unverified).	A +

Asia and Europe

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
G04 Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) Philippines 2008-present (institutionalized by Republic Act 11310 of 17 April 2019) Operating	Poor families with children 0-18 get PHP 750 monthly health grant, PHP 600 rice subsidy and PHP 300-700 per child monthly for 10 months (up to 3), conditional on 85% attendance and health visits (DSWD).	More than four million households (January 2020) (PIDS for DSWD). Republic Act 11310 sets a 7-year limit; an executive order extended it for qualified families; First 1,000 Days grant expanded 9 July 2026 (DSWD).	Regression-discontinuity third-wave evaluation (PIDS 2020 ; Orbeta, Melad and Araos 2023): higher enrollment at ages 12-17, more prenatal visits and deworming, higher per capita income; no effect on child labor; unexpected negative effects on some nutrition outcomes.	A +
G05 Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH) Indonesia 2007-present (randomized pilot assignment 2007; first transfers early 2008) Operating	Government cash to poor households with pregnant women or children, IDR 600,000-2,200,000 a year in the pilot, designed as 15-20% of household income, conditional on health and schooling requirements (Cahyadi et al. 2018).	Over 2.3 million households in more than 3,400 sub-districts by 2013 (Cahyadi et al. 2018). Still operating in 2026 (unverified).	Cahyadi et al. 2020 , randomized by sub-district, six-year follow-up of about 14,000 households: stunting down 9-11 points (23-27%), severe stunting down 56-62%; non-enrollment at ages 7-15 halved; wage work at ages 13-15 down at least one-third (paper).	A +
G09 Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP), including Benazir Kafaalat Pakistan 2008-present Operating	Quarterly cash to women in poor households ranked by a poverty scorecard; PKR 10,500 a quarter from January 2024, up from 8,750, with conditional health and education top-ups; federal budget (Business Recorder 2024).	9.3 million families and a PKR 472 billion budget in FY2023-24; conditional programs enrolled 0.9 million families and 1.9 million children (IMF review, per Business Recorder, May 2024). 5.29 million beneficiaries in 2016 (OPM).	Cheema et al. 2016 , regression discontinuity at the poverty-score cutoff: consumption up PKR 187 per adult equivalent a month; poverty gap down 3 points; more small livestock; less reliance on casual labor; more mobility for women; less wasting among girls; no effect on school attendance.	A +
G20 Şartlı Nakit Transferi (ŞNT): conditional education and health assistance (Şartlı Eğitim Yardımı, Şartlı Sağlık Yardımı) Türkiye (national) 2003 (unverified) to present Operating	Mothers (first) in needy families without social security (Law 3294) get per-child monthly rates, paid bimonthly: TL 270 boys, 300 girls in primary; TL 390, 450 in secondary; at most 4 absent days monthly.	Health strand: TL 350 monthly per child aged 0-6, TL 700 in pregnancy, TL 1,750 for hospital birth; rates in force 2026. EU-financed YŞEY pays foreign nationals the same education rates. Beneficiaries and spending (unverified).	No impact evaluation cited.	C +

Africa and the Middle East

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
G06 Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) Ethiopia (rural) 2005-present (Phase 5: 2021-2025) Operating	Chronically food-insecure rural households get cash or food: public-works participants for six months a year, labor-constrained households unconditionally for 12 months; government with development partners (EU EUR 35 million) (EEAS 2025).	Phase 5 (2021-2025) targets about 8 million people: about 7 million in public works, 1 million on direct support (EEAS, April 2025). Continuation beyond 2025 (unverified).	Gilligan, Hoddinott and Taffesse 2008 , propensity-score matching, no randomization: small average effects as transfers fell short of targets; households getting at least half of intended transfers had better food security; with agricultural support, households were likelier to be food secure, borrow productively, adopt improved technologies and run nonfarm businesses, without labor disincentives.	B +
G07 COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress (SRD) grant South Africa 2020-present (extended to March 2027) Operating	National budget pays R370 a month to eligible working-age adults; introduced in 2020 as a short-term COVID-19 measure for poor households; value frozen in 2026 while other grants rose 3.6-3.7% (Business Day 2026).	8.2 million beneficiaries; additional R36.4 billion allocated to continue it in 2026/27 (Business Day, 25 Feb 2026). Extended to March 2027 while proposals link working-age recipients to skills and employment programmes (EWN, 12 Nov 2025).	Evidence is administrative: by December SASSA had checked bank accounts of 6 million beneficiaries; over 291,000 grants were flagged for review and over 34,600 cancelled (2026 budget review, per Business Day).	C +
G08 Novissi Togo 2020-2021 (payment phases April 2020 to March 2021) Ended	Government mobile-money transfers to informal workers hit by COVID-19 restrictions, registered by phone with voter ID: FCFA 12,250 a month for women, 10,500 for men, in biweekly installments (Aiken et al. 2022).	819,972 beneficiaries of 1,632,942 registered; FCFA 13.3 billion paid in phases from April 2020 to March 2021 (Novissi). A rural phase in the 100 poorest cantons targeted 60,000 people with US\$4 million (Aiken et al.).	Aiken et al. 2022 , Nature: poverty predicted from phone metadata by machine learning, trained on 2018-2020 surveys, reduced exclusion errors by 4-21% relative to the geographic targeting options considered. The study measures targeting accuracy, not welfare effects of the transfers.	B +
G10 Government cash transfers in sub-Saharan Africa with impact evaluations: Kenya CT-OVC, Malawi SCTP, Zambia Child Grant and Multiple Categorical Targeting Grant, Lesotho CGP, Ghana LEAP (Transfer Project) Kenya; Malawi; Zambia; Lesotho; Ghana 2004-present (Kenya CT-OVC 2004; Malawi SCTP pilot 2006; Ghana LEAP 2008; Zambia CGP 2010) Operating	Government-run unconditional cash for ultra-poor households with orphans, young children, elderly or disabled members: Kenya CT-OVC KES 2,000 a month (up from 1,500); Malawi SCTP MWK 2,600-5,600 a month by household size (2020).	Malawi SCTP about 283,000 households, 1,195,000 people (August 2020); Kenya CT-OVC 240,000-250,000 households (2014-15); Zambia CGP and MCTG 145,000 households (2015). Each still operating in 2026 (unverified).	Randomized trials: Kenya CT-OVC (2,759 households, 2007-2011), Malawi SCTP (3,531, 2013-2015), Zambia CGP (2,515) and MCTG (3,078). UNICEF 2025 brief : poverty headcount down 8.8 points (Lesotho CGP) and 2.1 (Ghana LEAP 1000); Malawi poverty gap down 12.6 points and livestock ownership up 22 points; local multipliers 1.23-1.35 per dollar (Lesotho, Malawi, Kenya).	A +
G11 Other national conditional cash transfers: Takaful and Karama (Egypt), Bono de Desarrollo Humano (Ecuador), PATH (Jamaica) Egypt; Ecuador; Jamaica Various (Takaful and Karama from 2015) Operating	Egypt: Takaful pays women in poor families with children, conditional on schooling and health monitoring; Karama pays poor elderly, disabled people and orphans. Ecuador: government cash to poor mothers. Jamaica: PATH health and education transfers.	Takaful and Karama: 3.11 million households enrolled, 31 million registered applicants (November 2020) (IFPRI); 2.25 million beneficiaries, 87% Takaful, covering about 9.4 million people (October 2018) (IFPRI). Operating in 2026 (unverified).	Paxson and Schady 2010 , parish-level randomization, Ecuador: modest positive effects on physical, cognitive and socioemotional development of the poorest children. Levy and Ohls 2010 , Jamaica: higher school attendance and preventive health visits; no effect on marks, grade progression or health status. Breisinger et al. 2018 , Egypt: consumption up 8.4%, poverty probability down 11% (IFPRI).	A +

TRANSFERS · SECTION H

H. Emergency and one-off payments

Universal one-off payments are now a routine crisis tool. Three US rounds in 2020-2021 totalled more than USD 800 billion; Japan paid JPY 100,000 to 126.6 million residents, and Taiwan TWD 10,000 per person in 2025-26. Randomized or staggered payment timing makes them the best-measured transfers for spending: US households spent 12-40% of the 2001 and 2008 rebates on nondurables within three months and about 10% of the 2020 payments, more when they held little cash.

Grade **A** randomized or quasi-experimental · **B** administrative or natural-experiment evidence · **C** descriptive or too early · **W** in white paper v02 · + added here

United States

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
H01 Economic Impact Payments (CARES Act 2020, COVID-related Tax Relief Act 2020, American Rescue Plan Act 2021) United States 2020-2021 One-off	Federal budget: up to USD 1,200 per adult plus USD 500 per child (March 2020); USD 600 per adult and child (December 2020); USD 1,400 per person (March 2021); phase-out above USD 75,000 single.	Round 1: USD 271 billion disbursed, about 145 million payments by mid-2020; round 2 about USD 150 billion; round 3 just over USD 400 billion. Ended after the third round in 2021.	Parker, Schild, Erhard and Johnson (NBER 2022) : households spent about 10% of 2020 payments on nondurables within three months, 21.7% with low liquid wealth. Parker et al. (BPEA 2022) : 4.6-15.8% on nondurables across rounds. Census (Burns, Wilson and Fox 2021) : 2020 payments moved 11.7 million people, 3.2 million children, out of SPM poverty.	A W
H02 Economic Stimulus Payments (Economic Stimulus Act of 2008) United States 2008 One-off	Federal tax rebates: USD 300-600 per individual filer, USD 600-1,200 per couple, plus USD 300 per child; payment week set by the last two digits of the Social Security number.	About USD 100 billion paid to some 130 million taxpayers in 2008.	Parker, Souleles, Johnson and McClelland (AER 2013) , using randomized payment timing in the Consumer Expenditure Survey: households spent 12-30% of payments on nondurables and 50-90% in total, including vehicles, within three months; payments raised second-quarter 2008 personal consumption expenditures by 1.3-2.3% (NBER Digest).	A +
H03 2001 income tax rebates (Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001) United States 2001 One-off	Federal rebate checks of up to USD 300 (single), USD 500 (head of household) or USD 600 (married couple), mailed late July to end of September 2001 in weeks set by Social Security number digits.	USD 38 billion in rebates; about two-thirds of US households received one.	Johnson, Parker and Souleles (AER 2006) , exploiting randomly assigned mailing weeks: households spent 20-40% of rebates on nondurables in the three-month period of receipt and about two-thirds cumulatively over six months; larger responses for low-liquidity and low-income households.	A +

East Asia

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
H04 Special Cash Payment (Tokubetsu Teigaku Kyufukin) Japan 2020 One-off	JPY 100,000 per resident regardless of age, income or employment, paid per household by municipalities May-August 2020 from a national budget of JPY 12.73 trillion.	Payments for 126.6 million people by autumn 2020 (Cabinet Office follow-up, November 2020).	Kubota, Onishi and Toyama (JEBO 2021), using administrative payment delays across municipalities and 2.8 million bank accounts: spending jumped in the payment week and stayed elevated over a month; working-paper summary : MPC 0.49 (outflows) over six weeks. Kaneda, Kubota and Tanaka (2021): MPC 0.16 (range 0.06-0.27), higher for liquidity-constrained households.	A ⁺
H05 Fixed-Amount Cash Payment (Teigaku Kyufukin) Japan 2009 One-off	Flat cash payment per resident, JPY 12,000 or JPY 20,000 for those aged 65+ or 18 and under (amounts unverified), paid by municipalities from a national budget of JPY 1.957 trillion.	JPY 1.9367 trillion paid to 97.7% of 54.73 million eligible households by 31 March 2010, 99.0% of budget (MIC final result).	Administrative data only: 91.4% of eligible households paid by 27 July 2009 and 97.7% by 31 March 2010 (MIC 2009, MIC 2010).	C ⁺
H06 Child-Rearing Support Allowance for High Prices (Bukkadaka Taio Kosodate Oen Teate) Japan 2026 One-off	One-time JPY 20,000 per child, paid by municipalities for children eligible for child allowance for September 2025 or born 1 October 2025 to 31 March 2026.	Municipal payments in 2026; Imabari City began paying on 10 March 2026.	No evaluation results; paid in 2026.	C ⁺
H07 Cash Payout Scheme Hong Kong SAR, China 2020-2021 One-off	HKD 10,000 to each eligible Hong Kong permanent resident aged 18 or above, paid from the government budget to relieve financial burden and encourage local consumption.	About 7 million eligible people and about HKD 70 billion; by 27 January 2021 about HKD 64 billion paid to some 6.4 million people, over 90%.	Administrative data only: administrative cost about HKD 306 million, about 0.4% of the budget (LCQ1, January 2021).	C ⁺
H08 Consumption Voucher Scheme Hong Kong SAR, China 2021-2022 One-off	Government-funded electronic vouchers paid in instalments to permanent residents and new arrivals aged 18+: HKD 5,000 from 1 August 2021; HKD 10,000 from 7 April 2022.	2021: over 6.3 million registrants, about HKD 31.5 billion; 2022: over HKD 60 billion. A further HKD 5,000 round in 2023 (unverified).	Government Economist estimates, not causal: stimulus equal to 0.7 percentage point of GDP (2021) and 1.2 points (2022) (LCQ21, December 2022); retail sales up 9.6% year on year during the 2021 scheme (LCQ1, January 2022).	C ⁺
H24 Scheme \$6,000 Hong Kong SAR, China 2011-2012 One-off	HKD 6,000 to each Hong Kong permanent identity card holder aged 18 or above on 28 August 2011, adopted as an adjustment to the 2011-12 Budget; HKD 6,200 for second-stage registrants from 1 April 2012.	About 6.1 million eligible; payments estimated at HKD 36.8 billion plus HKD 75.8 million administration. By 15 February 2012, 4.47 million (72 percent) registered and about HKD 26.8 billion paid.	Administrative data only: 4.47 million registrations, 72 percent of eligible persons, and about HKD 26.8 billion paid by 15 February 2012 (GIA, February 2012, SFST, March 2012).	C ⁺
H09 Emergency Disaster Relief Fund (Emergency Disaster Relief Payments) South Korea 2020 One-off	Up to KRW 1 million per household (KRW 400,000 for one person to KRW 1 million for four or more, unverified), financed by the second 2020 supplementary budget passed 30 April 2020.	Plan of 31 March 2020: bottom 70% of households, about 14 million, KRW 9.1 trillion. Extension to all households at about KRW 14.3 trillion (unverified).	Card-spending response estimates by KDI (unverified). Gyeonggi province announced its own KRW 100,000 payment to every resident (ADB).	C ⁺

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
H10 Triple Stimulus Vouchers Taiwan 2020 One-off	Residents paid TWD 1,000 to receive TWD 3,000 in vouchers, a TWD 2,000 public subsidy per person; announced 15 July 2020; extended 12 November 2020 to foreign permanent residents and diplomatic ID holders.	Nationwide in 2020; total cost and take-up (unverified).	Descriptive policy record only (ADB).	C +
H11 Universal cash handouts (TWD 6,000 in 2023; TWD 10,000 in 2025) Taiwan 2023; 2025-2026 One-off	TWD 10,000 per registered national and qualifying resident under the Special Act for Strengthening Economic, Social, Livelihood and National Security Resilience in Response to International Circumstances; follows the 2023 TWD 6,000 handout.	TWD 236 billion within a TWD 550 billion special budget passed 17 October 2025 (Taiwan News); registration from 5 November, ATM withdrawal from 17 November 2025; claims closed 30 April 2026 (Taiwan News).	Descriptive only: eligibility and five delivery channels (direct remittance, registration, ATM, post office, roster) (Ministry of Finance).	C +
H23 Consumer vouchers (2009 Shopping Voucher Program) Taiwan 2009 One-off	Universal one-off vouchers to each individual, spent at vendors, some offering discounts to voucher users; TWD 3,600 per person (unverified), distributed January 2009 (unverified).	Single universal, well-publicized round in 2009. Total cost and number of recipients (unverified).	Kan, Peng and Wang (2017) : survey-based marginal propensity to consume of about one quarter, comparable to studies of fiscal stimulus payments; vendor discounts for voucher users significantly raised the programme's effect.	B +
H21 Solidarity Payment and Care and Support - Cash (Budget 2020) Singapore 2020 One-off	SGD 600 per citizen aged 21+, including SGD 300 of Care and Support Cash paid early; that cash totalled SGD 300-900 by assessable income, plus SGD 300 for parents of children aged 20 or under.	Paid from 14 April 2020, about 90 percent by direct bank credit; remaining Care and Support Cash paid from 18 June 2020 to over 2.8 million Singaporeans. Total cost (unverified).	Administrative payout records only: MOF releases report payment dates, channels and recipient counts, not spending effects (MOF, April 2020 , MOF, June 2020).	C +

Other high-income countries

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
H13 Canada Emergency Response Benefit (CERB) Canada 2020 Ended	Federal taxable benefit of CAD 2,000 per four-week period (CAD 500 a week) for residents aged 15+ with at least CAD 5,000 in earnings who stopped working due to COVID-19, 15 March-3 October 2020.	8.90 million unique applicants; CAD 74.08 billion in CERB payments (data to 4 October 2020). Closed; ineligible recipients must repay.	Statistics Canada (2022) : official poverty rate fell from 10.3% (2019) to 6.4% (2020), about 1.4 million fewer people in poverty, driven by COVID-19 income supports of about CAD 82 billion to 8.1 million families and individuals.	B +
H14 Economic Support Payments and Coronavirus Supplement Australia 2020-2021 Ended	Federal lump sums to pensioners, seniors, carers and concession card holders: two AUD 750 payments in 2020, then two AUD 250 payments; plus a temporary Coronavirus Supplement on income-support payments.	First AUD 750 payment to about 6.6 million people (World Bank, May 2020). Supplement extended and adjusted from 25 September 2020 to 31 March 2021.	Descriptive government and World Bank reporting only (Treasury ; World Bank, May 2020).	C +
H22 Economic Security Strategy payments (December 2008) and Household Stimulus Package payments (March-May 2009) Australia 2008-2009 One-off	December 2008: AUD 1,400 single pensioners, AUD 2,100 couples, AUD 1,000 carers, plus Family Tax Benefit A families. 2009: AUD 900 tax bonus (less above AUD 80,000), AUD 950 per schoolchild, AUD 900 single-income families.	About AUD 8.8 billion paid December 2008 (Leigh) and AUD 12.2 billion for 2008-09 household stimulus payments (Treasury); 10.6 million families and singles expected to receive at least one payment.	Leigh (2012) : June 2009 survey of 1,201 people; 40 percent of households reporting receipt said they had spent it, an aggregate MPC of 0.41-0.42, about twice US 2001 and 2008 rebate rates (working paper). Treasury projected the full stimulus would lift GDP 2.75 percent in 2009-10 and support up to 210,000 jobs (Budget 2009-10).	B +

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
H20 Kinderbonus (child bonus), 2020 and 2021 Germany 2020-2021 One-off	Temporary Kindergeld increase for every child entitled to child benefit: EUR 300 per child under the 2020 stimulus package, paid September and October 2020, and EUR 150 per child in 2021.	2020 round budgeted at EUR 4.3 billion; EUR 450 per child across both rounds. Cost of the 2021 round and number of children (unverified).	IMK (Behringer, Dullien and Gechert 2021) : survey of over 6,100 workers and jobseekers found about 51 percent of the 2020 bonus spent by November, 37 percent of recipients spending all of it. Bachmann, Bayer and Kornejew (2022) : 28-37 percent spent as additional consumption; low-liquidity households spent nearly all of it. Bundesbank (2022) : consumption rose only slightly.	B +
H15 Cost of Living Payments United Kingdom 2022-2024 One-off	Tax-free DWP lump sums to means-tested benefit and tax credit recipients: instalments of GBP 326, 324, 301, 300 and 299 in 2022-2024; two GBP 150 disability payments; GBP 150 or 300 pensioner top-ups.	Up to GBP 1,550 per eligible claimant across five means-tested instalments, 2022-2024. Ended; DWP plans no further payments (guidance updated 1 April 2026).	Descriptive administrative guidance only (GOV.UK).	C +
H16 Winter Fuel Payment (2024-2026 eligibility changes) United Kingdom (England, Wales, Northern Ireland) 2024-2026 (eligibility changes) Operating (modified)	Annual GBP 100-300 heating payment, mostly automatic, for people born on or before 27 June 1960 in England, Wales or Northern Ireland (winter 2026-27); HMRC recovers it from those with income over GBP 35,000.	Winter 2026-27 qualifying week 21-27 September 2026; Scotland uses Pension Age Winter Heating Payment instead. Winter 2024-25 limited to Pension Credit and other means-tested benefit recipients (unverified).	Descriptive eligibility rules only (GOV.UK).	C +

Middle-income countries and the global tally

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
H12 Auxílio Emergencial Brazil 2020-2021 Ended	Federal monthly transfer (Lei 13.982/2020): BRL 600 (BRL 1,200 for female household heads) April-August 2020; four BRL 300 (600) payments September-December 2020; BRL 150-375 April-October 2021.	About 68 million people in the first phase; 39.3 million in 2021; more than BRL 231 billion paid April-December 2020. Ended October 2021.	Andrade and Souza (2025) , simulation on PNAD-Covid 2020: extreme poverty 3.5% with the benefit versus 12.9% without; Gini 0.524 versus 0.573; Northeast extreme poverty 5.9% versus 25.3%.	B +
H17 Pandemic emergency transfers in Latin America (Argentina IFE; Chile IFE and Bono IFE Universal; Colombia Ingreso Solidario) Argentina; Chile; Colombia 2020-2021 Ended	Argentina IFE: ARS 10,000 to one member per family for April 2020. Announced: Argentina IFE 23 March 2020, Colombia Ingreso Solidario 22 March 2020, Chile IFE 20 April 2020, Bono IFE Universal 6 June 2021.	Argentina IFE expected 3.6 million beneficiary families as of May 2020. Final coverage, costs and end dates (unverified).	Descriptive policy inventories only (ECLAC ; World Bank, May 2020).	C +
H18 Pandemic emergency transfers in South Asia (Pakistan Ehsaas Emergency Cash; India PM Garib Kalyan Yojana transfers to Jan Dhan accounts) Pakistan; India 2020 One-off	Pakistan: federal cash transfers to low-income families and relief for daily-wage workers, announced 24 March 2020. India: emergency deposits into Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana accounts in 2020; per-family amounts (unverified).	Pakistan: PKR 150 billion for 12 million low-income families plus PKR 75 billion approved for 6.2 million workers (March 2020). India: Jan Dhan transfers reached 200 million people.	Descriptive coverage tallies only (ADB ; Gentilini et al. 2022).	C +

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
H19 Social Protection and Jobs Responses to COVID-19: A Real-Time Review of Country Measures (World Bank living review, Gentilini et al.) Global (223 economies) 2020-2022 One-off	Tally of 3,856 social protection and labor measures in 223 economies; about 61% social assistance, including 962 cash transfer measures in 203 countries, averaging 4.5 months initially and 30% of monthly GDP per capita.	Cash transfers reached 1.36 billion people; social protection and labor spending about USD 3 trillion in 2020-2021. Version 16, 2 February 2022.	Descriptive global inventory of coverage and design, without causal estimates (Gentilini et al. 2022).	C +

WAGE-ADJACENT · SECTION I

I. Public jobs, wage subsidies and in-work credits

Employment guarantees have run at national scale. India's MGNREGA gave work to about 6 crore households a year until a 125-day guarantee replaced it in July 2026; Argentina's Plan Jefes reached about 2 million households in 2002. Austria's Marienthal pilot raised employment among the long-term unemployed by 46 points. Job-retention subsidies supported 11.7 million UK jobs in 2020-2021, German short-time work peaked at 5.96 million people in April 2020, and the US Paycheck Protection Program cost USD 169,000-258,000 per job-year retained.

Grade **A** randomized or quasi-experimental · **B** administrative or natural-experiment evidence · **C** descriptive or too early · **W** in white paper v02 · **+** added here

Job guarantees and public works

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
I01 Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) scheme India (all rural districts) 2005-2026 Ended	Rural households volunteering for unskilled manual work were guaranteed 100 days of work a year at notified wages (2025: Rs 281 Rajasthan, Rs 336 Tamil Nadu); the Centre paid all unskilled wages.	About 6 crore households a year obtained work in 2017-25 (90% of those demanding it); 50 days per household in 2024-25. Spending Rs 85,834 crore (2024-25), Rs 88,000 crore (2025-26 RE). Repealed 1 July 2026 and replaced by the VB-G RAM G Act, 2025 : 125 days, 60:40 Centre-state cost sharing, Rs 95,692 crore budgeted 2026-27 (Meghalaya DIPR).	Muralidharan, Niehaus and Sukhtankar (Econometrica 2023) , randomized improvement of program implementation: beneficiary earnings +14%, poverty -26%, with 86% of gains from higher private-sector wages and employment. Imbert and Papp (AEJ: Applied 2015) , phased district rollout: public hiring crowded out private work and raised private wages.	A +
I02 Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados Argentina (national) 2002-2005 (end year unverified) Ended	Unemployed household heads with dependants (children under 18 or disabled) received 150 pesos a month against a 20-hour work requirement (community work, training, schooling or a subsidized private job); about one-quarter World Bank loan-financed.	About 2 million households by late 2002; government spending about US\$500 million in 2002.	Galasso and Ravallion (World Bank Economic Review 2004) : unemployment rate about 2.5 percentage points lower (versus 5.8 points claimed earlier); as many participants came from inactivity as from unemployment; about 10% of participants kept out of extreme poverty, about 2 points lower nationally; about one-third of recipients did not meet eligibility rules.	A +
I03 Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) South Africa (all spheres of government) 2004-present Operating	Government departments, municipalities, state-owned enterprises and non-profits hire unemployed people for temporary labour-intensive work in infrastructure, environment and culture, social and community programmes, funded from public budgets.	More than 14 million work opportunities from 2004 to April 2024. Phase V (April 2024-March 2029) targets 5 million and had created 1.7 million by March 2026.	Reported results are counts of work opportunities, not measured employment or income effects. In October 2024 the Deputy Minister of Public Works called for better collection, verification and recording of work opportunities by sector (SAnews 2024).	C +
I04 New Deal work relief: Works Progress (Work Projects) Administration (WPA) and Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) United States (national) 1933-1943 Ended	Federally funded relief jobs on public projects: WPA (from May 1935) paid hourly earnings roughly half to two-thirds of regular public works pay; CCC (from 1933) employed young unemployed citizens on conservation work.	WPA employed between 1.5 and 3.3 million people on projects at a time (peak about 3.3 million). About half of New Deal grants went to relief. Total WPA spending and CCC enrollment (unverified).	Fishback (NBER 2016) review of panel and instrumental-variable studies: relief and public works spending had state income multipliers around one; after 1935 each relief job displaced about two-thirds of a private job; 10% more work relief per capita cut property crime 1.5%; relief spending lowered infant mortality, suicides and infectious-disease deaths.	A +

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
I05 Modellprojekt Arbeitsplatzgarantie Marienthal (MAGMA) Gramatneusiedl, Lower Austria, Austria 2020-2024 Pilot completed	Residents unemployed 9+ months were offered, after up to 8 weeks of training, voluntary social-enterprise or subsidized private jobs at collective-agreement wages (about EUR 1,500 a month, 2020); AMS Lower Austria budget EUR 7.4 million.	107 participants from October 2020 to March 2024 (112 eligible residents).	Kasy and Lehner (AEJ: Policy, forthcoming 2026) , matched randomization of start dates plus pre-registered synthetic control: employment share +46 points; long-term unemployment below 1% of working-age residents; no negative spillovers; gains in well-being, status and inclusion; no effect on measured health; net cost EUR 237 per participant-month; participant income +EUR 102.	A +
I06 Territoires zéro chômeur de longue durée (TZCLD) France (83 habilitated territories) 2016-present Pilot running	Entreprises à but d'emploi (EBE) hire long-term unemployed volunteers for locally unmet work; State and départements pay 95% of gross hourly SMIC per full-time equivalent plus start-up grants of 30% of annual SMIC per hire.	From 10 territories (2016) to 83; 3,813 employees in 92 EBEs in 2025. End extended to 31 December 2026 by the 2026 finance law; permanence bill in second reading (September 2026).	Senate report 2026 citing the Cour des comptes (June 2025) and scientific committee: public funding EUR 47 million in 2023; about EUR 26,600 a year per full-time job created; 37% of hires were RSA recipients; exits to ordinary employment marginal.	C +
I14 Public works scheme (közfoglalkoztatás) Hungary (national) 2012-present (earlier start unverified) Operating	Government-funded public works jobs paid a special wage below the minimum wage: 77% of it in 2012, cut to 59% by 2018 to strengthen job-search incentives.	Enrolment fell to just below 150,000 by 2017 as the schemes were scaled down. Peak enrolment, spending and 2025-26 status (unverified).	OECD Economic Survey of Hungary (2019) : until early 2017 only 10-12% of enrollees later found jobs in the primary labour market, rising to 19% from early 2017 as job opportunities grew; judged successful anti-poverty measures but less so as an active labour market measure.	B +
I31 Teilhabechancengesetz subsidised employment: Teilhabe am Arbeitsmarkt (section 16i SGB II) and Eingliederung von Langzeitarbeitslosen (section 16e SGB II) Germany (national) 2019-present Operating (modified)	Jobcentre wage subsidies plus coaching: 16i (age 25+, on benefits 6 of 7 years) pays 100 percent for two years, falling 10 points yearly, maximum five years; 16e: 75 then 50 percent over two years.	June 2023 stock: about 38,000 (16i), just under 7,000 (16e); 2022 spending EUR 908 million and EUR 137 million. 16i permanent since 2023; from July 2026 16e targets long-term recipients, Passiv-Aktiv-Transfer extended.	IAB final evaluation (Achatz et al. 2024) : both instruments improve employability, social integration and other subjective indicators, 16e with a strong employment effect, no undesirable side effects, short observation window. Kasrin and Tübbicke (2026) : propensity-score matching of May-October 2019 entrants finds higher employment and lower benefit receipt up to 14 months after subsidy end.	A +

Job-retention subsidies

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
I07 Kurzarbeitergeld (short-time work allowance) Germany (national) Ongoing (peaks 2009 and 2020) Operating	When work falls for economic reasons, the Federal Employment Agency (BA) pays employees part of the net pay lost for hours not worked, so firms cut hours instead of jobs. Replacement rates (unverified).	Cyclical short-time work peaked at 1.44 million people in May 2009 (5% of employees) and 5.96 million in April 2020 (18% of employees subject to social insurance). Cost and 2025-26 take-up (unverified).	Giupponi, Landais and Lapeyre (JEP 2022) review: short-time work reduces socially costly layoffs against large temporary shocks but is less effective against persistent shocks that need reallocation; it complements unemployment insurance. Germany-specific causal estimates (unverified).	B +
I08 Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS, furlough) United Kingdom 2020-2021 Ended	Government grants via HMRC to employers covering up to 80% of furloughed employees' salary, capped at GBP 2,500 a month per employee; 70% from 1 July 2021 and 60% from 1 August 2021.	11.7 million jobs supported at various times from 1.3 million employers; peak 8.9 million on 8 May 2020; claims GBP 70.0 billion (to 21 November 2021).	HMRC administrative claims data (HMRC 2021); the final statistics give no estimate of jobs saved. Giupponi, Landais and Lapeyre (JEP 2022) conclude job retention schemes work best against large temporary shocks.	B +

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
I09 JobKeeper Payment Australia 2020-2021 Ended	Flat A\$1,500 a fortnight (before tax) per eligible employee, paid through eligible employers and administered by the ATO; it acted as a minimum salary for covered employees. Business eligibility tests (unverified).	About 3.5 million individuals received the payment between April and July 2020. Total cost (unverified).	Bishop and Day (RBA 2020) , eligibility-threshold design on casual employees in Labour Force Survey data: one in five recipients would otherwise not have stayed employed; employment losses reduced by at least 700,000 in April-July 2020; longer-run effects not estimated.	A +
I10 Pandemic wage subsidies: Canada Emergency Wage Subsidy (CEWS) and Netherlands NOW (Tijdelijke Noodmaatregel Overbrugging voor behoud van Werkgelegenheid) Canada; Netherlands 2020-2021 (CEWS); NOW end year (unverified) Ended	CEWS paid employers a fixed proportion (75%) of eligible employees' usual wages; NOW paid employers a subsidy proportional to their fall in sales (90%), not to hours lost; both government-funded.	CEWS eligibility ran retroactively from 15 March 2020, with claim periods scheduled to June 2021. Take-up, total cost and closing dates for both (unverified).	OECD (2020) contrasts these subsidies with hours-based short-time work: NOW support was proportional to sales losses and CEWS to usual wages, not to hours lost. Causal evaluations of either scheme (unverified).	C +
I11 Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) United States 2020-2021 Ended	SBA-backed low-cost loans to small businesses, forgiven if employees were retained and at least 60% of funds went to payroll costs; about USD 800 billion, federally funded.	About USD 800 billion; preserved 2 to 3 million job-years of employment over 14 months (Autor et al. 2022).	Autor et al. (JEP 2022) : cost USD 169,000 to 258,000 per job-year retained; only 23 to 34% of PPP dollars went directly to workers who would otherwise have lost jobs, the balance to business owners and shareholders; about three-quarters of funds accrued to the top income quintile.	A +

In-work tax credits

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
I16 Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and refundable Child Tax Credit United States (federal) Ongoing; tax years 2023-2024 data Operating	Credits claimed on tax returns by low- to moderate-income workers and families; refundable portions exceeding tax owed are paid as refunds (EITC and Child Tax Credit). Average EITC \$2,894, tax year 2024.	Tax year 2024: about 24 million workers and families received about \$70B in EITC; tax year 2023: 23 million, \$64B. BEA federal refundable tax credits (all types): \$227.5B in 2024, \$248.4B in 2025.	Hoynes and Patel (NBER Working Paper 21340, 2015) , quasi-experimental variation by tax year and family size among single-mother families: a \$1,000 policy-induced EITC increase raised employment 7.3 percentage points and cut the share of families below 100 percent of poverty by 9.4 points; gains concentrate between 75 and 150 percent of poverty.	A w
I12 Working Families' Tax Credit (1999-2003), then Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit (2003-2025) United Kingdom 1999-2025 Ended	Means-tested credits paid by HMRC to low-income families, Working Tax Credit for those in work and Child Tax Credit for children; average annualised entitlement GBP 2,800 (2004-05) and GBP 9,200 (2024-25).	Families claiming: 5.0 million (2004-05), peak 6.2 million (2010-11), 199,000 (2024-25). Entitlement peaked around GBP 29 billion (2011-12, 2014-15); Working Tax Credit rose from GBP 4.1 billion to 8.1 billion (2005-2011).	Brewer, Duncan, Shephard and Suárez (Inland Revenue 2003) , structural labour-supply model on pre- and post-1999 data: WFTC raised lone mothers' participation about 4.6 percentage points and fathers' in couples 0.8, lowered mothers' in couples 0.2; about 94,000 more workers.	B +
I13 In-Work Tax Credit (Working for Families) New Zealand Ongoing (start year unverified) Operating (modified)	Working families with children (no hours test since July 2020) get up to NZ\$97 a week for 1-3 children, plus NZ\$780 a year per extra child; abated 27.5% above NZ\$44,900 family income.	Maximum raised temporarily from NZ\$97 to NZ\$147 a week from 1 April 2026, reverting after 31 March 2027, or earlier if petrol stays below NZ\$3 a litre for four weeks. Recipients (unverified).	Causal estimates of the In-Work Tax Credit (unverified).	C +

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
I30 Earned Income Tax Credit (Geunro Jangnyeogeum) and Child Tax Credit (Janyeo Jangnyeogeum) South Korea 2009-present (start years unverified) Operating	Tax-administered payments to working households with assets under KRW 240 million: EITC up to KRW 1.65 million single, 2.85 million one-earner, 3.3 million two-earner; CTC up to KRW 1 million per child (2025 income).	2025 income year: 4.74 million households, KRW 5.2335 trillion, down from 5.05 million and KRW 5.5 trillion (2023). Announced August 2026: EITC maximums rising to KRW 1.8-3.6 million (enactment unverified).	Administrative payment data only: payouts fell from KRW 5.5 trillion (2023 income) to KRW 5.2 trillion (2025 income) as wage and asset growth pushed households past the limits; 70.1 percent of EITC households in the August 2026 round were single-person (Korea Tax Times, August 2026).	C ⁺

Displacement insurance

Intervention	Mechanism and size	Scale and status	Evidence	Grade
I15 Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) for Workers, including wage insurance (ATAA 2002, RTAA 2009) United States 1974-2022 (Trade Act of 1974 version) Ended	Certified trade-displaced workers got training and other services; wage insurance paid re-employed workers aged 50+ (new wage under USD 50,000, later 55,000) half the wage loss, up to USD 10,000 (later 12,000) over two years.	No new petitions or certifications since 1 July 2022; workers separated by 30 June 2022 may still receive benefits; online petition system decommissioned 14 May 2025.	Hyman, Kovak and Leive (NBER 2024) , age-50 eligibility discontinuity in linked Census data: wage insurance raised employment 8-17 points for two years after displacement and 4-year earnings by USD 18,260 (+26.6%), with unchanged reemployment wages; self-financing through fiscal externalities.	A ⁺

ANALYSIS

What the evidence shows

Unconditional cash reduces paid work little when payments are modest, more when they are large or income-tested, and among older people and mothers when it comes as pensions or child benefits. It improves children's outcomes in most studies, is spent mostly on necessities, and in poor villages raises output more than prices. Its weak point is durability: transfers end or erode when budgets or governments change, while assets handed to households stay with them. The clearest evidence of dependence is disability-insurance receipt passing from parents to children; income-tested top-ups also reduce work.

Question	What the evidence shows	Key studies (rows)
Do unconditional transfers reduce paid work?	Little where payments are modest; more where they are large, income-tested or lottery-sized, and among older people and mothers receiving pensions or child benefits. Seven randomized government programs in six developing countries showed no systematic reduction. Iran's national transfer, worth 29% of median household income, reduced work only among youth. Alaska's dividend left employment unchanged and raised part-time work 1.8 points; Finland (6 more days employed) and Germany's EUR 1,200-a-month pilot (no withdrawal) found none. Larger rich-country payments did reduce work: the 1970s negative income tax experiments cut hours about 6% for husbands and 19% for wives (significant only in Seattle-Denver); participation in Dauphin, Manitoba fell 11.3 points; USD 1,000 a month in the OpenResearch trial cut participation 4.2 points and non-transfer income USD 1,900 a year; US lottery winners cut pre-tax earnings by about 50 cents per extra dollar of unearned income. Kenya's basic income shifted work from wages to self-employment without reducing it. Pensions and child benefits do reduce work among recipients: women's labour participation fell 10 points under Bolivia's Renta Dignidad, and mothers' 2-3 points under Poland's 500+.	Banerjee et al. 2015 ; Salehi-Isfahani and Mostafavi-Dehzoeei 2017 (A06); Jones and Marinescu 2022 (A01); Kangas et al. 2020 (F14); Bohmann et al. 2025 (F18); Hum and Simpson 1993 (F02); Calnitsky and Latner 2017 (F01); Vivalt et al. 2026 (F31); Golosov et al. 2024 ; Cesarini et al. 2017 ; Banerjee et al. 2023 (F05); Hernani-Limarino and Mena 2015 (D17); Magda, Kielczewska and Brandt 2018 (D04)
Does receiving benefits create dependence?	The clearest evidence comes from disability insurance and from income-tested top-ups. When Norwegian appeal judges granted a parent disability insurance, the adult child's own disability-insurance participation rose 6 points within five years and 12 points within ten. Seoul's Stepping Stone Income, which tops income up by half the gap to 85% of the median, lowered household heads' work participation by an average of 10.4 points over the three-year support period (year-3 evaluation presented by a Seoul National University researcher, December 2025). Italy's means-tested citizens' income cut recipients' earnings 10-11% in the Centre-North. Payments without a work test show little withdrawal when they are modest (Alaska), and childhood access to Food Stamps raised adult economic self-sufficiency, with a marginal value of public funds of about 56.	Dahl, Kostøl and Mogstad 2014 ; Seoul year-3 results, Dailian 2025 (F22); Dachille, De Paola and Nisticò 2025 (E03); Jones and Marinescu 2022 (A01); Hoynes, Schanzenbach and Almond 2016 ; Bailey et al. 2024
Do transfers improve children's long-run outcomes?	In most quasi-experiments, yes; not yet in the one large US trial of cash from birth. Sons of accepted Mothers' Pension applicants (1911-1935) lived a year longer and had one-third more schooling. Cherokee casino payments of about USD 4,000 a year added a year of schooling by age 21 and cut minor crime at 16-17 by 22%. USD 1,000 of EITC income cut low birth weight 2-3% and raised test scores 6% of a standard deviation. Indonesia's PKH cut stunting 23-27%. Baby's First Years (USD 333 a month from birth) found no effect on child development at age four.	Aizer et al. 2016 ; Akee et al. 2010 (A03); Hoynes, Miller and Simon 2015 ; Dahl and Lochner 2012 ; Cahyadi et al. 2020 (G05); Noble et al. 2025 (F32)

Question	What the evidence shows	Key studies (rows)
What do households spend transfers on?	Mostly necessities, and quickly when cash is short. Randomized timing of the 2001 and 2008 US rebates shows 12-40% spent on nondurables within three months, and about 10% of the 2020 payments, more by households with little liquid wealth; estimates for Japan's 2020 payment range from a marginal propensity to consume of 0.16 to 0.49. Across 44 estimates from 19 studies, transfers did not raise spending on alcohol or tobacco; of 25 studies with significant effects on food spending, 23 found increases.	Johnson, Parker and Souleles 2006 (H03); Parker et al. 2013 (H02); Parker, Schild, Erhard and Johnson 2022 (H01); Kubota, Onishi and Toyama 2021 and Kaneda, Kubota and Tanaka 2021 (H04); Evans and Popova 2014; Bastagli et al. 2016
Do large transfers raise local prices?	Not in poor villages with spare capacity: Kenyan transfers worth over 15% of local GDP produced a local multiplier of 2.4 and average inflation of 0.1%, and Kenya's basic income left nearby prices unchanged. Economy-wide inflation does erode transfers that are not indexed: Iran's transfer lost nearly half its real value within five years, and about 40% of its effect on poverty; by 2019 it was worth 3% of median income (A06).	Egger et al. 2022 (F06); Banerjee et al. 2023 (F05); Enami and Lustig 2018
Does one-time capital produce lasting income?	When it buys productive assets and comes with support, yes. Graduation programs (an asset transfer plus coaching) produced benefits of 1.3 to 4.3 times their cost in five of six countries, and in India consumption was 0.6 standard deviations higher after ten years. Unsupported grants can fade: Ugandan youth grants raised earnings 38% at four years and controls caught up by year nine, though men's income was again 22% higher at twelve years (borderline significant); Kenyan cash recipients still held 43% more assets after three years, but their consumption gains had gone. A meta-analysis of 115 studies finds positive average effects of unconditional transfers on assets as well as consumption.	Banerjee et al. 2015; Banerjee, Duflo and Sharma 2021 (F08); Blattman, Fiala and Martinez 2020 and Fiala et al. 2025 (F07); Haushofer and Shapiro 2016 (F06); Crosta et al. 2026 (F13)
Do child accounts and matched savings build wealth?	Automatic deposits do; voluntary matched saving does little. SEED for Oklahoma Kids gave treated newborns an account: USD 1,130 against USD 76 at 30 months, and the USD 1,000 deposit had almost doubled by 2019. The UK Child Trust Fund left eligible children about GBP 426 better off, with the largest gains in better-off families and little sign of a savings habit; 827,000 of 3.78 million matured accounts were unclaimed in April 2026. Matched Individual Development Accounts raised homeownership only temporarily (Tulsa) and left net worth unchanged (learn\$ave).	Sherraden et al. 2015 (B07); McKay, Tian and Lymer 2023 and HMRC 2026 (B01); Grinstein-Weiss et al. 2012 (B22); Leckie et al. 2010 (B23)
Does worker ownership raise household wealth and security?	It adds wealth without lowering pay and steadies jobs, though most evidence is observational. ESOP participants hold about double the retirement wealth of similar workers and report fewer layoffs; employee-owned listed firms had steadier employment and higher survival in the 2001-03 and 2008-09 recessions. France's mandatory profit-sharing, studied with a firm-size threshold, raised the labour share 1.8 points with no significant effect on investment or productivity. In a 2022 mapping of 323 Italian worker buyouts, about 71% had survived.	Blasi and Kruse 2025 (C01); Kurtulus and Kruse 2017; Nimier-David, Sraer and Thesmar 2025 (C09); Legacoop 2022 (C05)
Do transfers survive changes of budget or government?	Often not, or not at full value. The US monthly Child Tax Credit lapsed after 2021 and child poverty (SPM) rose from 5.2% to 12.4%. Mexico closed Prospera in 2019 after 22 years, and teenage boys' enrollment fell 12 points within six months. Ontario cancelled its pilot a year in; Italy abolished its citizens' income from 2024. Alaska's dividend survived but has been set by appropriation since 2016, below the statutory formula in the years documented (2016-17 and 2025). Iran's survived, but inflation halved its real value within five years and cut it to 3% of median income by 2019.	Census P60-280 (D01); Marquez-Padilla, Parker and Vogl 2025 (G02); Ferdosi et al. 2020 (F15); E03; PFD Division (A01); Enami and Lustig 2018; A06
How much of the world has any social protection?	Just over half the world's population is covered by at least one benefit. The ILO counts 3.8 billion people with no social protection at all; the World Bank counts 2 billion people in low- and middle-income countries uncovered or inadequately covered. No country pays an unconditional cash income to residents of all ages (section D).	ILO 2024; World Bank 2025

Evidence is thinnest where the ownership thesis needs it most. No causal study was found for most capital dividends (Macao, Kazakhstan, Osage headrights, ANCSA corporations), for the largest one-time wealth transfers (England's Right to Buy, Iran's Justice Shares), for Trump Accounts, or for the 2025-26 one-off payments in Japan and Taiwan. Of the 213 entries, 116 carry grade C evidence.

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Ownership versus transfers: mechanism map

The entries differ most in what the household ends up holding. An owned asset (an account, shares, land or a home) stays with the household when the program that created it ends. A per-capita claim on a fund or an earmarked levy lasts only as long as its payout rule, and a budget transfer or wage support only as long as the law and the budget behind it.

Figure 3. Only owned assets stay with the household when a program ends

What the household holds	Universal or categorical Everyone in a place or age group	Targeted or by membership By income, tenancy, job or tribe
Owned asset Title held by the household <i>Kept if the program ends</i>	UK Child Trust Fund (B01) Trump Accounts (B05) Hungary Start accounts (B35) Czech and Polish vouchers (C11) CPF, superannuation (B04, B10)	Land-to-the-tiller reforms (C13) Right to Buy, 2.05m homes (C12) Iran Justice Shares (C30) ESOPs, 15.1m participants (C01) Osage, ANCSA shares (A40, A02)
Claim on a fund or levy Per-capita share of income <i>Lasts while its rule holds</i>	Alaska PFD (A01) Kazakhstan child accounts (A11) Iran energy-subsidy cash (A06) Swiss CO2 levy refund (A14b)	Tribal gaming per-capita (A03) Maricá and Niterói (A10, A43)
Budget transfer Cash from general revenue <i>Lasts while legislated</i>	Child benefits (D02, D04, D20) Social pensions (D08, D10, D17) US 2021 Child Tax Credit (D01) One-off payments (H01, H04, H11)	Minimum incomes (E02, E06) Conditional cash (G01, G05) Cash for women in India (E09) Pilots and trials (section F)
Wage support Pay or tax credit for work <i>Lasts while legislated</i>	Employment guarantees (I01, I05) Job retention (I07, I08)	In-work tax credits (I16, I12) Wage insurance (I15)

Main mechanisms by what the household holds and who is eligible; entry IDs in parentheses.

Only the top row passes title to the household. In the second row the asset stays with a public fund, a levy or a tribal enterprise and the household holds a claim on its income; in the bottom two, payments depend on the law and the budget each year.

How each mechanism works

Mechanism (example rows)	What the household holds	Who pays	If the program ends	Work condition	Main measured result
Child accounts and baby bonds (B01, B05, B06, B07, B35)	An invested account in the child's name, usable from 18	Government deposit at birth, plus family top-ups	Deposits already made stay with the child: 2.9 million UK accounts opened before 2011 were still open in April 2026	None	SEED OK: USD 1,130 in assets against USD 76 at 30 months (B07)
Mandatory and auto-enrolment retirement accounts (B04, B10, B11, B14)	An account balance, mostly locked until retirement	Worker and employer contributions from wages	Balances stay with members	Contributions come from earnings	No causal estimate in this document
Employee ownership and profit-sharing (C01, C03, C09)	Shares in the employer, or profit-share payouts	Firm profits, with tax incentives	Shares stay owned, but their value rides on one firm	Tied to the job	Employee-owned listed firms had steadier employment in recessions; French profit-sharing raised the labour share 1.8 points (C09)
One-time distribution of shares, land or homes (C11, C12, C13, C30)	Title to shares, land or a home	State assets, given away or sold at a discount	Title stays with the household	None	Korean land reform: rice yields about 5% higher per 10 points of prior tenancy (C13)
Membership dividends (A40, A02, A03)	A heritable headright, corporate shares or tribal membership	Mineral royalties, corporate profits or gaming revenue	Lasts while the asset earns and membership rules hold	None	Cherokee casino payments: a year more schooling by 21, minor crime down 22% (A03)
Citizen dividend from a public fund (A01, A11)	A yearly per-capita payment; in Kazakhstan, credits to a child's account	Fund investment income	Payments depend on the payout rule; Alaska's has been set by appropriation since 2016	None	Alaska: employment unchanged, part-time work up 1.8 points (A01)
Energy-price and carbon dividends (A06, A14, A14b, A14c)	Cash (Switzerland: a credit against health-insurance premiums)	Energy-price reform or carbon-levy revenue	Canada's ended with the fuel charge in 2025 and Austria's by amendment after 2024; Iran's continues, eroded by inflation	None	Iran: no fall in labor supply except among youth (A06)
Universal child benefits and social pensions (D02, D04, D08, D17)	Cash	General revenue	Lasts while legislated; the US 2021 monthly credit lapsed after six months of payments	None; a few withdraw at high incomes	US 2021 credit: no significant employment effect (D01); Poland's 500+: mothers' participation down 2-3 points (D04)
Means-tested minimum incomes (E02, E03, E06)	A cash top-up to a floor	General revenue	Lasts while legislated; Italy's citizens' income was abolished in 2024	Benefit withdrawn as earnings rise; work-search rules	Italy: earnings down 10-11% in the Centre-North (E03); Seoul: household heads' work participation down 10.4 points (F22)
Conditional cash transfers (G01, G02, G05)	Cash	General revenue	Can be closed: Prospera ended in 2019	Conditions on children's schooling and health, not on work	PKH: wage work at ages 13-15 down at least a third (G05)
One-off payments (H01, H04)	A lump sum	General revenue or borrowing	One-off by design	None	12-40% of the 2001 and 2008 US rebates spent on nondurables within three months (H02, H03)

Mechanism (example rows)	What the household holds	Who pays	If the program ends	Work condition	Main measured result
Wage-adjacent supports (I01, I05, I16)	Wages, wage subsidies or earnings credits	General revenue	Lasts while legislated; MGNREGA was replaced in 2026	Requires work	Marienthal: employment up 46 points (I05); EITC: single mothers' employment up 7.3 points per USD 1,000 (I16)

What ended, and what households kept

Program (row)	What happened	What households kept
Mincome, Manitoba (F01)	Federal and provincial governments declined to continue it in 1979	Nothing
Swedish wage-earner funds (C08)	Abolished by a 1991 government bill; liquidated by mid-1994	Nothing: the funds held shares collectively, with no individual claims
Mongolia Human Development Fund (A05)	Universal monthly cash stopped after the 2012 elections; its debt moved to the Future Heritage Fund	Erdenes Tavan Tolgoi shares issued in 2011, 536 per citizen; dividends reached 1.08 million holders in 2020
UK Child Trust Fund (B01)	Closed to children born after 2 January 2011	Accounts already opened: 2.9 million still open in April 2026; matured accounts claimed in 2025-26 averaged GBP 3,596
Ontario Basic Income Pilot (F15)	Cancelled by the government elected in 2018, about a year in	Nothing
Prospera, Mexico (G02)	Closed in 2019 after 22 years	Nothing; teenage boys' enrollment fell 12 points within six months
US expanded Child Tax Credit (D01)	Monthly payments ended after December 2021	Nothing; child poverty (SPM) rose from 5.2% in 2021 to 12.4% in 2022
Italy's Reddito di Cittadinanza (E03)	Abolished from 1 January 2024 and replaced by narrower schemes (E14)	Nothing
Canada Carbon Rebate (A14) and Austria Klimabonus (A14c)	Ended with the fuel charge in April 2025 (Canada) and by amendment after 2024 (Austria)	Nothing
MGNREGA, India (I01)	Repealed on 1 July 2026 and replaced by a 125-day guarantee with 60:40 Centre-state cost sharing	The successor guarantee
Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend (A01)	Continues, but set by appropriation since 2016: USD 1,000 in 2025 against about USD 3,900 under the formula	A smaller yearly payment; the fund stays public
Iran's universal cash transfer (A06)	Continues; its real value roughly halved within five years (Enami and Lustig 2018), and by 2019 it was worth 3% of median income	A cash payment worth a small fraction of its launch value, now topped up with food e-vouchers
Right to Buy, England (C12)	Discounts cut sharply in November 2024	2,052,813 homes bought by tenants by March 2026
Land-to-the-tiller reforms (C13)	One-time reforms, 1946-1953	Land titles: tenanted farmland fell from 45.9% to 9.9% in Japan and from 41% to 10% in Taiwan
US Homestead Acts (C18)	Ended in 1976 (1986 in Alaska)	About 270 million acres, a tenth of US land
Iran's Justice Shares (C30)	Untradable until 2020, with few dividends	Tradable shares for 49 million holders since 2020

When a transfer or a collectively held fund ended, households kept nothing; when title had passed to households, the asset outlived the program and the governments that created it. Ownership does not guarantee value, though: Alaska's regional Native corporations lost 80% of their original cash endowment in business operations in 1973-1993 (A02), Polish investment-fund firms underperformed direct sales (C11), and Justice Shares paid little before 2020 (C30).

Four patterns in the record bear on avoiding transfer dependence:

1. Payment size matters as much as design: modest unconditional payments show the smallest work effects (Alaska, Kenya, Finland); large unconditional payments (OpenResearch) and income-tested top-ups (Seoul, Italy) show larger ones; and parents' disability-insurance receipt raises their children's take-up (Norway).
2. Automatic deposits reach every eligible child, while few families open accounts on their own (2.4% of SEED OK control children had one at 30 months); voluntary matched saving built little lasting wealth (Tulsa, learn\$ave).
3. Transfers that are not indexed lose value (Iran's halved in real terms within five years), and amounts set by appropriation can be cut (Alaska's dividend was set below its formula in 2016-17 and 2025).
4. Individual title survives repeal: UK Child Trust Fund accounts outlived the scheme's closure, while Sweden's collectively held funds were wound up.

REFERENCE

Excluded

Proposals, bills, laws that have not paid out, and pilots that never started are kept out of sections A to I. Each is listed once here with the reason and the nearest operating precedent. The white paper's own proposals come first.

Proposal or measure	Why it is excluded	Nearest operating precedent	Source
Federal Sovereign Fund paying 3.5% of its opening balance a year in equal shares to every adult (white paper, channel 1)	Proposal; no national fund pays every adult a dividend	Alaska PFD (A01); Norway's fund pays the budget (A15)	White paper v02
In-kind equity levy: firms above a size threshold issue 1.5% of their equity a year to the fund (white paper); Altman's American Equity Fund, 2.5% of market value a year paid in shares (2021)	Proposals; no in-kind share levy has operated at national scale, as the white paper itself notes	Sweden's wage-earner funds bought listed shares with cash levies, 1984-1991 (C08)	Altman 2021
Land value tax of 2.5% a year paid to a public fund (Altman 2021)	Proposal	State land-grant and permanent funds that pay budgets (A16)	Altman 2021
Citizen Capital Accounts: USD 20,000 seed at birth plus an annual public deposit for every adult (white paper, channel 6)	Proposal	Trump Accounts, USD 1,000 seed (B05); Connecticut Baby Bonds, USD 3,200 (B06); UK Child Trust Fund (B01)	White paper v02
AI-enterprise trust statute with a resident beneficiary class (white paper, channel 5)	Proposal; no such legal form exists	Employee ownership trusts (C02, C03)	White paper v02
Legal wrapper for DAOs so that on-chain governance creates enforceable ownership (white paper, channel 5)	Proposal; this review found no DAO paying household-scale income	Worker cooperatives (C19)	White paper v02
Guaranteed-income floor indexed to GDP per adult and to measured wage displacement (white paper, channel 4)	Proposal; no national floor is indexed this way	Pilots (section F); Alaska's dividend formula, overridden by appropriation since 2016 (A01)	White paper v02
State and local fund enabling acts with a federal match (white paper, channels 2-3)	Proposal	State and municipal funds that pay budgets, not residents (A16, A16b)	White paper v02
Alaska 2026 dividend of USD 3,800 proposed by the governor (December 2025)	Proposal; the legislature agreed USD 1,000 plus a USD 200 energy rebate for 2026	Alaska PFD (A01)	Alaska Beacon
Alaska 2025 formula dividend of about USD 3,900 proposed by the governor	Proposal; the 2025 dividend was set at USD 1,000	Alaska PFD (A01)	Alaska Beacon
Alaska state municipal dividend program (HB 28, 2005)	Bill to pay municipalities, not residents, USD 250 per resident (minimum USD 40,000 each) from Permanent Fund earnings; enactment unverified	Alaska PFD (A01); Alaska municipal funds, which pay budgets (A16b)	Alaska Legislature
Rhode Island Baby Bonds (USD 3,000 trust per child)	A 2025 law created the framework for a USD 3,000 trust per newborn in an RI Works family, but nothing has been appropriated or deposited; bill S2843 would fund about 150 children a year from unclaimed property from 1 July 2027	Connecticut Baby Bonds (B06)	RI General Treasurer

Proposal or measure	Why it is excluded	Nearest operating precedent	Source
American Opportunity Accounts Act (Booker-Pressley baby bonds)	Bill, not enacted: USD 1,000 at birth plus up to USD 2,000 a year, about USD 46,000 by 18 for children below the poverty line; first introduced in 2018	Connecticut Baby Bonds (B06)	Rep. Pressley
Meidner plan (1975): firms issue new shares worth 20% of profits to union-selected funds	Proposal; the 1983 law enacted cash-levy funds that bought listed shares instead	Swedish wage-earner funds (C08)	nordics.info
England mandatory community benefits and shared ownership for low-carbon energy	Consultation working paper (May 2025, updated March 2026); no mandatory scheme in force	England's voluntary onshore-wind benchmark and German local-equity rules (C15)	GOV.UK
SECURE 2.0 Section 1042 deferral for S-corporation ESOP sales (10% of gain)	Enacted in 2022 but effective in 2028, so no sale has used it	US ESOPs (C01)	NCEO
France 2026 employee-savings bill (one-off withdrawals up to EUR 5,000)	Adopted with amendments by the Senate Social Affairs Committee on 1 April 2026; enactment not confirmed	French profit-sharing and employee savings (C09)	Sénat
England Right to Buy reforms announced in 2025	Announced changes to an operating scheme (qualifying period 3 to 10 years, new-build exemption, 30-year cost floor); in-force date not stated as of September 2026	Right to Buy as it operates (C12)	Commons Library
South Korea full rural basic income rollout with 80% national funding	Party proposal reported in August 2026; not enacted	Rural Basic Income pilot (E19)	Nocut News
Namibia national Basic Income Grant law	Promised after the Otjivero pilot; no law enacted as of October 2020, and expansion was dropped after the 2014 elections	Otjivero-Omitara pilot (F03)	The Namibian
Regional basic income for Central America (ECLAC, 2010)	Policy proposal with cost estimates; no payments	None in this document	CEPAL
Brazil Citizen's Basic Income law (Lei 10.835, 2004)	Creates a right to a universal basic income reached in stages at the Executive's discretion; universal payments not implemented (unverified)	Bolsa Família (G01); Maricá (A10)	Planalto
Jarrow and East Finchley basic income pilot (England)	Proposed in June 2023 (30 participants, GBP 1,600 a month for two years); funding not secured (London Assembly, September 2025)	Wales care leavers pilot (F20)	London Assembly
Camden basic income pilot for care-experienced young people (London)	Still being designed with Camden Council in September 2025; no payments	Wales care leavers pilot (F20)	London Assembly
London-wide basic income pilot	London Assembly review (September 2025) made no formal recommendation; the Mayor said the cost is beyond the Greater London Authority	None in this document	London Assembly
Los Angeles STAY SAFE guaranteed income program	Advanced by the City Council in August 2025 with USD 2 million for about 83 people at USD 1,000 a month; payments not confirmed	BIG:LEAP (F36)	Spectrum News
Cook County permanent guaranteed income program (FY2026)	USD 7.5 million approved in November 2025; households, eligibility and start date still being designed; no payments confirmed	Cook County Promise pilot (F34)	Fox 32
Bill to make Territoires zéro chômeur de longue durée permanent (France)	Pending: adopted at first reading by the Assemblée nationale (27 January 2026) and the Sénat (9 June 2026); in second reading as of 19 September 2026	The running TZCLD experiment (I06)	Sénat

REFERENCE

Sources, verification and white-paper cross-check

Every row rests on official statistics, program documents or research papers, supplemented by press reports where those were unavailable, all linked in the row. Each row was compiled in a first research pass and re-checked claim by claim in a second, independent pass; figures that changed were corrected in place, and any detail that could not be confirmed on an opened page is marked (unverified). 96 of the 213 rows still carry at least one such detail, usually a start year, a total cost or a recipient count. Notable corrections on re-check: the OpenResearch employment paper was revised in August 2026 (participation down 4.2 points rather than 2.0); Alaska's 2025 GDP is USD 73.6 billion, not USD 75 billion; England's Right to Buy total is MHCLG's 2,052,813 sales; and the EITC moved from the transfer families to row I16. National-accounts figures follow BEA's 2026 annual update (FRED series updated 30 September 2026), which revised every 2023-2025 value the white paper took from April-May 2026 vintages. A third pass re-confirmed the details six capital rows had carried over (C02, C04, C05, C08, C13, C20), and an independent audit checked every figure in the summary sections against the rows.

White-paper cross-check: programs and funds

White-paper claim	Finding	Current figure and source
Alaska Permanent Fund USD 85.1B, 1.1x state GDP of USD 75B (Table 1-4)	Fund confirmed; ratio differs slightly	USD 85.1B at 30 June 2025 and USD 91.9B at 30 June 2026 (APFC); 2025 state GDP USD 73.6B (BEA via FRED), a ratio of 1.16 (1.25 at the 2026 value)
PFD USD 1,000 (2025) and USD 1,702 (2024); 5% draw	Confirmed	PFD Division ; 5% of average market value over five of the preceding six years, AS 37.13.140(b) (APFC); the draw also pays for state services
Dividend "cut by the legislature in most years since 2016"	Understated	Set by appropriation every year since 2016; 2025 paid USD 1,000 against about USD 3,900 under the statutory formula (Alaska Beacon); 2026 pays USD 1,200 including USD 200 energy relief (A01)
"A handful of Alaska boroughs pay a municipal dividend"	Not supported	The Anchorage, North Slope and Valdez funds pay municipal budgets, as the white paper's own Table 1-4 says ("Local budgets"); no resident dividend was found (A16b)
Anchorage MOA Trust USD 483M, 4% draw	Confirmed	USD 483.2M at 31 December 2025, payout 4.00% since March 2022 (MOA Trust Board)
North Slope Borough fund about USD 1B	Differs	USD 1.25B at 30 June 2025 (NSB)
Valdez fund about USD 300M, founded on a pipeline fee	Origin confirmed; value differs	USD 340.1M at 30 June 2026 (City of Valdez)
Texas PSF USD 60.6B; PUF USD 44.5B	PSF partly confirmed; PUF unverified	"Over USD 60 billion", undated (Texas PSF)
New Mexico funds about USD 75B	Differs	USD 61.2B in the three State Investment Council permanent funds at 31 December 2025; USD 100.3B including pensions (LFC)
Wyoming PWMTF USD 12.4B	Differs	USD 13.1B at 28 February 2026 (Wyoming State Treasurer)
North Dakota Legacy Fund USD 15B; state funds about USD 300B in all	Unverified	The verified funds (Alaska, Texas PSF, New Mexico, Wyoming) sum to about USD 226B
Norway's fund USD 2.39T	Unverified	NBIM reports NOK 22,683 billion at 30 June 2026 and gives no USD value (NBIM)

White-paper claim	Finding	Current figure and source
Norway's fund 4.5x GDP	Differs	4.1x 2025 GDP and 5.2x mainland GDP (SSB); the government says "almost four times" (norskpetroleum.no)
4.5% real return since 1998; fiscal rule cut from 4% to 3% in 2017	Confirmed	4.50% a year net to 30 June 2026 (NBIM); Ministry of Finance
Petroleum inflows averaging 8-12% of GDP (Part 3); Norway saved 3-12% of GDP a year (Tables 4-2 and A-2)	Unverified	Cumulative net inflows to the fund NOK 5,509 billion at 30 June 2026 (NBIM)
ESOPs: 6,609 plans, 15.1M participants (10.9M active), USD 2.06T, USD 166B paid out (2023)	Confirmed	Plan year 2023 (NCEO)
5.6% of adults are ESOP participants	Arithmetic correct, broad base	The 15.1M include about 4.2M retirees and separated workers; active participants are 4.0% of adults
Collectively owned assets 6.7% of GDP	ESOP assets only	USD 2.06T (2023) over 2025 GDP; excludes cooperatives, EOTs and credit unions
About 32 US employee ownership trusts	Dated	A November 2022 count (Mark Hand, reported by NCEO); no 2025-26 count published
2.3 million boomer-owned firms change hands in the coming decade	Differs	2.34 million is the stock of boomer-owned firms; six in ten owners plan to sell within a decade (Chicago Fed)
UK EOT sector up 1,640% in a decade (Table 1-4); EOTs up 16x (Table 4-2)	Differs in scope; the two figures disagree	1,640% (17.4x) covers all employee-owned businesses, 2014-2025 (EO Australia); Employee Ownership Association counts imply about 21x (135 in 2014, about 2,824 in March 2026) (C03)
Mondragón's share of the Basque economy as a comparator	Not supported	No GDP or equity share is published; Mondragón's industrial area held 9.3% of Basque industrial employment in 2019 (Tulankide)
About 1,300 US worker cooperatives (16,000 workers)	Confirmed as an estimate	820 firms and 13,520 workers directly identified (C19)
Trump Accounts: USD 1,000 seed for 2025-28 births, 4M enrolled, contributions from July 2026	Confirmed	6M+ sign-ups by 22 July 2026; 60M+ further accounts auto-created on 1 October 2026 (Treasury)
Trump Accounts: "newborn cohorts; first payouts 2043+"	Differs in part	Accounts exist for children of all ages, so older holders reach 18 well before 2043; only the seed is limited to 2025-28 births (B05)
Connecticut Baby Bonds USD 3,200, 33,000 children	Confirmed	CT Treasurer
Rhode Island USD 3,000 (2025)	Differs	A framework law with no appropriation; listed under Excluded
UK Child Trust Fund mean matured balance GBP 3,203; 25% unclaimed	Mean confirmed for 2024-25; 25% matches the NAO's 2022 estimate	GBP 3,596 in 2025-26; 827,000 of 3.78 million matured accounts (22%) unclaimed in April 2026 (HMRC)
100+ city guaranteed-income pilots	Confirmed as a national count	More than 100 launched since 2018 (Urban Institute); 160 announced since 2017 (Economic Security Project)
"No national universal program anywhere" (Table 4-2)	Holds only for all-age programs	Mexico pays every national aged 65+ (13.7 million) as a constitutional right (D08); section D lists other age-universal programs
England onshore-wind community benefit benchmark GBP 5,000 per MW a year	Confirmed; voluntary	DESNZ guidance of July 2025, not legally required (C15)
Altman (2021): 2.5% of company market value a year in shares; 2.5% land value tax	Confirmed	Moore's Law for Everything

White-paper cross-check: national accounts and other figures

White-paper claim	Finding	Current figure and source
Personal income 2025 USD 26,100B (Table 1-1)	Revised	USD 26,327.6B (FRED); Table 1-1 omits about USD 89B of other transfer receipts, so its lines cannot sum to BEA's total
Personal interest income USD 1,968B	Revised	USD 2,389.6B, the largest change (FRED)
Dividends USD 2,248B; proprietors' income USD 2,109B; rental income USD 1,115B	Revised	USD 2,151.0B (FRED); USD 2,017.0B (FRED); USD 1,139.8B (FRED)
Wages USD 12,959B; supplements USD 2,768B	Revised slightly	USD 12,976.3B (FRED); USD 2,719.9B (FRED)
Government social benefits USD 4.95T	Differs for calendar 2025	USD 4,824.5B (FRED); USD 4.94-4.99T is the annualized monthly rate for December 2025 to March 2026
Capital income USD 5.3T, 17% of GDP	Revised	USD 5.68T, 18.4% of GDP; it includes imputed owner-occupied rent, which is not cash
Nominal GDP 2025 USD 30,762B	Revised	USD 30,861.3B (FRED); per-adult and share-of-GDP figures shift about 0.3%
Compensation 51.5% of GDI	Differs	50.9% in 2025; 51.5% is the 2023 value (FRED)
Labor share down from about 65% postwar	Differs	The compensation share of GDI peaked at 58.4% in 1970; 65% comes from a different measure (FRED)
Corporate profits after tax 11.4% of GDP	Confirmed	USD 3,528.6B in 2025 (FRED)
Social Security USD 1.60T (Table 1-4) and USD 1.57T (section 1.1)	Both defensible; label them	USD 1,608.9B is 2025 OASDI total cost (2026 Trustees Report, via CRS); benefits paid were USD 1,570.0B (FRED); 70.6M beneficiaries in January 2026
Medicare USD 1.22T; Medicaid USD 1.01T; veterans USD 0.29T	Revised	USD 1,199.6B; USD 1,024.0B; USD 260.5B (BEA 2025, row E01)
Refundable credits USD 225B	Confirmed as CBO's FY2025 outlays	Includes premium tax credits paid to insurers (CBO); BEA: USD 227.5B (2024) and USD 248.4B (2025) (FRED)
SNAP USD 102B to 42M; SSI USD 65B; cash and near-cash transfers about USD 2.3T	Confirmed	SNAP FY2025 USD 102.6B, about 42.1M a month; SSI USD 65.0B; a derived total of USD 2.28T (row E01)
Census 2024 median household income USD 83,730	Confirmed; a newer figure exists	2025: USD 87,460 (Census P60-289)
Census mean about USD 121,000; CBO middle quintile about USD 86,000	Unverified	Census summaries give medians only; CBO's quintile values are in its Excel file (CBO)
Top 1% hold 50% and next 9% hold 37% of corporate equities and mutual funds	Confirmed	50.6% and 37.3% in Q1 2026 (FRED , FRED)
Bottom half holds 1.1% of corporate equities and mutual funds	Differs	0.6% in every quarter since Q1 2025 (FRED)
Bottom half holds 2.5% of net worth	Differs	2.4% in Q1 2026, 2.3% in Q2 2026 (FRED)
Household net worth USD 183T	Confirmed	USD 183.07T in Q1 2026; USD 195.87T in Q2 2026 (FRED)
Retirement assets USD 49.1T (IRAs USD 19.2T, DC plans USD 14.2T)	End-2025 values	USD 51.2T, IRAs USD 19.9T and DC plans USD 15.0T at 30 June 2026 (ICI)
About three-quarters of households have a retirement account	Depends on the definition	ICI's "nearly three-quarters" counts defined-benefit coverage (ICI); 54.3% of families held retirement accounts in the 2022 Survey of Consumer Finances (Federal Reserve)
CBO: a 5% VAT raises about USD 350B a year	Confirmed	An average of USD 338B a year over 2025-2034 (CBO); the paper's 10% figure doubles this rather than citing a CBO score

White-paper claim	Finding	Current figure and source
CBO: taxing gains at death raises about USD 47B a year	Differs	An average of USD 53.6B a year, USD 536.1B over 2025-2034 (CBO)
US government revenue about 27% and spending about 33% of GDP	Differs	28.5% and 36.0% in 2025 (FRED , FRED); on this measure each public-claim figure in the paper rises about 3.5 points of GDP
Denmark and France collect 42-46% of GDP	Confirmed	Tax-to-GDP 45.2% and 43.5% in 2024 (OECD)
Adults 269.8 million; births 3.629 million	Confirmed	Census ; CDC
The median household gets about 88% of cash income from wages (87% in Tables 1-2 and 2-2)	Use one figure	87.2% from wages; 88.1% only if ESOP and co-op distributions count as earned income
Musk, April 2026: "Universal HIGH INCOME via checks issued by the Federal government"	Confirmed	Fox Business , 17 April 2026; a follow-up post implies money-financed checks
Imas and Madarász, Review of Economic Studies (2024)	Citation confirmed; "roughly doubles" unverified	RES 91(4): 2347-2386 (IDEAS)

Open items

- Norway: state the currency, date and exchange rate behind USD 2.39 trillion, and source the inflow and saving ranges.
- Balances of the Texas Permanent University Fund and North Dakota's Legacy Fund, and the total for state funds.
- Census mean household income and CBO's middle-quintile income, from Census Table A-2 and CBO's Excel file.
- UK employee-ownership growth: one figure with its scope stated.
- The details marked (unverified) in 96 rows of sections A to I.